The Historical Status of Dasan’s *Inseongmulseongron*: On the Horak School’s *Immulseong-dongiron*

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I. History of Thought: The Dual Views of Criticism and Succession

There have been two sharply opposing views concerning the evaluation of society, culture, and thought in the late Joseon Dynasty. One view takes the period, which is about 250 years from the middle of the 17th century until the beginning of the 20th century, to be a continuous process of Joseon’s collapse. And the opposite view takes half that period, which is about 125 years between the end of the 17th and 18th centuries, to be the Golden Age of Joseon’s cultural development.

These sharply opposed views reached their culmination when they came to evaluate the prevalent idea at the time, *viz.* Neo-Confucianism. According to one view, it played a certain role at an earlier stage, but became a vacuous ideology as it began to emphasize the theory of person’s status at a later stage. And, according to another view, it

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was a completely new thought whose origin could not be found even in Chinese Neo-Confucianism and, also, it was the source of the Golden Age.⁴

Such conflicting views also occur in evaluating Silhak⁵; one views it as an attempt to escape from the views presented by Zhu Zi’s Studies,⁶ whereas the other thinks that it was internally influenced by them.⁷ As a result, some avoid using the term ‘Silhak,’⁸ whereas others wholly deny the existence of such a school. The latter claims that there was no such thing as the school of Silhak, since it had never been established, and that the term was in fact quite a modern invention;⁹ this is the extremist interpretation.¹⁰

These opposing views are without exception, to be found in the evaluation of Jeong Yak-yong (Dasan, 1762-1836) who is known as the establisher of Silhak in the late Joseon period. The prevalent view is that he was an ex-scholar of Zhu Zi who escaped from the orthodox idea of Zhu Zi or an anti-scholar of Zhu Zi who was opposed to the orthodox idea of Zhu Zi. However, there is also another view that he was a pro-Neo-Confucianist who criticized the wrongly accepted view of Zhu Zi and practiced his real view.¹⁰ He does appear to be an anti-Neo-Confucianist in his criticism of the theory of li and gi and the theory of the nature of mind both of which are the theoretical bases of Neo-Confucianism. In his writings, he often appears to reject
Neo-Confucianism, which was largely accepted in East-Asia in the mediaeval age, and to intend ‘to construct a new one.’ On the other hand, he severely criticized Mao Qi-ling who in his interpretation of the Book of Documents presented a condemnation for the school of Zhu Zi. Kim Mae-sun regarded this fact as entailing Dasan’s high respect for Zhu Zi and praised him as the brave successor who saved the school of Zhu Zi from disgrace. At this stage, we now come to confront the question that was unceasingly raised since research into Silhak first started, viz. the question of whether Silhak is the criticism and overcoming of Neo-Confucianism or the succession and development of it.

In order to settle this question, this paper begins by comparing Inmulseong-dongiron (the theory of whether human nature and animal nature are the same or different) presented in the debate of Horak, which was the central matter of his contemporaries of Neo-Confucianism, with his own theory. It has been well known that Yoo Bong-hak illustrated the connection between Neo-Confucianism and Bukhak on the basis that Inmulseong-dongiron (the theory that human nature and animal nature are the same) of Rakpa (the school of Rak) was the basis of the philosophical thought of the school of Bukhak, but there has been no appropriate stooly of the relation between Dasan and Horak’s debate. However, if Dasan’s formulation of his own view was due to the possession of the consciousness against Neo-Confucianism, he could not have been indifferent to Horak’s debate on which later Neo-Confucianists focused and which had a close relationship to the

12. The Horak’s debate refers to the debate between the schools of Ho and Rak. Ho designates ‘the area below Seoul, i.e. Chungcheong Province and Honam area,’ and Rak designates ‘Seoul and its surrounding area, i.e. Gyeonggi Province.’
contemporary politics. Whether admittedly or being aware, Dasan
could not have escaped the influence of Neo-Confucianism in the
middle of which Horak’s debate positioned.

The primary view of this paper is that as Neo-Confucianism was
formed on the basis of Buddhism, Dasan’s thought was formed on the
basis of Neo-Confucianism. In general, the history of thought is based
on criticizing and overcoming, as well as, succeeding and developing.
However, the studies of Dasan until now, have deteriorated the real
history of thought by focusing on the former. At this point, it is worth-
while noting Yi Gwang-Ho’s effort to explain the relevancy of Yi Hwang
“Toegyehak Sasang-e michin Yeonghyang (The Influence of Lee Toegye’s Philosophy on
Jeong Dasan’s Theory of study of Confucian Classics ),” Toegyehak Yeongu

II. Horak’s Debate of Inmulseong-dongiron
    and Dasan’s Criticism of Inmulseong-dongiron

Horak’s debate is a philosophical discussion which transformed
Chinese Neo-Confucianism into the peculiar aspect of Joseon’s Neo-
Confucianism and developed it further. The subject-matter of this
debate consists of miballon (the discussion of unarousedness) and
Inmulseong-dongiron, i.e. ohaenron (the discussion of the Five
Elements). Oeam’s view that denies the attribution of the physical
nature to unarousedness leads to the theory of the sameness of the
basic mind of the nobler man and the interior man and, eventually,
to the theory of the sameness of the original nature of human beings
and animals. On the contrary, Namdang’s point of view that admits the
attribution of the physical nature to unarousedness leads to the Sthe theo-

Sasang-e michin Yeonghyang (The Influence of Lee Toegye’s Philosophy on
Jeong Dasan’s Theory of study of Confucian Classics ),” Toegyehak Yeongu
15. Oeamjip (Collected works of Oeam) Book 12.
ry of the differentness of the mind in the nobler man and the inferior man 16 and, eventually, to Inmulseong-iron. 17 Oeam’s view is based on ‘dong’ (sameness), whereas Namdang’s is based on ‘differentness’ or differentiation. 18

The Inmulseong-dongiron is mainly based on the claim that human beings and animals are the same since the Five Constant Virtues are equally attributed to them and that they possess all of them and, also, the opposite claim that they are different since all the Five Constant Virtues are attributed only to human beings, whereas animals have some of them. 18 Oeam, the representative of the theory of sameness, once said on the ground of Zhu Zi’s Zhongyong Zhangju (the Commentary on the Doctrine of the Mean) as follows:

In general, human beings and animals have received the gi of the Five Constant Virtues, but there is a difference in having a part, or the whole. Now it is right to discuss the difference of great and small, but wrong to say that of the Five Constant Virtues one is and one is not. Since a grass or a plant has them, how can it be possible for a more spirited thing (e.g. an animal) not to have them? 19

Oeam claims that there is a differentness in gijil (the physical

16. Namdangjip (Collected works of Namdang) Book 11. 17. There are various views concerning such questions as which is more essential between the theories of unarousedness and Inmulseong-dongiron and which of them was developed first. What is clear is that the two theories are closely connected to each other (Jeon In-sik. Yi Gan-gwa Han Won-jin-ui Mibal-Osang Yeongu (A study of Yi Gan and Han Won-jin’s theory of unarousedness and the Five Constant Virtues). PhD Thesis. Jeongsinmunhwasa, 1998. pp. 6-9).

18. mul (Chin. wu), in general, designates those other than human beings, i.e. geumsuchomok (birds, land animals, grasses, and plants), but it here refers to birds and land animals. For the conception of ‘⁩’, see my article, ‘Juyeok-eseo boneun Yingan-gwa Jayeon-ui Gwan-gye (The relation between human beings and the natural world viewed from the Book of Changes)’. Dongyang Choolhak 13, 2000.

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quality) of human beings and animals, but that, since everything is composed of gi of eumyang-ohaeng the Five Constant Virtues. Therefore, the original nature of human beings and animals is the same, whereas the physical nature is different in themselves and others. This claim of Oeam is not different from that of Zhu Zi. The formulation of his theory of the differentness of the nature in human beings and animals can be found in the following passage:

Li is originally one, (but it is said in three ways) as that which transcends hyeonggi (the shape and physical energy), as that which is in virtue of the physical quality, and as that which is mixed with the physical quality. If we describe it as that which is transcendental to hyeonggi, it is Taeguk (Chin. tai chi, the Supreme Ultimate) and the principle of everything is the same. If we name it in virtue of the physical quality, it is the name of geonsunsang (the strong-adaptive-Five Constant Virtues) and human beings and animals are not the same. If we describe it as mixed with the physical quality, it is the nature of good and evil and individual men and animals are not the same.

It is to be noted that, as the passage shows, when Namdang says that human nature and animal nature are different, the nature ‘ingi jil (in virtue of the physical quality)’ is not the physical nature, but rather the original nature. This claim of Namdang does not correspond to the general theory of Zhu Zi. Zhu Zi’s theory is based on the twofold distinction between li, sameness, and gi, differentness or the original nature and the physical nature, whereas Namdang’s theory of nature, called the theory of three levels of nature, is based on the threefold distinction between chohyeonggi (li, sameness), ingi jil (gi, differentness), and haejil (the shape and physical energy) (Namgândangjip Book 11, p. 132). Yoo Cho-ha, says that “the difference between human beings and animals discussed in Neo-Confucianism includes the minute particular qualities of all individuals and, in fact, the emphasis is rather on them” (ibid. p. 132). But this is obviously wrong. The sung (xing, nature) he talks about is not the original nature, but the physical nature.
different and the same), and japgijil 슬 (mixed physical quality, 슬). Thus it is hard for Zhu Zi’s system to acknowledge the claim that ‘since human nature and animal nature are in virtue of the physical quality, their natures are different, but since they are not mixed with the physical quality, the natures of the same species are the same.’ Dasan never refers directly to the Horak’s debate. However, by criticizing Chu Tsu’s Inmulseong-dongron he indirectly reveals his negative attitude towards it. He views Zhu Zi as making a fundamental mistake in saying that the nature and the Way or Heaven’s mandate, the nature, the Way, and Instruction are applied to animals as well as human beings. In other words, despite the fact that Instruction 委 in ‘the regulation of the Way is called Instruction 委委员’ is of human beings, Zhu Zi mistook it to be included not only for human beings but also for animals. Dasan thinks that Zhu Zi in his commentary on the Zhong Yong took ‘What Heaven has conferred is called the Nature 委委员 to be the original nature and this original nature to be equally inherent not only in human but also in animals. On this ground, he goes on to criticize that “as I thought of it alone, the original nature is not the same for all of them.” This claim indicates that Dasan takes Zhu Zi’s comment to be Inmulseong-dongron and so criticizes his fallacy. If so, are we qualified to think that Dasan rejects the claim of Inmulseong-dongron by the school of Nak and accepts the claim of Inmulseong-iron by the school of Ho?

III. Dasan’s View on the theory of Inmulseong-iron: A Comparison with Namdang’s

As is well known, the literary ground for Inmulseong-dongron is Chu Zi’s commentary on the section of What Heaven has conferred is called The Nature of the Zhong Yong, whereas that for Inmulseong-iron is his

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23. 蔡周漢翻译的東論之理論 蔡周漢 翻譯 the 蔡周漢 翻譯
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commentary on the section of To give birth is called the nature (e) of the Mencius. Let us now turn to discuss the relation between Dasan’s theory and Inmulseong-iron by choosing and analysing some passages from his works *Supplements to the lecture on the Zhong Yong*, *Inmulseong-dongiron*, referring to Inmulseong-dongiron.

Let us first compare Dasan’s commentary on the section of What Heaven has conferred is called the Nature of the *Zhong Yong* and Namdang’s.

(Dasan)

Now if human beings and animals have obtained deok (the virtue) of the strong-adaptive-Five Constant Virtues, who is the master and who is the servant? Since there is no difference of levels, how can the Heavenly principle of producing things be like this? … Such names as benevolence, righteousness, propriety in demeanor, and wisdom originally arise in the practice of human affairs, not in a profound principle of the mind. What human beings have received from Heaven is only this spiritual brightness and so they can be benevolent, right, of propriety in demeanor, and wise. If someone says that Heaven has given the four virtues, Inuiyeoji to the middle of human nature, it is not true. Since humans are thus, how can animals equally obtain the Five Constant Virtues?\(^{25}\)

(Namdang)

If we discuss Zi Si’s meaning, [it will be as follows]. If Heaven commands things with perfection, then nature is also perfect: these are human beings. If [Heaven commands things] with partiality, nature is partial, too: these are animals. There cannot be differentness or sameness between destiny and nature. … However, whether it is with

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\(^{25}\) To give birth is called the nature (e) of the Mencius. Let us now turn to discuss the relation between Dasan’s theory and Inmulseong-iron by choosing and analysing some passages from his works *Supplements to the lecture on the Zhong Yong*, *Inmulseong-dongiron*, referring to Inmulseong-dongiron.
perfection or with partiality, since the natures of everything comes from the Heaven, the first word is Heaven. From this, we can see that everything originates from the same root.26

These passages have something in common in denying that human beings and animals can equally obtain the Five Constant Virtues. The difference is that Namdang criticizes Imulseong-dongron on the basis of Zhu Zi’s comment on the Zhong Yong, whereas Dasan criticizes it under the influence of Buddhism. The more significant agreement of Nam-dang and Dasan is that they emphasize the essential differentness of human beings and non-human beings. From this point of view, they reconstruct the commentary on the section of ‘What Heaven has conferred is called The Nature as follows:

(Dasan)

As I have thought of it alone, the original nature is originally not the same. Human beings are fond of goodness, are ashamed of dirt, cultivate themselves, and direct themselves to the Way; this is their nature. Dogs guard at night, bark at thieves, eat dirty things, and chase birds: this is their nature. … Since each receives the command of Heaven and cannot transfer or change it, cows cannot do what human beings do and human beings cannot do what dogs do. They cannot do so not because they do not have the same shapes, but because their principles that they received are originally different from each other.27

(Namdang)

Saying myeong (a mandate) after ‘composing the shape and receiving the principle’ means that, if the gi that composes the shape is not the same, the li is not the same either; that is, that which gives a command to things is different. If the mandate is not the same, how can it

26. 一切相互的形状来源的同一性，……所以说，既然大自然是相同的，
27. 既然每个生物的形状和它所接受的命令是不同的。既然命令是不同的，那么……
be possible that the nature that human beings and animals obtain by means of being ordered are the same?\textsuperscript{28}

Namdang concentrates on claiming the differentness of nature in human beings and animals and, in order to support this claim, he must say that the li given by Heaven is not the same (since ‘the nature is li’ is the fundamental premise of Neo-Confucianism). Also, Dasan says that the differentness of the original nature is not due to the difference of shapes, but to the difference of li that was given by Heaven. As Zhu Zi’s phrase ‘Gi is almost the same; li is definitely not the same’ implies, the difference of li is stressed here. Namdang and Dasan go on to claim that the myeong itself that gives the principle is different.

\textit{(Dasan)}

There are a lot of animals that are of the same species and have the same shape, but have different natures. Wolves and dogs have the same shapes, but they cannot have the same nature. Also, pheasants and chickens have the same shape, but they cannot have the same nature: this is because the command given by Heaven is not the same from the beginning.\textsuperscript{29}

\textit{(Namdang)}

Since the nature and the Way cannot be divided into two, from the unsameness of the Way, we can see that the nature would not be the same. Since the mandate and the nature cannot be divided into two, from the unsameness of the nature, we can see that Heaven’s appointment would not be the same.\textsuperscript{30}

As noted, the first chapter of the Zhong Yong formulates the consistent system of ‘Heaven-Command-Nature-Way-Instruction’ and Zhu Zi’s comment on this is grounded in li. Namdang and Dasan think that the

\textsuperscript{28}...\textsuperscript{30}
origin of human beings and animals should be Heaven, but, in order to show the differentness of original Natures, they claim the difference of Mandate, Way, and Principle that is the theoretical ground for them (Mandate and Way).

Let us compare the comments of Dasan and Namdang on the section of to give birth is called the nature of the Mencius.

(Dasan)

Human nature is only those of some humans and the nature of dogs or cows is only those of some animals. In general, human nature is composed of morality and the physical quality, whereas animal nature is purely composed of physical nature. ... Human nature is human nature and the nature of dogs or cows is animal nature. In so far as original nature is concerned, in the case of human beings the morality plus the physical nature composes a nature and this is what they are, whereas in the case of animals there is only a physical nature and this is what they are. Why compare with the physical nature on earth?²¹

(Namdang)

Despite the fact that all things have natures, only human nature is the noblest and the utmost, because they have the virtues of Inuiyeji. ... Zhu Zi discusses this by distinguishing Inuiyeji and the act of perception and shows that the nobility of human beings cannot be compared with those of animals, in order for human beings to have the same birth and not to fall into the group of animals. ... Perception is in human beings, as well as animals, though the degree of delicacy and roughness is different. However, when it comes to Inuiyeji, animals do not wholly have them without mixing delicacy with roughness. Therefore, the act of perception is the same for human beings and animals, but Inuiyeoji is different for them.²²

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²¹. 趙成賢. “對於自然之不同看法。”《哲學研究所》, 141.

²². 趙成賢. “對於自然之不同看法。”《哲學研究所》, 141.
As mentioned earlier, Zhu Zi’s comments on the section of to give birth is called the nature of the Mencius are the theoretical ground work for Inmulseong-iron. Namdang interprets the remark of Mencius that the nature of dogs, cows, and human beings is different as referring to the original nature, whereas Oeam interprets it as referring to the physical nature: their views crash at this point. For this reason and because of the ambiguity of Zhu Zi’s comments, King Jeongjo asks Dasan “whether the nature of dogs, cows, and human beings are the original nature or the physical nature.” Dasan claims the obvious differentness between human nature and animal nature and provides the reason that it is because human nature is morality plus the physical quality, whereas animal nature is only physical. In particular, he points out that it is obviously wrong for Zhu Zi to have thought that the original nature is the same for human beings and animals, whereas their physical nature is different. On the contrary, human beings are different from animals because, although the physical nature is the same for them, the original nature is only for human beings. However, this argument is similar to that of Zhu Zi’s that gi is the same, but li is different. As cited above, gi is the same, but li is different is the theory that explains the comments of Zhu Zi on the section of to give birth is called the nature. Dasan’s remark that ‘human beings’ perception, movement, and the pursuit of bodily desires are not at all different from those of animals’ is the same sort of claim as Zhu Zi’s remark that ‘the act of perception is the same for human beings and animals.’ Dasan claims that human

32. "...이러한 논의들은 ..." 
33. Jeon In-sik, ibid., p. 185. 
34. "...이러한 논의들은 ..." Dasan, ibid. 
35. "...이러한 논의들은 ..." 
36. "...이러한 논의들은 ..." 
37. "...이러한 논의들은 ..." Zhu Zi, ibid. 
38. "...이러한 논의들은 ..."
beings and animals are inherently different, because only human beings have the moral mind\[^{1}\] in virtue of the occurrence of morality\[^{2}\], whereas animals have only physical natures. As pointed out earlier, the reason for the claim is that the principle they have received is fundamentally different. Zhu Zi claims that human beings and animals are different in that human beings have received the completeness of gi and so have the complete li as well, whereas animals have received the incomplete gi and so have the incomplete li: this is li is different\[^{3}\]. Their uses of li is different are different in content, but the same in that they explain on the basis of the differentness of human beings and animals.

That gi is the same and li is different. In *the The Discussion of the Sameness and the Differentness*\[^{4}\], he takes Immulseong-dongron to be ‘composing and discussing’ the act of perception and Inuiyeji, and Immulseong-iron to be ‘dividing and discussing’ them. And, also, he bases Immulseong-iron on Zhu Zi’s ‘gi is the same, but li is different.’ On the basis of this phrase, Namdang is looking for the reason why only human beings can be human beings despite the fact that even beasts, like human beings, have the act of perception as the identical aspect of gi.

From the comparison of the above claims made by Dasan and Namdang, we can see that they maintain that ‘human beings and animals are the same in the act of perception, but different in morality.’ Therefore, Dasan criticizes ‘li is the same and gi is different’\[^{5}\] to a high degree, which is the theoretical ground for Immulseong-dongron.\[^{39}\]

Dasan emphasizes a transcendental distinction by maintaining that human beings and animals are different since the original state of human beings is due to morality plus the physical quality, whereas the original state of animals is due to their physical nature. And he shows the difference of li from mandate (or destiny) on the basis of ‘The li conferred is not originally the same’\[^{6}\] and ‘The mandate conferred by Heaven is not originally the same’\[^{7}\]’. This is in the same fashion as ‘li is not the same’\[^{8}\], which means that. Both Dasan and Namdang are emphasizing that human beings and animals are different in their original state.

\[^{39}\] 然而, 異端的論述也時常數見於其他地方。
IV. The Division of Human Beings and Nature

It has been well known that Dasan disentangled the theory of *li* and *gi* as well as the discussion of the original nature and the physical nature on which it is based.⁴⁰ However, as seen earlier, he maintains the twofold distinction of the moral nature from the physical nature in the *Essential Meaning of the Mencius* and admits the transcendence of the former by using the term ‘the original state,’ though denying the use of the term ‘the original nature.’ The reason for this is to provide a theoretical ground for the transcendental distinction of human beings and animals. On this point, Dasan and Namdang agree. Both of them emphasize that human beings are the noblest. However, there is much difference in content. This point will become obvious upon comparison of the phrases concerning the difference of human beings and animals which they illustrated.

*(Dasan)*

1.1 There are three classes of things. The nature of plants includes life, but not sensation; the nature of animals includes life and sensation; the nature of human beings includes life and sensation and is spiritual and good. The three classes of above, middle, and below are not the same at all.⁴¹

1.2 At the beginning of Heaven’s becoming and giving the generating principle, plants and animals transmit it from species to species and complete each of their nature and destiny. However, human beings are not so: all the people under Heaven enjoy and use everything as they receive the spiritual brightness and transcendent all the other species.⁴²

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2.1 The commentator’s meaning is this: the nature of all things is good and there is no goodness of human nature that is not complete; and the mind of all things is spiritually bright, but there is no spiritual brightness of human mind that does not penetrate; and there is no human nature that is not good. For these reasons, human beings are the noblest and the utmost. It is not that animal nature is not good, whereas only human nature is good. … In general, human nature and animal nature is all good, and what is not the same is in its partiality.

2.2 It is said in *Immuljiseong-jeolrok*  것입니다 that “the purity of *Inuiyeoji* is not in animals.” In my opinion, the term nothingness is not appropriate. Animals have received *Inuiyeji*, but they cannot be complete and pure. However, it is not right to say that they do not have them at all.

Dasan distinguishes three classes: i.e. plants, animals, and human beings. All things have life; human beings and animals have awareness or perception in addition to it; and human beings also have spiritual brightness and goodness. It can be diagrammed as follows: plants = life, animals = life + awareness (or sensation), and human beings = life + awareness (or sensation) + goodness (or spiritual brightness).

It is well known that this view of classified ontology has already appeared in the *Xun-Zi* 學子. In the section of *injisoiegamsuglhi* 以樂稽之 of the *Maengjayouui*, Dasan cites Xun-Zi’s method of classification (植物 = 聲, 動物 = 音 + 聲, 人 = 音 + 聲 + 他) and says that, since among these human beings and beasts are very close, all of them have sensation and desire; the only difference is that human beings have the moral mind. To sum up, human beings and animals

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cannot be the same in essence because only human beings have morality, such as spirit (spiritual brightness), goodness, and the moral mind, whereas all others lack morality. Dasan, in *The Essential Meaning of the Mencius* claims that human beings have ‘the capacity for thought’ and ‘moral autonomy’ which enables them to think, judge, and claim in the occurrence of moral problems, whereas animals have a limited capacity because of their being subordinate to the natural law. Thus animals are morally neutral. At this stage, human beings have the peculiar characteristic that is clearly separated from Nature (the natural world).

As seen earlier, Dasan and Namdang agree that human beings and animals have perception, but they are different in possessing morality. However, Namdang is different from Dasan in that he accepts Zhu Zi’s view that all things have goodness and spiritual brightness. He clearly states that animals have not been given the whole of *Inuijeji* and the purity, but we cannot say that they do not have them at all. The differentness between human beings and animals relies on partiality or wholeness. Oeam regards the differentness as relying on partiality as the physical nature and so emphasizes its original state. As for Namdang, the continuity of Nature and human beings which is the fundamental premise of the School of Zhu Zi or, broadly speaking, Neo-Confucianism are at the basis of his thought.47 Dasan rejects this fundamental premise and separate human beings from Nature.

V. The Logic of Differentiation and Its Meaning in the History of Confucian Thought

It is undeniable that Dasan rejects looking at human beings and animals from the viewpoint of *Inmulseong-dongron*. If so, does he succeed the Inmulseong-iron of the School of Ho? Geum Jang-Tae claims that “the fact that Dasan rejects *Inmulseong-dongron* does not mean that his position is the same as *Inmulseong-iron* of Neo-Confucian-

46. For the difference of the classification of things in Dasan and Xun-Zi, see Yoo Cho-ha, *ibid.*, pp. 17-22.
ism. Dasan’s conception of nature is very different from that of Neo-Confucianism in that he is not discussing the problem of *Inmulseong-Dongron* on the basis of the discussion of *li* and *gi.*\(^{48}\) This assessment is valid in the sense that Dasan’s ‘the inference of the liking of nature’ is different from ‘the nature is *li*’ of Neo-Confucianism and it also disentangles the theory of *li* and *gi*. However, as we have so far examined, Dasan and Namdang have something in common in that they claim the differnteness of human beings and animals is that of ‘original states.’ Also, they agree on the presentation of *li* as the theoretical basis and *mandate* or *destiny* as conferring that *li*. They stand upon the common ground of ‘the logic of differentiation.’

‘The logic of differentiation’ is also to be found in their recognition of realities. Dasan conceives that there is a hierarchy of social positions. He says that “since there is a person’s status between rulers and subjects, or between slaves and masters, and since there is a gap between them, as there is a gap between Heaven and Earth, there cannot be a change of hierarchy.”\(^{49}\) He regards ‘the differentiation of the classes’ as the core of politics\(^{50}\) and has the view of the civilized and the barbarian that distinguishes China from other nations. Thus, he has an idea of distinction between the noble and the low, the center and the civilized, and human beings and animals.\(^{51}\) The same line of thought can be found in Namdang’s confession that what he has tried to seek throughout his life is the criticism of no distinction between human beings and animals, no distinction between Confucianists and Buddhists, and no distinction between the civilized and the barbarian. On the basis of *Inmulseong-Iron*, that strictly distinguishes human beings from animals, Namdang tries to settle the party strife by distinguishing the civilized and the barbarian, and the nobler man and the inferior man.\(^{52}\)

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49. ibid.

50. ibid.

The division of Nature and human beings, and the Way of Heaven and the Way of human beings is also found in the history of Confucian thought in modern Japan. Maruyama Masao claims that the modern way of thinking derives from overcoming the natural characteristic of norms in Japanese Neo-Confucianism by means of the logic of artificiality by Ogyu Sorai and Ito Jinsai who belonged to the school of old studies. He interprets the flow of this history of thought as the process of disentangling the continuous structure of norms and Nature. Maruyama Masao claims that the modern way of thinking derives from overcoming the natural characteristic of norms in Japanese Neo-Confucianism by means of the logic of artificiality by Ogyu Sorai and Ito Jinsai who belonged to the school of old studies. He interprets the flow of this history of thought as the process of disentangling the continuous structure of norms and Nature. Maruyama Masao claims that the modern way of thinking derives from overcoming the natural characteristic of norms in Japanese Neo-Confucianism by means of the logic of artificiality by Ogyu Sorai and Ito Jinsai who belonged to the school of old studies. He interprets the flow of this history of thought as the process of disentangling the continuous structure of norms and Nature.53

Dasan accepts with criticism the interpretation of Classics by the Japanese school of old studies, because he sympathizes with their intention.54

‘The separation of Nature from human beings by ex-moralization,’ which can be also described as ‘the disentanglement of the continuity in the middle ages,’ is a notable event in the history of thought. As the phrase “Sincerity is the way of Heaven. The attainment of sincerity is the way of men and, ad infinitum,” in the Zhong Yong indicates, the Way of Heaven and the Way of human beings are essentially continuous. Zhu Zi shows the paradigm case of the Confucian way of thinking, which derives norms from existences by interpreting sincerity as the original state of the heavenly principle and the attainment of sincerity as the natural state of human affairs. However, Dasan, on the one hand, admits morality and autonomy to human beings and, on the other, denies morality to animals and, also, defines them to be subordinate to the law of nature. In this way, he separates human beings from the natural world. Now, ex-moralized nature is redefined as the ‘object’ that human beings enjoy and use. This is the ‘modernity’ that appears in

52. Jeon In-sik, ibid., p. 18.
55. As it appears in the art of the four gentlemanly plants, Confucianism formulates moral theories by deriving moral norms from Nature that human beings should follow. Choi Jin-won calls this ‘the norm of Nature’ Ganghogado Yeonu (A study of the method of singing in Gangho), PhD Thesis, Sungkyungkwan University, 1975, pp. 50-64).
Dasan’s thought.\textsuperscript{56}

Since a view of a thinker is the outcome of his various experiences and academic works, the fact that Dasan appears to use the similar method of discourse to Namdang is not direct evidence to conclude that he is in favour of \textit{Inmulseong-iron}. As noted earlier, the main characteristic that makes Dasan distinct from earlier scholars is that he attempted to separate human beings from Nature. In formulating this logic of differentiation, many elements were worked out. Among them are Xun-Zi’s hierarchical ontology, the idea of the separation of Heaven from human beings,\textsuperscript{57} the thought of Western Studies presented in \textit{The Tien Chu Shih} \textsuperscript{58} etc. \textit{Inmulseong-iron} that is the logic of differentiation in Neo-Confucianism functions as the background for the understanding of those elements. \textit{Inmulseong-dongiron} of 18th century was the reality for Dasan.\textsuperscript{59}

\textsuperscript{56} Yi Jeong-wu, “Dasan-ui Sayu-wa Geundaeseong (The thought and modernity of Dasan),” in \textit{Dasan-ui Gongburon-gwa Jisikron, Dasan Hakseol Munwhajaedan} vol. 2, 2000, pp. 57-62. Ahn Jae-sun has claimed as follows: The thought of \textit{Inmulseong-dongiron} that is the logic of differentiation by the school of Bookhak disentangles the difference between human beings and animals and admits the value of animals as animals. And so it suggests the significance of studying animals and using them. On the contrary, \textit{Inmulseong-budongron} maintained by Giho-Namir started in the hope of establishing the priority (morality) of human beings to animals and pursuing the realization of the universal reason, but it ended up presenting the view of seeing animals as animals because it raised the emphasis on the individual animal (\textit{ibid.} pp. 74-75). However, Dasan goes further to separate animals from human world and to regard them as the object of enjoyment and use.

\textsuperscript{57} Geum Jang-tae(1999), \textit{ibid.}, pp. 181-198.

\textsuperscript{58} Cf. Hankuk Sasangsa Yeonkuhoe, \textit{inseongmulseong-ron} (the theory of human nature and animal nature). Hangilsa, 1994. Among the contemporary scholars of Jeong Yak-yong included in this volume are Hong Jik-pil (1766-1852), Yi Ki-kyeong (1713-1787), Yi Hang-no (1792-1868), Kw Jeong-jin (1798-1879), Hong Dae-yong (1731-1783) etc. The debate of Horak started in the 17th Century and continued until the beginning of the 20th Century.
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Glossary

cheonbujimyeong wonjabudong The mandate conferred by Heaven is not originally the same
Cheonmyeong (Chin. Tienming) Heaven’s mandate
doshim the moral mind  
gijil the physical quality
Horak the schools of Ho and Rak
hyeonggi (Chin. xingqi) the shape and physical energy
ingijil in virtue of the physical quality
Inmulseong dongron the theory of the sameness of the original nature of human beings and animals
Inmulseong-dongiron the theory of whether human nature and animal nature are the same or different
Inmulseong-iron the theory of the differentness of the nature in human beings and animals
insumubun no distinction between human beings and animals
Itô Jinsai
japgijil mixed physical quality
Jeong Yak-yong Dasan
Kim Mae-sun principle
Mao Qi-ling Maruyama Masao
miballon the discussion of unarousedness
myeong (Chin. ming), mandate
Namdangip Collected works of Namdang
Nonseongdongbyeong The Discussion of the Sameness and the Differentness
Oeam Ogyu Sorai
olhaeagron the discussion of the Five Elements
sobujiri weonjabudong The li conferred is not originally the same
Taeguk (Chin. tai chi) the Supreme Ultimate
Tien Chu Shih Zhong Yong
Zi Si