Display at Empire's End: Korea's Participation in the 1900 Paris Universal Exposition¹

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Abstract:

In 1900 the recently established empire of Korea (Taehan cheguk) participated in the Paris Universal Exposition (Exposition Universelle de Paris) of 1900, the second and final time Korea attended a world's fair as a unified and independent nation. Though a cursory look at the Korean pavilion and delegation would seem to indicate active and independent Korean involvement, in actuality Korean participation hinged on active French efforts, in particular those of the French consul in Korea Victor Collin de Plancy. French interest in turn was related to aspirations for various concessions in Korea. This paper examines the dynamics behind Korean participation in the Paris Universal Exposition of 1900 as well as period reactions to and attitudes towards Korea and its Paris display.

Keywords: Korean-French relations, universal exposition, Kojong, Collin de Plancy, Sino-Japanese war

Introduction

Alluding to the decade separating the Tonghak Uprising and Sino-Japanese War from the Japanese imposed protectorship of 1905, one historian has written that, “During these years Korea’s condition was akin to a boat cast upon a turbulent sea.”¹⁰ Vivid though the imagery may be, I believe it somewhat misleading to portray the period and place as a “turbulent sea.” The murder of Queen Min in 1895, and the subsequent flight of King Kojong to the welcoming walls of the Russian legation, tend to skew our view of the era by their drama. In their capacity as vivid anecdote they have endured when more mundane, but nonetheless important, details have faded. So is it often with history.

In actuality, Korea, or the Empire of Great Han (Taehan cheguk) as it was known after 1897, enjoyed in the decade or so preceding Japanese protectorship a relative peace and independence. Though the upper echelons of government in this period may have been rife with partisan intrigue, though leadership lacked direction or conviction and foreign powers clamored for concessions, the years separating Japan’s defeat of China (1895) from Japan’s defeat of Russia (1905) was an interim of relative peace and haphazard modernization for
Korea. In this sense, the decade is perhaps better characterized as the eye of a storm rather than its fury. These years were, after all, the era of the Independence Club and the burgeoning of a popular press, of the development of national infrastructure and industry, and of modernizing reforms in government. Until the failure of the last concerted Korean effort towards reform, that initiated by the Independence Club in 1897-1898, it still seemed as if Korea might navigate this period with its national integrity intact. Despite that fin de siècle gloom that in hindsight often shades the time and place, I believe these were years primarily of hope and not despair for Korea. 1897 saw Korea's symbolic shedding of its title as kingdom - that is, satellite of China - to assume the title of empire, with all the symbolic independence such an act connoted in Asia.

Having said this, although Korea enjoyed relative autonomy during this decade, the term "maneuverability" might serve better. As one foreign observer ironically noted, "Korea is in fact a microcosm of the great world of the East. One progressive Power could take her and govern her, and make a country of her in a few years. But no Power can act independently in the East without arousing the jealousy and hatred of several others. So four or five Powers are pecking greedily at Korea, squabbling over each mouthful, and confirming her in her independence and consequent ruin." It is within this context of international rivalry and independent initiative that the following story must be told.

Halfway between the Chinese and Russian defeats at the hands of Japan, Korea participated in a great "universal exposition" held in Paris as a paean to le modernism in all realms as well as a showcase of national riches. This was not Korea's first such participation in a world's fair; it had sent a small delegation to the World's Columbian Exposition of 1893 in Chicago. Going further back, there was actually a Korean "table" (through no official Korean involvement) at the World's Columbian Exposition of 1893 in Chicago. Going further back, there was actually a Korean "table" (through no official Korean involvement) at the 1889 Paris Universal Exposition, organized through the efforts of Emile Guimet (1836-1918), the French amateur art collector and orientalist. U pon cursory observation, Korean participation at Paris seems to stand in dramatic contrast to Chicago. Here was no meager kitsch stand housing the "crude productions of the Korean skill or rather dullness" relegated to an insignificant corner of an engulfing warehouse. At Paris Korea boasted a grand pavilion worthy of a rich and proud nation, built just off the Champs de Mars, that great gaudy expanse that first gave birth to the notion of an international fair, and since the 1889 fair dominated by the Eiffel Tower. Rather than "a bunch of junk", as the Korean display at Chicago was once dubbed 4, were displayed masterpieces of Koryo silk painting and noteworthy examples of early Korean print technology, including a sixteenth century edition of the Samguk sagi, not to mention the oldest moveable metal-type printed book known to man in the fourteenth century Chikji simgyöng.5

But appearances are deceiving. Though Korean organization and commitment to the Paris Fair seemed to rival the interest expressed by Japan, which had been using the forum of the fairs to their utmost advantage for the past half-century, this was not the case. Despite the relative paucity of the Korean participation at Chicago, one could at least fairly call it a heartfelt "Korean" effort to engage itself with the international community. Korea, "richer in goodwill than in money", as a French consul once put it, had given its humble best at Chicago. Despite originally sincere intentions, Korea's participation at the Paris Universal Exposition, however, was more than anything the result of French efforts and French money. But to better understand Korean participation at the 1900 Universal Exposition we should first step back to examine the international rivalries at play in Korea at the end of the nineteenth century.

Rivalries at Work

Whatever the hopes of her politicians and generals, Japan's decisive defeat of China in the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895) did not pave the way for unrivaled Japanese dominance on the peninsula. The alarm with which China's defeat was met among western nations assured this. Regardless of its weakness vis à vis the west, China was still regarded by those nations as an entity of great power - great in the way that only massive states can be. Japan's ample defeat of China, as chronicled so thoroughly in a fascinated western press, came as a shock. It is from this time, in fact, that Japanese intentions began to be truly questioned, and Japan taken as a rival to be by turns respected and feared, but in any case reckoned with.

4 My special thanks to the Center for Korean Studies, University of Hawai'i and the Northeast Asia Council of the Association for Asian Studies for their generous support of research both in the United States and France.
5 Yun Ch'i-ho, 1974: 24 September 1893.
6 Cockerill, 1895:7.
7 Around the rightful ownership of which a debate still rages.
However, Japan did not reap the benefits from it might have from its war with China. Reports of a massacre of Chinese civilians by Japanese soldiers at Port Arthur in November 1894 served even before the war was over to tarnish Japan's image among the major powers. Its misstep (to risk an understatement) in the murder of Queen Min in December 1895 was a more serious blow. It resulted not only in King Kojong's burned flight to the Russian legation (and for a year thereafter under the sway of Russian influence), but had the domino effect of arousing the interests of other western nations concerning Korea (who, stowed in European history, feared Russia more than Japan). Japan's retrocession of the Liaodong Peninsula following the "Triple Intervention" of Russia, France, and Germany was another blow to the ostensible Japanese victory. And in a final ironic twist, its very indemnity levied against China worked against Japan, for it would be a Franco-Russian loan that would float it, and with it strengthen the influence of France and Russia in China and the region, at the expense of Japan.

There was another way in which the Japanese victory over China only worked to hamper its influence on the peninsula. For better or worse, China's defeat meant for Korea a new, if short-lived, era of recognized independence unencumbered by Chinese aspirations or meddling. The impetus this gave to domestic reform and modernizing initiatives was great. Korea became in the years after 1895 a potentially lucrative market for foreign interests seeking to build railways, telegraphs, and electric plants, to supply steamships and develop a Korean postal system, to modernize industry or to establish schools, to manufacture arms or train a modern army, to dig mines and set up foundries, and the list goes on. Here the political and commercial interests of rival nations crossed - in the late nineteenth century one as important as the other. As demonstration of this new marriage of means, more than one foreign representative was dismissed for his lack of skill in procuring national concessions. Such was the fate of the British Minister to China, Sir Nicholas O'Connor, who was recalled in 1896 - and with it strengthened the influence of France and Russia in China and the region, at the expense of Japan.

No wonder it was said that a stranger could not arrive in Seoul without ruffling all the ministerial dove-cots.

Having set the general stage of the period, we should now look at French involvement on the Korean peninsula in the years leading up to the Exposition of 1900.

French Interests in Korea

Following the dismally conceived 1866 French attack on Korea, and the severe check it administered to French prestige in the region, France remained relatively aloof from affairs on the Korean peninsula. The dreary fortunes of France in the years that immediately followed - their humiliating defeat in the Franco-Prussian War and the fall of the Second Empire - further isolated the country from events in the Far East. It was not until 1887 that France of the Third Republic got around to establishing diplomatic relations with Korea, even then sending only a junior consul named Victor Collin de Plancy from his post in Shanghai to Seoul to sign the necessary paperwork and exchange formalities.

It would be nearly another year before Collin de Plancy would return, now officially appointed the first French consul to Korea. Except for a posting to Japan from 1892-96 and a short aberration in Algeria, Collin de Plancy would serve as
chief French diplomat in Korea until 1906.
French commercial interests lagged even further behind. French industry had never had a particularly strong showing abroad, in Korea or elsewhere. One scholar has pointed to a major reason for this lack of overseas success: French industry tended to focus on the production of high-value items of superior quality and price, more often made by craftsmen in small workshops than in large factories by cheap, unskilled labor. In short, French industry could not compete in large overseas markets where the cheap textiles of Britain excelled.

French interests in Asia, as elsewhere in the world, had been for long years chiefly religious in nature, protecting (albeit reluctantly at times) the rights of Catholic clergy and laity to proselytize and worship unmolested. But even here they were checked by their failed 1866 attack on Korea and the Tianjin Massacre of 1870. Further, French involvement in Indochina and its war with China in 1883-1885 were more than enough to occupy its attentions. The 1889 failure of the French bank Comptoir d’Escompte, which had a branch in Tianjin (in which Li Hung-chang had unfortunately placed his funds), seemed to bring French fortunes in the Far East to their nadir. So lacking was French commercial representation in Korea in 1889 that an inquiry sent to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from a French producer of mechanical looms regarding potential markets in Korea was forwarded to Monsignor Jean Blanc, the vicar apostolic for Korea. But from the mid-1890s the dismal state of affairs for French industry in Asia began to improve, and the reverberations would be felt in Korea.

In 1895 the Sino-French Accord was signed, bringing to a conclusion a decade of back and forth negotiations regarding French rights in Indochina and southern China. By this agreement of this treaty France was given the right to build railroads between its new colony in Indochina and Yunnan in southern China, a situation French officials hoped would result in a boom for French commerce in the area. That same year saw the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese War, in the aftermath of which China entered the market for a large loan to both pay off its huge indemnity to Japan and finance internal reforms. It was a French-Russian consortium, in turn a product of the 1892 Russo-French alliance, that ended up floating the loan through the newly established Russo-Chinese Bank in Shanghai, and with it French influence in China rose a notch.

After 1895 France harvested fruits in Korea from its alliance with Russia. During the period of dominant Russian influence in 1896-1897, the French company Five-Lilles (the same that had been granted a concession to build railroads in Yunnan the year before) won a concession to build a Korean railway from Seoul to the Chinese border at Ulju, it was said through the influence of the Russian minister.

The year 1896 marks the real onset of French commercial interest in Korea. This date also coincides with the reappearance in Seoul of Victor Collin de Plancy, arriving from Tokyo to serve again as French consul to Korea. Collin de Plancy would dedicate himself to promoting a budding French influence, commercial and cultural, in Korea. Ultimately his involvement would prove critical to Korean participation at the 1900 Universal Exposition in Paris.

The French Consul

Victor Emile Marie Joseph Collin de Plancy (1853-1924) was born in Plancy, a small town near Troyes in the Champagne region of eastern France, the son of a Jesuit priest and prolific writer on the occult whose name is much more recognized in France than that of his son. Despite the name, Collin de Plancy was not of noble pedigree. Against the strict laws of lineage Victor’s father, Jacques Collin de Plancy, had illicitly added the ‘de Plancy’ to his family name of Collin in a move that would later bring accusations against the son.

Whatever the case, Victor Collin de Plancy gained entrance to the prestigious Ecole des Langues Orientales Vivantes in Paris, where he trained in Chinese, graduating in 1876 (about a decade before his fellow alumnus Maurice Courant) and was soon sent to Peking as a junior interpreter, often a preliminary step to seeking consular duties. Prevented by his stationing in Peking from taking the requisite exam for consular assignment (administered only at Paris), it was 1883 before he finally received his coveted consular position, when he was
named consul second class at Peking. In 1884 he was promoted to acting French consul at Shanghai, where he served during the Sino-French War, distinguishing himself by services rendered to a cholera-stricken French fleet harbored in Shanghai. As mentioned earlier, Collin de Plancy served briefly as the first French consul to Korea, after relations were opened with that country in 1887, before moving on to a post in Japan and a brief assignment to Tangiers. Upon his return to Seoul in 1896 he would never request reassignment, seeming to prefer the post to any other.

Collin de Plancy has been described alternately as laborious (“doing the work of two”), impartial, and instructed, while lauded as well for his more social qualities, charm, elegance of manners, impeccable taste, and perhaps most importantly, amiability. It was this social adeptness and perspicacity that he seemed to refine as the years passed. The introduction to his collected papers in the French Foreign Ministry notes the qualities for which Collin de Plancy seemed best known, “his tact, courtesy, and refined manners” and as one who excelled in “issues of etiquette...but who rarely ventured into the realm of general ideas.” His gruff figure as it appears in photographs, with full beard and stern glance, seems hardly to hint at such refinement. Yet in Seoul he became known for his charming garden parties. Particularly well received were his “chrysanthemum festivals,” perhaps an inspiration from his days in Japan, held every autumn in the gardens of the French legation, during which guests strolled the peaceful grounds in the midst of the budding capital, admiring the park with its greenhouses of flowers. In 1896 he had constructed an elegant European style compound for the French legation, filling it with antiques from the Chateau de Chenonceaux. He was himself a collector; his respectable assortment of Asian art and ceramics eventually donated to the Musee Guimet in Paris where it forms a core part of the Korean collection.

It was Collin de Plancy’s diplomatic acumen and his attention to detail that would prove the biggest asset for French interests in Korea during this period, arguably more valuable than the Russo-French Alliance. He became occupied in procuring the concession for of the Seoul-Uiju line for Five-Lilles, personally negotiating with the Korean Foreign minister Yi Wan-yong. Along with the above railway concession he also successfully petitioned for mining rights on behalf of French companies along the proposed railroad. However, other efforts spearheaded by Collin de Plancy to gain railway concessions to Mokpo and Wonsan were not so successful.

Despite the apparently lucrative concession won on behalf of Five-Lilles for mining and railway rights form Seoul to Uiju, Collin de Plancy had to sit back and watch his efforts go to seed, as Five-Lilles delayed in sending out engineers and assessors, and then failed to raise the necessary capital in the required time. This meant the French concession soon ran out with hardly anything begun, despite Collin de Plancy’s efforts to have it extended. The French consul’s disappointment is palpable in his letter of July 1898: “The dismissal of the Five-Lils Company,” he writes, “will serve... to show the utter disadvantage of ever granting any concession to the French in the future, for after a delay of three years they [Five-Lilles] haven’t done a bit of work... I can only remind Your Excellency of the extreme damage this is liable to cause French influence.” As chief French diplomat in Korea, and enjoying a wide range of contacts, Collin de Plancy was the natural hinge for the expansion of French influence. Collin de Plancy helped a certain Mr. Saltarel establish official contacts in Seoul upon his arrival there as representative of several French companies in early 1898. Saltarel would later be appointed to accompany M. Yoon-ch’ang to Paris in early 1900, when that prince was named the official Korean representative to the Paris fair. Upon Saltarel’s return from France he would gain a mining concession in Korea. In late 1899 a French military attaché in China, Commander Polyeucte Vidal, was also brought in through Collin de Plancy’s efforts to assess the state of the Korean arsenal and make recommendations as to its improvement and the establishment of a Korean arms industry. Collin de Plancy also helped an expert from the Sevres Ceramic Works to recommend ways of modernizing and expanding the Korean porcelain industry. But France’s most visible representative, behind Collin de Plancy himself, was undoubtedly M. Clemencet, who was brought to Korea in 1898, shortly after Korea’s entrance into the International Postal Union, to organize a modern Korean postal service. Upon the bureau’s official opening in January 1900 Clemencet sent the first international letter to Collin de Plancy (then on leave in France), as the “only fit

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17 E. Guillemin to M. AE (14 November 1879) and Contre-Amiral Legier to M. de la Marine (10 August 1885), MFAA, “Personnels/2nd serie/Dossier #874, Collin de Plancy, Victor Emile Marie Joseph.” Also see Bourdaret 1904: 97.
19 Bourdaret, 1904: 97.
20 See Collin de Plancy to Yi Oan-yong (31 May, 3 July 1896), Kuhan’guk oegyo munso, Display at Empire’s End.
22 Collin de Plancy to M. AE (18 July 1898), MFAA, “Nouvelle-Serie/Affaires Commerciales/Relations avec l’Etranger(1897-1904).”
ning homage" to the man who had contributed so much to making the service a reality.23

Misssteps

Plans for the Universal Exposition of 1900 went back nearly a decade before the exposition’s opening. It was in May 1893, in fact while Korea was engaged in the fair at Chicago, that the French consul to Korea answered certain preliminary “feelers” from Paris regarding Korean willingness to participate in the planned Paris exposition. Then French consul Frandin responded that King Kojong had personally assured him Korea would participate, he would send a fine exhibit of art and artifacts and even dispatch a member of the royal family as commissioner. He added that the Korean display in Paris would certainly surpass that of Chicago, which was “arranged in some haste and in disorder and didn’t represent a serious effort”. Finally, Frandin warns that Korea is a poor country, “richer in good will than in money”, and that any Korean effort will have to be financially supported, if not led, by the French, much as was done with Chicago. 24

It was not until January 1896 that official invitations finally appeared for the 1900 Paris Universal Exposition, and on January 27 Korea sent official word that it would attend. Despite such a timely response, following the initial acceptance not much was forthcoming from Korean officials. Meanwhile, Collin de Plancy had taken over from Lefevre, and for the next year, in both official dispatches and personal meetings, the new French consul urged a deferring Korean Foreign Ministry to meet with European countries in the 1880s Korea had not succeeded in sending an official representative to any of them.

23 Clemencet to Collin de Plancy (31 January 1900), MFAA, “Correspondence Particulée et Privé/Corée/1900”.
24 Frandin to MAE (7 May 1893), MFAA, “Correspondence Commerciale/Seoul/1893-1901”.
25 Collin de Plancy to MAE (18 January 1897), MFAA, “Affaires Diverses Commerciales/Expositions/Corée”.
26 Russia, Great Britain, France, Germany, Austria, Italy. Since establishing diplomatic relations with European countries in the 1880s Korea had not succeeded in sending an official representative to the world’s fair. Among the eight named members, three were Frenchmen, Charles Rouliina, E douard Mene, and Maurice Courant.27

Charles Rouliina must remain an obscure and mysterious figure. In June 1897 the Korean king appointed him Consul General of Korea in Paris, with the title of “Consul Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to South Korea”.28

For his part, Collin de Plancy had graduated from the École des Langues Orientales Vivantes with a degree in Chinese language. Unlike Collin de Plancy, Courant graduated at the top of his class in 1888. He went on to serve as an interpreter in Peking, Tianjin, Tokyo, and Seoul (1890-1892). Not really cut out for consular duties, he was however a brilliant linguist and scholar. The publication of the first volumes of his Bibliographie Coréenne in 1896 made such an impression on Korean officials that they applied pressure to the French legation in Seoul to allow Courant to serve in the pay of the Korean government, where he might “give the best advice for the reform of the educational system on the peninsula and translate books which could be used by my young officials”29

Partly in response to such pressure, in January 1897 Min Yong-hwan, brother of Min Yong-ch’an and cousin of the Korean queen, was finally named Minister Plenipotentiary to Six European Nations, filling a post that had for too long remained vacant.30 Along with him was soon named the list of commission-
Embracing France

Though the Sino-Japanese War had dealt a decisive blow to Chinese influence in Korea and Manchuria, in so doing it also removed a formidable obstacle to Russian designs in the region. This in turn brought in the more acute interest of third parties. It was as if a great balance had been removed, and with its removal the fate of Korea began to drift among many powers, enjoying the precarious freedom spoken of earlier. If one issue seems to dominate discussions of Korea in the period of the late 1890s—be they in diplomatic correspondence, travelogue, newspaper article, or royal audience—it is the issue of Japanese versus Russian influence, and which would ultimately prevail.

King Kojong (though from October 1897 Emperor Kwangmu, only Kojong will be used here) fell easy prey to his own anxieties over his kingdom’s fate. In April 1897, having emerged just months earlier from the Russian legation, where he had sought refuge following Queen Min’s murder, Kojong was wracked by not unfounded fears of Russian and Japanese designs to divide the peninsula. In May 1896 had been signed the so-called “Yamagata Convention,” in which Russia and Japan recognized their mutual spheres of influence in Korea. It seemed that outright partition could not be far behind. To help avert this, Kojong was eager to have the foreign legations manned by their own armed nationals, in particular such third party states as the United States, Great Britain, and France.

In the spring of 1897, just as Min Yong-hwan was preparing to depart as Minister Plenipotentiary to Europe, Kojong was seized by new rumors of partition, which had begun to swirl, no doubt, around the open letter entrusted to him by his king while en route to Paris. Perhaps anticipating Collin de Plancy’s non-commital, Kojong had composed a letter to the French president Félix Faure, and entrusted its delivery with Min in Yong-hwan (though Min was unaware of its contents). The letter bore similarities to the one carried by the Korean minister to Washington in the train of the Chicago World’s Fair delegation of 1893. Only the letter sent to the French president was more urgent in tone:

Several years have now passed since our two countries signed a treaty of amity; a reaffirmation of the ties that bind us is now called for. I know of France’s renown, and of the value she places on the ties of friendship between us. From the bottom of my heart I wish her to realize my hope that she support me with all her force, and, if necessity so demands, to come to my aid.

The Russian-inspired fears that drove Kojong to seek succor from France in the summer of 1897 dissipated with remarkable speed in the coming year. Russian designs on the peninsula seemed to crest with the failed attempts to establish a Russo-Korean Bank in Seoul in the winter of 1897-1898 (really just a branch of the Russo-Chinese Bank) and to replace the commissioner of Korean finances Mr. Leavy Brown with the Russian Alexeev. It was from these checks (and concomitant gains in China) that Russia seems to have turned its attentions away from Korea, deciding instead to focus on Manchuria and the Liaodong Peninsula with an intensity that would lead to the Russo-Japanese War in 1904. But in the summer of 1897 Min Yong-hwan went to Europe carrying what seemed ostensibly a desire on the part of Korea to forge a defensive alliance with France.

Min Yong-hwan arrived in England in July 1897. Like Hamlet, Min in apparent manner opened the letter entrusted to him by his king while en route to London, and like Hamlet read perfidy. For once in England Minister Min telegraphed Kojong on July 23, informing him that he was done with his mission, having discovered the Korean king’s misguided intention to open Korea to French troops. To believe Collin de Plancy, Min’s telegraph stated his preference “to lose his head” rather than carry out such a reckless diplomatic mission.

2. Collin de Plancy to MAE (18 September 1897), MFAA, “Nouvelle Série/Politiques extérieures/Francs en Corée 1897-1902.”
3. In May 1896, by a secret agreement with China, Russia gained the right to construct a portion of its Trans-Siberian line through Manchuria, the promised use of Port Arthur in event of hostility, and mining rights in Jilin and Heilongjiang provinces.
4. Collin de Plancy to MAE (1 August 1897), MFAA, “Nouvelle Série/Protocole.”
the United States, where he lived in dire straits until Kojong, letting bygones be bygones, allowed him to return to Korea in 1898 (having rejected M in's request to be appointed Korean minister to Washington).

The Korean government was fairly quick to name another plenipotentiary. On September 1, 1897, they named M in Yong-hwan, another scion of the M in clan (in fact the younger brother of Queen M in), who had had some foreign experience, having lived for periods in Japan, Shanghai, and Hong Kong, as the new minister to Europe. But this too hit a snag when the French refused to grant M in diplomatic recognition due to his role in appropriating several thousand pounds from the Hong Kong branch of the Comptoir d'échange in 1884, funds which by 1897 had still not been recovered. In the course of the next two years Kojong made two more appointments, both resigning before departing Korea. Collin de Plancy was back nearly at square one. Though he had an obtainable list of Korean and French "commissioners" there was no still overall commissioner in charge and no coordination between them. Worse yet, by late 1898 Korea still had no designated plot on the filling fairgrounds.

The Universal Exposition

Meanwhile, events finally made some headway in Paris. Upon hearing of the failure of the M in mission, Consul Roulina was not long in finding a "benefactor" who would take on the organization and expense of the Korean exhibit. This was the Count Delort de Gleon. The name was not unknown in Paris; he had gained a modicum of fame for his organization of the Egyptian section at the fair of 1889, in which he had designed an entire "Cairo Street", complete with donkeys and their boy handlers and authentic Cairo merchants. The depiction of one scholar of this earlier Egyptian project of Delort de Gleon is worth keeping in mind:

Delort de Gleon set about collecting the necessary Korean objects for display, and the more difficult task of recruiting "authentic types" to fill his Tchemulpo Street. For this task Delort de Gleon sent a certain Alphonse

...with the inhabitants being in type, and dressed in manner, most diverse and unusual.

Delort de Gleon soon wrote to Mr. Delaunay-Belleville, the Director General of the Paris Exposition, about his plans for the Korean section:

"Convention entre M. Alfred Picard et M. Delort de Gléon", FNA, F/12/4357.

Faced with the new reality of M in Yong-hwan's resignation and the French rejection of M in Yong-hwan, the Korean government consented to Consul Roulina's nomination of Delort de Gleon, and in July 1899 the official contract was signed between the Universal Exposition Committee, whereby Delort de Gleon acquired several exposition lots for Korea, the largest being an extended plot on the eastern border of the Champs de Mars. The expenses of the new Korean Commissioner for the Universal Exposition would be great. The planned 320 square foot national pavilion would cost an estimated 87,000 French francs to build and decorate, while the planned Tchemulpo Street, to be built in a concession granted along the Seine near the themed pavilions of other nations, would be a further 54,000 francs.

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Tremoulot, a fifty-four year old whose checkered past included combat in the Franco-Prussian War and a work as a petty official in Indochina. Trémoulet arrived in Seoul in the spring of 1899, charged by Baron Delort de Gléon with ‘purchasing different products destined for use in the Korean section [of the fair], and to gather material to be used in the construction of the official Korean pavilion, as well as to recruit natives to practice their trades under the eyes of the public’...37

In response to this new state of affairs, on June 17, 1899 the Korean government issued an updated list of national commissioners. The commissioners were divided into Korean and European groups, each headed by their respective presidents. Appointed as president of the Korean delegation was Min Y?ng-ch'an, younger brother of Min Yong-hwan and then Vice Minister of Justice. To the list of Europeans was added Polyeucte Vidal, the military attaché Collin de Plancy brought over to Korea the year before, as well as Trémoulet and of course the Baron Delort de Gléon as Commissioner General.38

In late summer 1899 construction was begun on the Baron-Commissioner General's grand plans for the Korean display. Surviving blueprints detail the grand scale of the Baron's vision for Korea. These included an extensive, twin-winged palace (that bore little resemblance to traditional Korean architecture) ornamented in what resembles European chinoiserie. But just as things began finally to get under way mortality struck.

Unfortunately or otherwise, the Baron Delort de Gléon dropped dead in Paris on November 9, 1899, his plans for the Korean section only partially completed.39 Though the Korean authorities, notified of this, wished to continue with the plan, by early March. Roulina's recommendation of Mimerel was communicated to the Korean government, which on February 17, 1900 approved the selection.40

Mimerel was a lawyer and the son of a powerful industrialist who had served as a key advisor to Napoleon III. He found a lucrative living in colonial dealings as well, winning concessions in the French Congo and serving as president of the Conseil d'Administration of the Compagnie N’Goko in the Central Congo.41 The motivating factors behind his involvement in the Korean section were apparently not so artistic and creative as those of Delort de Gléon, who, for all his rather shallow showmanship, and quest for a showman's profit, did exhibit a flair for production. Mimerel slashed the Baron's grandiose plans, including the projected street in Tchemulpo, and focused instead on the construction of a relatively simple pavilion, based upon a portion of the larger planned structure of the Baron. To build it he commissioned the architect Eugène Ferret, who had built the Saigon Theater in French Indochina. At the same time he released Tremoulet from service, having no need to recruit natives to man craft stations. In the end Korea would have to satisfy itself with a simple pavilion at the corner of the Champs de mars designed after the Royal Audience Hall of Kyongbok Palace. A letter from the French legation in Seoul to the Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs, even as the exposition was in session, sheds some light upon Count Mimerel's motivations:

To follow up on a dispatch I sent you on May 11, regarding a mining conces-
Impressions

The Korean pavilion did not enjoy a prime location. Situated on the Avenue Suffren, off the Champs de mars, no doubt most fairgoers were never even aware of its presence. Indeed, Korea was even omitted from most guidebooks of the fair. If they did find their way to the Korean exhibit, however, they would have been highly impressed with this Korean pavilion in the midst of Paris, a colorful anomaly among the subdued grays of the area's Second Empire structures. One period publication described it:

"Done entirely in wood, painted in a vivid display of colors, and covered by a large roof with the upturned eaves characteristic of Far Eastern architecture, the structure captures the attention of the passerby. The design of the unique inner chamber finds its inspiration in the audience hall of the old royal palace. The walls are covered in silk drapes, the oldest dating from the 7th century; and two panels facing one another as you enter are covered with giclacing masks and other theatrical items. The showcase displays include precious collections sent by the emperor himself, items belonging to several Frenchmen who have spent some time in Korea, as well as a sampling of national produce...all of which give a strong conception of the resources of Korean industry."

Surviving impressions of the Korean exhibit at Paris are few. China inadvertently stole the headlines during the fair with the eruption of the Boxer Rebellion in May. By July news of the barricaded European community in Peking awaiting the arrival of an armed coalition of western troops challenged the exposition for the day's headlines.

One prominent personality who did visit the Korean pavilion in Paris, and left us his impressions, was Maurice Courant. Courant equated the Korean pavilion's obscure location with the "hermit" reputation that stubbornly clung to the country itself. Korea was still widely viewed in the west as a "hermit nation", despite the long historical ties it shared with China and Japan and the more recent strides it had taken in internal development and contact with western nations. Yet one may argue that this sobriquet was insisted upon as a way of justifying, perhaps even subconsciously, foreign incursions upon Korean sovereignty in order to open and "modernize" it. A 1900 National Geographic magazine article

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43 Commander Vidal, on his way to southern China, accompanied the Paris-bound Min partly as far as Shanghai and left us his own impressions of the young Min Yong-ch' an worth quoting in part.
44 "He's a man of about thirty, timid, intelligent, progressive, with a melancholy air about him. He is keen on learning and doesn't look upon a trip to France as a mere pleasure excursion. Having spent some time in England and America, where he was sent upon the queen's urging, he seems most interested in the scientific progress of Western nations. Yet he seems to lack the firm instructive foundation to appreciate this progress for its true value. Also, in conversation with him one is struck by the superficial aspect of his understanding. Rather than a focus upon the reasons behind things, he is struck by their immediate effects. He deplores the complaisance with which the misguided Korean emperor seems to distribute mining and railroad concessions to the foreigners, thus depriving the native Koreans of the benefits they might receive from such projects..." Vidal to
on Korea stil chose as its title, "Korea- The Hermit Nation".

Courant certainly followed this trend when he wrote of the Korean pavilion, "The crowds remain unaware of the Korean pavilion: it seems that out of timidity or modesty Korea wishes to confirm, in this far corner, the image of isolation with which she has so long been associated." Korea remained a highly unknown entity to Europeans in 1900, as it had been to Americans in 1893. A colorful front-page illustration in one of France's numerous weeklies depicted the Korean pavilion in rather fantastic and imaginary terms, illustrating literally the unknown nature of Korea and Koreans in the European mind. The result is a mélange of Korean, Chinese, Japanese, Manchu, and entirely fanciful motifs. The small written account of Korea and its pavilion in the same issue also sheds some light on lingering western attitudes towards Korea:

One of most closed countries of the Far East, and certainly the one most coveted by its neighbors, must be Korea. Everything there is hidden, its customs unique, and the fondest wish of its inhabitants is to not enter into relations with any foreigners. Thus its participation in the exposition comes as a pleasant surprise. The Korean government has had a curious looking pavilion constructed...inspiring the hope that relations might be established with this mysterious region.

Sandwiched physically between China and Japan, in the European mind Korea seems to have been psychologically suspended between those two as well, notably in such an eventful summer for Asian affairs as that of 1900. Was the so-called "Hermit Kingdom" a recalcitrant and conservative one teetering on its timidity or modesty Korea wishes to confirm, in this far corner, the image of isolation with which she has so long been associated? The young Seoul newspaper Hwangsong siumun [Capital gazette] commented on the relative paltriness of the exhibited Korean wares. This was the exact same critique that had been expressed by the young reformer Yun Ch'i-ho when he visited the Korean exhibit in Chicago seven years earlier. The opinion of the Hwangsong siumun, run by men of reformist tendencies is indicative of an undercurrent of dissatisfaction, not only with the efforts at reform in Korea but at the concomitant representation of Korea as backward to a foreign audience. The excuse of modernizing and reforming Korea would indeed become a central theme in Japanese justifications for annexation a decade later.

Conclusion

As an attempt by Korea to represent itself - rather than have itself represented - the Korean display in Paris fell far short of Korean efforts at the Chicago World's Fair of 1893. The larger scale of the Korean exhibit at was unfortunately not indicative of a greater commitment by Korea, nor I believe a finer appreciation of the opportunity the forum of the World's Fairs presented. Kojong's misguided attempts to secure French arms are evidence of a growing foreign - predominantly Japanese - influence over the peninsula. However, it is unfortunate that Kojong saw the fair as an opportunity only insofar as the Korean commissioner might take the opportunity to seek out French military assistance, hardly recognizing the occasion the Exposition offered for presenting Korea to the outside world as something other than a quaint and "hermit" kingdom. As it were, the Korean display contained traditional craft invitation, and lean optimistically towards the idea of a modernizing Korea. As one period French guidebook to the Paris fair, describing the Korean exhibit, put it,

Since the Sino-Japanese War everything has changed in Korea, and they now follow more or less the route taken by modern Japan. The army and finances are being reorganized, mining concessions granted, electric trolley cars and railways constructed, and foreigners are to be found everywhere as advisors, teachers, engineers.

In contrast to the more or less warm reception the display received in Paris, in Korea one response to accounts of the Korean national exhibit that filtered back was not so positive. The young Seoul newspaper Hwangsong siumun [Capital gazette] commented on the relative paltriness of the exhibited Korean wares.

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items, ceramics, old books, even a traditional execution device, interesting and even laudable in their way but not enough to inspire confidence in Korea's potential for the new century. The only impetus towards industrialization (certainly a key ingredient to modernity as it was understood at the time) displayed was a few black and white photographs of Seoul, showing new streetcars (built through foreign concessions) juxtaposed with the traditional Korean structures of the capital. "A most odd confusion of past and present," as one guidebook had it. It is just this shortcoming in the Korean exhibit that is mentioned in the Korean press. Even where progress was hinted at, it is the work of foreigners in Korea that is emphasized - laboring as "advisors, teachers, engineers" in the effort to modernize Korea.

But this becomes understandable once one realizes that Korea in fact had little to do with its own display. It had not paid for it, planned it, built it, nor really stocked it. It reaped none of its profits - material or otherwise. The untimely death of De l'ort de Géron, as he was organizing an extravagant Korean "spectacle", seems hardly fortunate as far as Korea is concerned when De l'ort de Géron's replacement is considered. The Count Mimerel, who soon showed his true stripes by requesting mining concessions in Korea after the exhibit had barely opened, clearly had his own agenda in taking on the expenses of the Korean pavilion.

Yet despite these factors, one must recognize that the image of a large Korean pavilion on the most famous grassy expanse in Paris during the summer of 1900 did not, as it could not, go unnoticed. Though relatively hidden away the Korean pavilion was evident enough to garnish a full-page color illustration in a leading French weekly. This very illustration and the description that accompanied it, however, may serve to represent western confusion - even in 1900 - over just who the Koreans were. That they should be represented as an amalgamation of Chinese, Manchu, Japanese, and Korean did not augur well. Korea seemed a sideshow in the affairs of Northeast Asia, or more accurately perhaps a strategic footnote in the more momentous maneuverings of Russia, China, and Japan.

Despite its rather isolated location the Korean pavilion is said to have received upwards of 50,000 visitors, and received a grand prize, three gold medals, ten silver, five bronze and three honorable mentions. The Korean emperor was grateful enough to his French benefactors to award them all various ranks of the p'al-kwae medal, a national decoration instituted in 1901. For his efforts in getting Korea to France a grateful host of fellow Frenchmen petitioned the French Minister of Commerce, Industry, Post and Telegraphs to name Collin de Plancy an Officer of the Legion of Honor, an honor he duly received. As for Mimerel's mining concession in Korea, it never panned out.

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**Glossary**

- Chikhjinsimgyong
- Chong Kyoung-won
- Hong Chong-yu
- Hwangdong simmun
- Kim Ok-kyun
- Ko Yong-ho
- Li Hongjang
- Min Pyong-sok
- Min Yong-ch'an
- Min Yong-hwan
- Min Yong-ik

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