

Beyond Turtleboats: Siege Accounts from Hideyoshi's Second Invasion of Korea, 1597-1598

Kenneth M. Swope
Ball State University

ABSTRACT

Toyotomi Hideyoshi's invasions, which lasted from 1592 to 1598, were perhaps the most traumatic events in the history of Korea. The war produced Korea's greatest national hero, Admiral Yi Sunsin, and it remains prominent in Korean historical consciousness. While Admiral Yi's exploits are well-documented in secondary literature, and rightly so, far less attention has thus far been accorded to other dimensions of the conflict, most notably the sieges that characterized most of the fighting during Hideyoshi's truncated second invasion. Even though the allies were seldom able to dislodge or completely defeat the Japanese invaders, they managed to effect a military victory by virtue of preventing the Japanese from launching any offensives and wearing them down through process of attrition. This article examines various accounts of the sieges of the second Japanese invasion of Korea and discusses their tactical and strategic significance. It also considers these sieges within the larger context of early modern siegecraft in Europe.

Keywords: Imjin war, sieges, Toyotomi Hideyoshi, Ming-Chosŏn relations, comparative military history

Introduction

The fact that the countries of the Korean peninsula have been at the forefront of the international news scene for the past few years should not surprise any student of Korea's past. Intermittently throughout its long recorded history Korea, or, more properly, various polities located in what is now the Korean peninsula, have been caught up in power struggles involving militarily more powerful neighbors. As early as the fourth century BCE, the ancient state of Old Chosŏn was invaded by the Chinese kingdom of Yan, which sparked the formation of a successor kingdom, Wiman Chosŏn, which bore many of the hallmarks of more advanced Chinese civilization to the west. This state in turn was invaded and crushed by Han(202 BCE-220 CE) China in 109 BCE. The Chinese then established a number of commanderies that functioned as proto-colonies in the Korean peninsula.¹ States in the Korean peninsula would be attacked again by China under the Sui(589-618) and Tang(618-907) dynasties, though it should be noted that the latter was in fact allied with the Korean kingdom of Silla. These later actions also involved Japanese interests on the peninsula, although neither the exact nature of the Japanese presence nor the precise interests of the Japanese Yamato state on the peninsula have

been definitively explained.² Still later the state of Koryo found itself in the unenviable position of serving as an unwilling accomplice in Khubilai Khan's two abortive invasions of Japan in 1274 and 1281. In the early Chosŏn(1392-1910) period Korea and China alike were frequently subjected to waves of piracy, attributed to the Japanese, but perpetrated by residents of all the East Asian states as well as buccaneers from as far away as Europe and Africa.

Nonetheless, it must be stressed that these outbreaks of international strife were more the exception than the rule. The Korea of the Koryŏ(935-1392) and Chosŏn dynasties was arguably more stable in terms of both domestic and foreign strife than either China or Japan over the same time frame, due both to the power of indigenous political structures and reasonably amicable foreign relations with the governments of both China and Japan. Chosŏn Korea and Ming(1368-1644) China, for example, exchanged regular diplomatic missions, enjoyed cultural and intellectual interchanges between their literati and religious elites and participated in joint military actions against common enemies such as the Jurchens. The Chosŏn government also managed to make its sea lanes secure through the establishment of coastal garrisons and the creation of trade arrangements with the Japanese that restricted the latter to trading in the environs of Pusan. Although there were sporadic outbreaks of violence such as a Korean naval campaign against Tsushima in 1449 and the Three Ports Revolt of 1510, in general early Chosŏn Korea was peaceful and prosperous with respect to international relations.

This state of affairs made things all the more shocking when a massive Japanese invasion force landed at Pusan in the middle of the fourth lunar month of 1592. Masterminded by Toyotomi Hideyoshi(1536-1598), the ensuing invasions, better known to most Koreans as the *Imjin waeran*[Japanese calamity of 1592], which lasted from 1592-1598, were perhaps the most traumatic events in the history of Korea. They involved hundreds of thousands of Korean, Chinese, and Japanese soldiers and even more civilians, and left the peninsula devastated for decades. The war produced Korea's greatest national hero, Admiral Yi Sunsin(1545-1598), and shrines and memorials to the conflict still dot the Korean countryside. Amongst Koreans the war is perhaps the single most significant national historical memory, dwarfing even the Korean War of the 1950s in its overarching long-term significance.³ Yet surprisingly enough, until quite recently, there were no full-length monographic studies of the war available in English.⁴ Given the profound impact the war had on all three major participants and the sheer number of extant primary source materials, this is a lacuna that invites filling.

More significantly for the purposes of this article, while Admiral Yi's exploits are well-documented in secondary literature, and rightly so, far less attention has

¹ This survey of early Korean history is based on the account given in Lee Ki-baik, 1984:16-21.

² For a recent examination of the war between the Sui and Tang Chinese, the Yamato Japanese, and the Three Kingdoms of Korea, see Batten, 2006:18-31.

³ On the historical and cultural significance of the conflict, see Haboush, 2003:415-442; Peter Lee, trans. 2000:38-43.

⁴ Two works have recently appeared, but neither is really an academic study based on primary source materials. See Hawley, 2005; Turnbull, 2002.

thus far been accorded to other dimensions of the conflict, most notably the sieges that characterized most of the fighting during Hideyoshi's truncated second invasion.⁵ For while they easily overran Korea's defenses in the spring and summer of 1592, the Japanese invaders were much less successful in their second attempt to conquer Korea due to vigorous allied resistance by the Chinese and Koreans that managed to check the Japanese advance and force them to retreat to an extended defense line that stretched from the vicinity of Ulsan on the east coast down to Sunchŏn on the south coast. Even though the allies were seldom able to dislodge or completely defeat the Japanese defenders, they managed to effect a military victory by virtue of preventing the Japanese from launching any significant offensives and wearing them down through process of attrition. In the end, upon the advice of his top generals in Korea, Hideyoshi ordered a withdrawal of Japanese forces, which was already well underway by the time of the *taikō*'s death in September of 1598.⁶ This article shall examine various accounts of some of the sieges of the second Japanese invasion of Korea and discuss their tactical and strategic significance. It will also suggest bases for comparison between these sieges and their early modern European counterparts.

Drawing upon my extensive reading of accounts produced by all three belligerents, I have attempted to reconstruct what I believe to be plausible narrative reconstructions of each siege. At the beginning of each narrative I will briefly describe how the events in question are rendered in the dominant narrative interpretation favored by each side. This should not be taken to imply that there are not sometimes differences between the accounts produced even by members of the same side. As you will see with the siege of Ulsan in particular, representations of events could often be clouded by political factors that might have very little to do with what happened and the battlefield as censorial officials often seemed predisposed to see potentially dangerous and subversive cabals everywhere. Keeping this point in mind, I will also draw attention to some of the discrepancies between the Chinese, Korean, and Japanese sources within the individual narrative account of each siege.

Before launching into a discussion of the sieges themselves, a few words about the conflict prior to 1597 are in order.⁷ In the fourth lunar month of 1592 a

⁵ On Yi Sunsin, see Park Yune-hee(1978). For translations of primary sources produced by Yi, see Ha Tae-hung, trans.(1981a and 1981b) Recently another extremely important document, the account of Korea's prime minister during the war, Yu Sŏngnyŏng, known in Korean as the *Chingbirok*, has also been translated into English as *The Book of Corrections: Reflections on the National Crisis During the Japanese Invasion of Korea, 1592-1598*. The original version of Yu's text is included in a recent Chinese compilation of materials on the invasion by Wu Fengpei and others. In the rest of this piece, I shall refer to the translation as *Book of Corrections* and the original as *CBR*. For a more complete discussion of the historiography of the conflict, see Swope, 2001:157-161, 379-383.

⁶ The title *taikō* translates as "retired imperial regent" and was adopted by Toyotomi Hideyoshi in 1591, when he designated his nephew, Hidetsugu, as his heir. Hideyoshi had attained the lofty title of *kampaku*, or imperial regent, in 1585.

⁷ There are far too many general histories of the Hideyoshi invasions to enumerate here, especially in Japanese. For starters, see Kitajima(2002), and Ishihara(1963). Also see *CNE*. I do not read Korean, so I cannot comment on the quality of the secondary literature in that language, though it is certainly voluminous. The primary accounts from all three participants are generally written in classical Chinese, thus allowing me to read them. In the summer of 2006 Sogang University hosted an

force of over 150,000 Japanese troops landed at the southeastern coastal city of Pusan. The stated Japanese goal was conquest of not only Korea, but China and India as well and the Koreans were regarded as but a nuisance to be dealt with along the way to greater things. There had been some warning of the invasion but Korea's faction-ridden court and military were ill prepared for the onslaught. In particular the Koreans were daunted by Japanese arquebus muskets, which they had been using for decades in Japan but were far less known in Korea.⁸ Within weeks the capital city of Seoul had fallen to the invaders and the King Sŏnjo(r. 1567-1607) and his court were fleeing to the north, stopping at the auxiliary capitals of Kaesŏng and Pyŏngyang before finally retreating to the border town of Ŭiju, on the Yalu River, where they beseeched Ming China, Korea's tributary overlord, to send military assistance. Although an initial Ming expeditionary force was badly beaten by the Japanese in the summer of 1592, a Ming negotiator managed to arrange a cease-fire with the invaders in order to buy time for the Ming to assemble a more formidable host. In the meantime Korean guerrillas sprang up all over the country and in conjunction with the naval exploits of the aforementioned Yi Sunsin, the Koreans managed to finally stem the tide of the Japanese advance.

In the first month of 1593 a Sino-Korean force of some 50,000 or so troops counterattacked the Japanese garrison at Pyŏngyang and overwhelmed them with superior firepower, most notably great cannon whose range and destructive power greatly exceeded that of the Japanese muskets.⁹ The allies then drove the Japanese south, quickly recapturing Kaesŏng, before their advance was temporarily checked at *Pyŏkchegwan*, just north of Seoul. Though some in the Chinese camp now advocated a temporary respite or even a retreat, a small detachment managed to burn the Japanese grain stores in the vicinity of the capital and the invaders were compelled to withdraw to fortified camps along Korea's eastern and southern coasts. A prolonged and bizarre period of peace talks then followed, with both the Chinese and Japanese negotiators deceiving their respective governments even as the Koreans were largely kept out of the process.¹⁰ The end result was that the talks fell apart entirely when Hideyoshi realized the true nature of the dealings and the angry Japanese leader organized a second invasion of Korea, this one punitive, with no "lofty" goals of world conquest.¹¹

As indicated above, the second invasion of Korea did not go nearly as smoothly as the first, at least from the perspective of the invaders. While on the one hand they did benefit from a factional intrigue that had resulted in the removal of Yi Sunsin from his position of military authority in Korea's naval forces, they also

international conference on the war in South Korea and the revised proceedings are expected to be published in Korean, Japanese, and English in late 2007. I am currently working on my own book on the war, tentatively entitled *A Dragon's Head and a Serpent's Tail: Ming China and the First Greater East Asian War, 1592-1600*, which is scheduled for publication by the University of Oklahoma Press in 2008.

⁸ For a more detailed look at the military technologies of the conflict, see Swope, 2005.

⁹ For an in-depth discussion of the battle of Pyŏngyang, see Swope, 2003.

¹⁰ The peace talks are treated in Swope, 2002.

¹¹ Since the Japanese technically never totally withdrew from Korea, it might be more correct to refer to this action as a second offensive.

now faced a much more experienced and less daunted foe. Once again Ming China would send help and this time they would blunt the Japanese advance before they even reached Seoul. The result was that unlike the first invasion, the second would see the Japanese on the defensive most of the time and would feature extended sieges. Even though the allies were never completely successful in rooting the Japanese out of their seaside fortresses, known as *wajō* [Japanese castles], they did prevent the invaders from carrying out any effective offensive actions after the autumn of 1597 and eventually convinced Hideyoshi and his generals that retreat was their only option.

A study of the major sieges of the second invasion reveals much about the nature of warfare in early modern East Asia. One also gets a sense of what the different combatants valued and how they perceived one another. The importance of internal politics and their relationship to events on the battlefield is also revealed. Finally, we can actually hear at least a few individual voices, accounts from the lowly as recorded by Korean, Japanese and Chinese chroniclers. In the rest of this piece I shall briefly examine accounts from the four major sieges of the second Japanese invasion of Korea(Namwŏn, Ulsan, Sachŏn, and Sunchŏn)and discuss them in light of these issues.

The Siege of Namwŏn

The first important siege of the second invasion was the Siege of Namwŏn, a fortress city located in south-central Korea. This is the only siege discussed herein in which the Japanese were the besiegers and it offers a fine picture of Japanese battle tactics and strategy. In particular, surviving Japanese sources give us a picture of the vengeful mentality of Hideyoshi's second offensive. They speak far more of individual glory than they do of larger tactical or strategic issues. There is no sense of the bigger picture, or any larger goal. Destruction and chaos itself seems to be the only goal. Thus it is possible to find both vainglorious accounts of samurai exploits and horrified expressions of dismay and remorse amongst Japanese chroniclers, depending upon their relationship to the action.

Indeed, starting with the Battle of Namwŏn, the Japanese forces also contained some of the most important chroniclers of the second invasion, namely the minor *samurai* Okochi Hidemoto, author of a book of reminiscences known as *Chōsen ki*[A Record of Korea], and the Buddhist priest Keinen(ca.1534-1611), who left behind one of the most poignant and descriptive memoirs of the entire war, a poem diary known as *Chōsen nichinichi ki*[Korea Day by Day].¹² This chronicle details the horrors of war with a level of sympathy unrealized by the vainglorious accounts presented by samurai eager for rewards or the terse accounts typically proffered by Chinese and Korean military censors. From the start of his journey as a physician and spiritual advisor to the daimyo Ōta Kazuyoshi, Keinen describes Korea as a veritable Hell, in which slavery, wanton slaughter and general human suffering play major roles.¹³

¹² Information on both of these sources can be found in Elison(1988:26-32). Elison also translates a few passages from each. Keinen's work has recently been republished with considerable commentary and analytical essays. See Keinen, 2000.

Chinese and Korean sources on this siege tend to focus upon the tactical mistakes made by the Chinese garrison commander, Yang Yuan, and upon the reluctance or inability of nearby Chinese and Korean units to come to the aid of the beleaguered defenders. In particular in Korean accounts, one notices a willingness to criticize the Chinese for refusing to listen to the good advice offered by their Korean allies, whom the Chinese generally treated as subordinates anyhow. While also holding Yang accountable for the battle's tragic outcome, Chinese sources stress that Yang made the mistakes that he did in large part because he refused to change his tactics to suit the rugged south Korean terrain. Yang was a cavalry commander, who had earned his stripes battling nomadic raiders along China's northern frontier. He favored flat ground rather than the mountain fortresses that constituted the bulk of Korea's defenses. This proved to be his undoing for even though he would be one of the few to survive the battle, he would eventually be publicly executed in Seoul for his failures. Additionally, Korean sources in particular emphasize the panic that gripped the populace immediately following the fall of Namwŏn.

Turning to the action itself, after a series of battles that routed the Korean navy at sea, the Japanese landed on Korea's southern coast and various divisions advanced towards Seoul "like the outstretched fingers of a hand seeking to extend its grasp around Korea."¹⁴ Meeting little resistance, a force estimated at approximately 60,000 and including many of the most prominent Japanese commanders, surrounded the city of Namwŏn in the middle of the eighth month, 1597.¹⁵

It seemed to many observers that Namwŏn was doomed to fall from the start. Or at least this is the impression one gets from reading the Korean sources on the battle. The Chinese defender of the city, Yang Yuan, and his Korean allies had assembled barely 4000 troops for the defense on the city. In addition to this serious numerical disadvantage, Yang had not made adequate use of the local topography. Nearby there was a *sansŏng* [mountain fortress] typical of the kind of defenses used to protect local populations throughout Korea.¹⁶ Had the allies and locals retreated to this fortress they most likely would have been able to withstand a protracted siege, as the invaders would have had to attack uphill and through forested terrain, as opposed to a level plain where they could easily surround the vastly outnumbered defenders. The Koreans urged Yang Yuan to relocate to the mountain hold, but Yang remained stubborn, exemplifying the high-handed behavior that unfortunately characterized many Chinese officers in Korea. As noted above, it was said that Yang, being a soldier from northern China, was unfamiliar with fighting in such terrain and he preferred the flat ground of Namwŏn and disdained the fighting styles of southern Chinese troops.¹⁷ This did not mean that Yang refrained from bolstering his defenses, however. He actually did quite a bit, adding walls, digging deeper trenches around the outside of the fortress, setting cannons up atop the

¹³ See Keinen, 2000:14-15; Elison, 1988:33-34.

¹⁴ Kitajima, 2002:80.

¹⁵ *SI*:714.

¹⁶ Traditional Korean fortresses are described in Bacon, 1961. Also see Turnbull, 2002:20-21.

main gates, and digging a small reservoir outside the fortress in the midst of which he built a fortification called Yangmajang, that he later altered to incorporate cannon into.¹⁸ He also had a network of fences built in the fields around the city, although ironically enough these would subsequently work to the advantage of the attackers.

When the Koreans saw the Japanese coming, most of them fled. Yang requested help from the Korean commander Yi Pŏngnam (d.1597), who arrived leading a few hundred more troops only after receiving several urgent missives from the Chinese general.¹⁹ Probing Japanese attacks commenced on the thirteenth day of the eighth month as about one hundred Japanese in the vanguard approached the fortress and launched musket volleys, a tactic that had served them particularly earlier in the war. The Japanese then dispersed themselves in the fields around the city and used the newly erected livestock fences for cover as they attacked in small units of three to five. On the fourteenth the numbers of the besiegers increased and the Japanese unveiled great siege ladders. They also started harvesting logs from the forested hills around the city for use in crossing the moat. Making use of stone and clay walls around civilian homes that had been torched just outside the south gate of the city, the enemy advanced in unison.²⁰ They also used covered wagons to get closer to the city gates, particularly the west gate.

Because the attackers operated in such small units, the large cannon mounted atop the walls had difficulty hitting them.²¹ The main Japanese army, made wary of the power of Chinese and Korean cannon by the experience of the first invasion, took care to remain outside firing range, hoping to goad the defenders into sallying forth. They eventually succeeded in their efforts according to the Korean chronicler Cho Kyŏngnam. Again we see Yang portrayed as an arrogant hothead who disdains the tactically sound advice of his Korean allies. Yang Yuan was worried that his inability to repulse the endless assaults would expose the weakness of his defenses. He proposed launching a desperate night attack to shock the enemy into at least temporarily lifting the siege, but his plan was rejected. Yang's Korean allies reasoned that if they mounted a stout enough defense, help might still arrive. But Yang rejected their advice and ordered 1000 volunteers to open the gates and sally forth. The Japanese feigned a retreat and lured the allies into an ambush beyond a

¹⁷ Throughout the war there was considerable rivalry between northern and southern Chinese troops and their commanders. The Koreans generally placed more faith in southern troops, whom they deemed more proficient in infantry based warfare and who had a record of battling so-called Japanese pirates [*wokou*]. See *CXSL*: 1040. (*Sŏnjo sillok 30th year, kwŏn 90:2*) This is a compilation of Korean sources on the Japanese invasions, mostly taken from *The Veritable Records of the Chosŏn Dynasty, or Chosŏn wangjo sillok*. I will include the original *kwŏn* and page number along with the citations from this compilation so that readers can consult the original Korean source if they wish. This compilation also contains the specific year, month, and date references for every entry. Also see *FBZ*: 528. This is another Korean account, compiled by a relative of the Korean royal family. As this edition was published in Taiwan, I use Chinese Romanization for the title. The Korean title is *Chaejo pŏngbang chi*.

¹⁸ See *FBZ*:528; Kitajima, 2002:80; Choi Byŏngnyŏn, trans. 2002:200, 210.

¹⁹ *CXSL*:1061 (*Sŏnjo sillok 30th year, 91:19*)

²⁰ *NC II*:144.

²¹ Choi Byŏngnyŏn, trans. 2002:210-211; *FBZ*:547.

stone bridge on the outskirts of the city. Yang quickly beat a hasty retreat, but suffered heavy casualties.²²

The next day the attackers closed in on the city from three sides and attacked with cannons and muskets as they had the day before. That night they launched a probing attack on the south gate, resulting in heavy losses for the defenders.²³ On the fifteenth day of the eighth month, the Japanese soldiers started cutting down wild grass and rice plants, bundling them into sheaves and piling them between the fences and walls. The evening witnessed another concerted Japanese attack with arrows and musket fire. The Japanese used their superior numbers to keep the pressure on the defenders who could never catch their breath as wave after wave of gun and arrow fire rained down. Even the elements seemed to betray the defenders as the moonlight rendered the evening as bright as day when it reflected off the green rice plants growing in the fields around the city.²⁴

At one point the Japanese commander Konishi Yukinaga(1558-1600) dispatched an emissary to ask Yang to abandon the city. Yang responded, "I have been a general since I was fifteen and I have traveled all over the empire and never have I not known victory in battle. Even now 15,000 crack troops are coming to defend this city. Now the Son of Heaven has ordered me to defend this city and I have not yet received an order to withdraw."²⁵ At this, Konishi laughed and said, "One thousand odd troops certainly cannot resist one million fierce soldiers. Korea accepts your sacrifice but will they have sympathy for your efforts later?"²⁶

The overmatched defenders somehow managed to hold out against the incredible odds for four days. They continued to rain cannon fire down on their besiegers. The weather was also soggy and depressing and bright late summer moonlight apparently aided the attackers more than the defenders. Finally the Japanese managed to move in close enough to secure the moat. Moving up against the most lightly defended portions of the city wall, the attackers piled up their bundles of rice and grass stalks they had harvested from the fields around the city. That night a great sound burst from the Japanese ranks and they attacked with a renewed fury, bullets and cannon balls coming down like rain. This lasted for one to two hours before it suddenly stopped.²⁷ By the time the defenders, many of whom had quailed within during the latest barrage, realized what was happening, the Japanese were atop the walls. Though initially driven back, some Japanese managed to enter and set things alight. Chaos ensued as fires broke out all over the city and the Chinese troops rushed to escape out the north gate but could not as there were simply too many horses "running around as if their legs were bound."²⁸

When the city gates were finally forced open by the defenders seeking to escape, they were confronted with Japanese troops several ranks deep. Many sim-

²² NC II:145.

²³ CXSL:1062. (*Sŏnjo sillok* 30th year, 91:20)

²⁴ SI:719.

²⁵ NC II:145.

²⁶ NC II:145.

²⁷ FBZ:548.

²⁸ FBZ:549, Choi Byŏnghyŏn, trans. 2002:212.

ply bowed their heads and allowed themselves to be decapitated.²⁹ Yang Yuan, seeing the situation was hopeless, fled the scene on foot with eighteen followers, though some maintained the Japanese deliberately allowed him to escape so he could bring word of the destruction of Namwŏn to the north.³⁰ All the other commanders died. Tōdō Takatora was the first Japanese commander to enter the city and was honored by Hideyoshi.³¹ All told, some 3900 were killed and nearly 2000 were captured, according to Japanese sources. Keinen noted that men and women, young and old alike, were all slaughtered indiscriminately so the Japanese soldiers could obtain noses, the grisly trophies they sent home for rewards from Hideyoshi.³²

The collection of noses is one of the most galling aspects of the second invasion for Koreans, but it became a symbol of the prowess of competing Japanese daimyo and a testament to their eternal martial glory. Moreover, the collection of noses was not confined to one's defeated battle foes. Ordinary peasants were also subjected to the indignity so that warriors could inflate their battle rewards. Cho Kyŏngnam, in his *Nanjung chamnok*, notes that many people actually survived having their noses severed and that for many years after the war there was an abundance of nose-less people in southern Korea.³³ Noses were pickled in brine and shipped back to Japan where they were inspected by Hideyoshi and eventually interred in a mound in Kyoto erroneously labeled the Mound of Ears [*mimizuka*], which was allegedly erected by the Japanese ruler to show mercy to the ghosts of his victims.³⁴ Additionally, leading commanders such as Shimazu Yoshihiro sent triumphant letters back to Hideyoshi boasting of their success and family chronicles immortalized these exploits for future generations.³⁵ A Chinese source says that barely 100 made it out of the city alive.³⁶

In terms of the strategic and military significance of the siege of Namwŏn, it reinforced Korean notions of the superiority of southern Chinese troops over their northern counterparts. Rivalries between northern and southern Chinese soldiers had simmered since the beginning of China's intervention and southern infantry troops were generally regarded as most effective in battling the Japanese, in part because they were supposedly better versed in the tactics of the late Ming general Qi Jiguang(1528-1588), who had bested the so-called Japanese pirates in the 1560s in south China. Qi's training manuals were widely adopted in Korea during and

²⁹ FBZ:549, Choi Byŏnghyŏn, trans. 2002:212.

³⁰ PRL:315. This contemporary Ming source contains chronicles of Chinese military actions against foreign and domestic foes in the Longqing(1567-1572) and Wanli(1573-1620) reigns. Also see SDZK:52. Yang Yuan would later be executed for his failure.

³¹ SI:721.

³² Keinen, 2000:17-18; Kitajima, 2002:81-85; Elison, 1988:28-30.

³³ NC II:137.

³⁴ Kitajima, 2002:85.

³⁵ Images of some of these communications can be found in Kitajima 2002:82-83. Shimazu Tadamori allegedly took thirteen heads himself. See Shimazu *kokushi*, *ken* 21:5a. This is a family history of the Shimazu clan, created from clan histories.

³⁶ See SI:721-722; PRL:316.

after the war.³⁷

The siege also demonstrated the importance of utilizing terrain to the best advantage, something the attackers clearly did. In that way it also proved the superiority of mountain based defenses versus isolated citadels on plains. For when the Japanese advance was checked at Chiksan a few weeks later, they retreated to isolated mountain strongholds rather than face equal or superior numbers in more vulnerable locales. In fact it was strange that Yang even chose to defend Namwŏn over the nearby mountain fortress because one of the stated goals of allied commanders in the second campaign was to make optimum use of Korea's formidable natural defenses. The defeat also temporarily threw the Koreans into a general panic and refugees scrambled north towards Seoul.

For the Japanese, the battle illustrated their response to the often overwhelming firepower of the allies and was just one more example of the kind of ingenuity displayed by Japanese field commanders throughout the war. It also demonstrated that they appreciated the value of superior numbers, an advantage they did not always enjoy, though it should be noted at this juncture that Japanese accounts from the time tended to exaggerate the number of enemy foes as well as inflate their own head counts in battle, a mistake that has been replicated in at least some of the modern accounts of the war. In fact it is doubtful that the Ming ever had as many as 80,000 troops in Korea at any one time, as opposed to well over 100,000 Japanese soldiers during both invasions. In any case, the victory at Namwŏn marked the high point for the Japanese during the second invasion. Although they would win future battles, they would never regain the momentum they enjoyed just after the victory at Namwŏn. This was because the defeat at Namwŏn galvanized the allied counteroffensive and led the Ming commanders Yang Hao and Xing Jie to dispatch their best subordinates to engage the Japanese south of Seoul, where they halted their advance in a sharp engagement that featured heavy use of firearms.³⁸ The Korean court also saw the error of its ways and restored Yi Sunsin to a position of authority and in tandem with Chinese naval forces, his fleet managed to cut Japanese supply lines to the west. The result was a tactical retreat along a several hundred mile front along Korea's eastern and southern coasts. The Japanese would essentially be on the defensive for the rest of the war and would face siege after siege before they finally withdrew in defeat.

The Siege of Ulsan

The Siege of Ulsan is probably the most interesting and well documented of the entire campaign, as the priest Keinen was once again present and there was a major factional crisis amongst the allies in the wake of the battle. It would probably be fair to say this siege could be viewed as a microcosm of the entire second invasion. With respect to the documentary coverage of the events in question, there is again some disparity in the interpretation of events, although all the sources seem to be

³⁷ Qi's works have remained in print. For a recent edition, see Qi, 2000. On the impact of Qi's thought in Korea, see Sun, 2004.

³⁸ On the significance of the Battle of Chiksan, see Li Guangtao, 1971. Also see *FBZ*:550-553.

generally in agreement about the course of the siege itself. Chinese sources focus on the command incompetence of the civil official in charge of the operation, Yang Hao. Among other things, Yang is accused of having an improper relationship with one of his military subordinates, Li Rumei, an official who already had a somewhat tarnished reputation prior to the war in Korea. Yang supposedly made poor decisions so that Li could earn the lion's share of the rewards after the battle was won. Along with other officials, Yang and Li would later be charged with being part of a dangerous cabal, thereby falling into the murky waters of factional strife that frequently engulfed late Ming officialdom. This is particularly relevant in that Yang Hao would later be recalled to service to battle the Manchus in the seventeenth century and the Ming would suffer a crushing defeat that presaged its eventual fall at the hands of these invaders. Later Chinese historians would trace Yang's incompetence back to Korea.

Korean sources, on the other hand, while admitting that the Ming commanders made some huge strategic blunders in this engagement, still tend to defend Yang Hao somewhat, primarily because Yang had been responsible for turning the tide of war the previous summer. As Gari Ledyard and myself have discussed elsewhere, Yang became one of the Chinese heroes of the war from the Korean perspective, and Yang was vigorously defended by his Korean allies against all charges leveled by Ming censors.³⁹ Japanese sources range from the heroic depictions of samurai fortitude and resilience found in daimyo chronicles to the poignant depictions of suffering found in the writings of Keinen. Once more the human dimension of the war is exposed in graphic detail and even victory cannot alleviate the hopeless despair felt by many of the Japanese soldiers.

As the invaders hunkered down for the winter in eleventh month of 1597, the allied commanders resolved to embark on a three-pronged assault, attacking the Japanese forces under Katō Kiyomasa at Ulsan, the forces under Konishi Yukinaga at Sunchŏn, and those under Shimazu Yoshihiro at Sachŏn. In the months following their retreat, the Japanese had embarked upon a crash program of fortress expansion and reinforcement, much of it completed by conscripts brought from Japan or slaves rounded up from the Korean populace who were forced to work day and night by Japanese overseers, a scene Keinen describes as being reminiscent of Hell itself.⁴⁰ The Japanese constructed a series of rings around the innermost fortress of Ulsan proper, a defense strategy that calls to mind the traditional layout of contemporary Japanese castles and one which was replicated throughout Korea.⁴¹

An allied force of some 44,800 troops set out from Seoul on January 14, 1598, gathering intelligence and determining to attack Katō Kiyomasa, regarded as the most dangerous of the Japanese generals, first, learning he was at Tolsan, a for-

³⁹ See Ledyard, 1988; Swope, 2007.

⁴⁰ Kitajima, 2002:89-90.

⁴¹ The Japanese colonial administration conducted extensive studies of the remains of Japanese built castles in Korea during the occupation in the first half of the twentieth century. See Ōta, 2002:35-48.

tified camp just south of the main fortress at Ulsan.⁴² Delighted at this news, the allies reached the outskirts of Ulsan two weeks later and enjoyed early success, pushing the Japanese back into the mountains as they smashed through the outlying defenses, reportedly taking 500 heads the first day and some 800 the next as the Japanese pulled back.⁴³ The Korean minister Yi Tökyong was cautiously optimistic, exclaiming, “This is what can certainly be called a minor victory. But when we exterminate the (Japanese) bandits at Sösaengpo and Pusan, then I will really be delighted.”⁴⁴

When the attack began in earnest, the sky was filled with arrows and cannons thundered, allegedly shaking heaven itself. High winds, chronicled in Keinen’s account, spread fires, throwing the Japanese into a panic as myriads perished in the flames.⁴⁵ Two Chinese commanders led their elite cavalry in an assault upon the central fastness of Ulsan, but were forced to retreat before a heavy counterattack, though they managed to entice the Japanese into an ambush that claimed 400 more Japanese lives.⁴⁶ The Japanese pulled back into the city as the allies tried to create further havoc by starting fires within, to no avail. In the meantime the allied commanders tried to get the Japanese to surrender.

There was much debate amongst the Japanese commanders as to what course of action they should take as they were sorely outnumbered and supplies were almost gone. The Japanese were already out of water and forced to collect snow to melt and drink and food supplies were so scarce that the besieged took to sneaking out of the fortress at night to search the bodies of the dead for scraps of food.⁴⁷ Many of these scavengers were captured by Chinese forces, who pumped them for information regarding the state of affairs within the city. The Japanese later resorted to eating paper and even mud in a desperate attempt to keep their bellies full. Keinen’s diary is replete with images of the suffering of the garrison and with his own belief that he would soon “go in bliss to paradise.”⁴⁸

The allies kept the pressure on. On the twenty-fourth day of the twelfth month, Chinese commanders attacked one of the reinforced outposts, firing the stockade around it. Five hundred more Japanese perished in the conflagration and the rest retreated further. Allied losses were also heavy. The next day they attacked the heavily fortified inner Tolsan fortress as the Japanese rained bullets down upon them, inflicting grievous losses once again. In the end, though, the allied forces, led by one Mao Guoqi’s southern troops, took the outer fortress, killing 661 more Japanese.⁴⁹ The Ming attacked the inner sanctum the following day only to be surprised by the arrival of Katō Kiyomasa himself at the head of 500 troops. The

⁴² FBZ:556-557.

⁴³ CXSL:1161(*Sönjo sillok*, 31st year, 96:1; FBZ:558).

⁴⁴ FBZ:558-559.

⁴⁵ Li Guangtao, 1969:545.

⁴⁶ SI:736.

⁴⁷ It is possible that the defenders also resorted to cannibalism, but the sources I have used here only refer to getting food from the corpses and to eating horseflesh.

⁴⁸ See Keinen 2002:69-73; Elison, 1988:34-37.

⁴⁹ MSJSBM:2378.

shocked besiegers proved unable to prevent the relief force from entering the city, though they still held the outlying areas.

The Japanese then shut the gates and waited for reinforcements, hoping the weather might impel the allies to lift the siege. The Chinese continued their assault as a commander named Chen Yin personally braved the arrows of the defenders to set up scaling ladders. Katō Kiyomasa galloped about the battle in white robes urging his men on. For the time being the allies were deterred by the high, stout walls of the fortress. The assembled generals held a meeting in which they decided to cut off the water supply and tighten their hold on the areas around the city, thereby starving them out. Fearing the Japanese would send a rescue force from Pusan, the Ming commander Ma Gui sent two officers to Yangsan and another to Namwön, while still another commander was detailed to guard the water approach from Sösaengpo.⁵⁰ For ten days and nights they besieged the Japanese, all the while under heavy fire from those within the fortress. Again the Ming had trouble getting their heavy cannon up the narrow roads leading to the fortress itself, as their men were exposed to heavy fire every time they tried to advance.⁵¹ It is said that spent shells piled up high within the fortress while the Japanese kept up their dogged resistance. Still, Ma Gui figured that the Japanese would soon be unable to resist for lack of food and water, as he estimated there were perhaps 10,000 Japanese in the city.

The allies stepped up their attack, pummeling the walls with heavy cannon, but to no great effect. The defenders continued to riddle them with bullets from their muskets. One of the Ming commanders managed to ascend the wall briefly, only to be clipped by an enemy bullet.⁵² On the evening of the twenty-fifth day of the twelfth month of 1597, the skies clouded over and freezing rain fell, turning the ground around the fortress into a quagmire. Ma Gui reported the allied forces continued to attack, and despite losing 700 Chinese and 200 Korean troops in the process, an equal number of Japanese were killed.⁵³ Yang Hao also received a tip that Katō Kiyomasa was planning to escape on his own. Further allied assaults claimed many more Japanese lives, and they even breached the wall for a short time before being turned back by the well-prepared defenders. Forty Japanese ships were spotted approaching on the Ulsan River, so 2000 southern Chinese troops and 1000 cavalry were dispatched to guard the riverbank. Captured Japanese reported Katō had fled two nights before. Yi Tökyong and the Korean general, Kwön Yul, reported that the rains continued to fall and they were hopeful the Japanese would soon capitulate though there were rumors Katō was returning, if in fact he ever left. The battle raged again the following night, as lead from the besieged came down with the rain, inflicting heavy casualties on both the Chinese and the Koreans. At one point Yang Hao pulled the Chinese forces back to rest, telling Kwön Yul to lead Korean troops in the attack. Kwön did so and suffered

⁵⁰ SDZK:54.

⁵¹ CXSL:1162(*Sönjo sillok* 31st year, 96:2).

⁵² CXSL:1163(*Sönjo sillok* 31st year, 96:2-3).

⁵³ CXSL:1163-1164(*Sönjo sillok* 31st year, 96:3-5).

heavy losses in a hail of Japanese bullets.⁵⁴ There was reason for hope however as captured Japanese reported the situation within the city was growing worse by the day. They also reaffirmed the fact that Katō himself was still in the city.⁵⁵

On the thirtieth day of the twelfth month, the Japanese sent a letter to the besiegers which read, “We want to negotiate a peace agreement, but no one in the city is literate(in Chinese). There is a Buddhist monk on a boat in the river. If you dispatch an envoy(to meet him) then we can negotiate.”⁵⁶ Considering the Japanese situation, the attackers decided not to negotiate. The Japanese still held out some hope, both because they received word that help was on the way and because spies reported there were no cooking fires in the Ming camp, meaning that they were also running low on food.⁵⁷

Finally, three days later, just as Japanese resolve was crumbling and they were on the verge of capitulating, Konishi Yukinaga arrived by sea with a large relief column.⁵⁸ Konishi was initially reluctant to advance, seeing the numbers arrayed against him. Instead he sent a force of 3000 crack troops upriver to see if there might be a weakness somewhere in the allied lines. Yi Tōkhyong saw this and sent word to Yang Hao. Yang then asked Yi what he felt they should do. Yi replied that allied forces should be able to hold the relief columns off until the city fell but Yang was less sure, pointing out that thus far they had attacked the city for several days to no avail but with grievous losses. As it turned out, at least two probing assaults by the relief column were turned back.⁵⁹ In addition to this fact, the great sleet that had been falling for days continued, seriously hindering the assault, and the cold and lack of adequate fodder conspired to kill many horses.⁶⁰

Reports came in suggesting as many as 60,000 Japanese troops were on the way to rescue the garrison at Ulsan. Therefore, Yang, apparently believing he was about to be flanked, fled the field, causing the entire allied army to break ranks. The Japanese were overjoyed. They emerged from Ulsan to attack the Chinese and Koreans as they fled, killing over 10,000, according to some accounts.⁶¹ Countless weapons and suits of armor were reportedly abandoned as soldiers fled for their lives. The allied troops might have been completely wiped out had it not been for the valiant efforts of Mao Guoqi and another Ming commander, who turned back the Japanese onslaught with heavy losses.⁶² On the other hand, according to the Chinese general Li Rumei, while some 3000-4000 Chinese and Korean troops were killed, they also inflicted significant casualties on the Japanese, which forced them

⁵⁴ Li Guangtao, 1969:553.

⁵⁵ CXSL:1165(*Sōnjo sillok* 31st year, 96:5-7).

⁵⁶ CXSL:1167-1168(*Sōnjo sillok* 31st year, 96:9-10).

⁵⁷ SI:744; Elison, 1988:36; FBZ:561.

⁵⁸ On the arrival of the Japanese relief column and the panic it caused, see *Shimazu kokushi* 21:6b-7a.

⁵⁹ FBZ:559-560.

⁶⁰ CXSL:1972(*Sōnjo sujong sillok* 31st year, 31:7).

⁶¹ For Chinese investigations of casualty figures, see CXSL:1420(*Sōnjo sillok* 31st year, 107:29).

⁶² See MSJSBM:2378; FBZ:568-569.

to break off their counterattack.⁶³ The Ming Military Commissioner Yang Hao returned to Seoul, dispatching his subordinates to other strategic locales with orders to prepare for another offensive.

While this defeat was extremely disheartening for the allies, it did not really change the course of the war, though it could be argued that the failure at Ulsan prolonged matters. The Japanese were still not of a mind to launch any more offensives and in the face of certain future assaults by even larger allied forces, many Japanese commanders pushed for an end to the war and advocated a general retreat. Perhaps the greatest damage done took place in the aftermath of the siege as the battle was initially reported as a victory to Chinese officials back in Beijing.⁶⁴ When contrary reports of the outcome started rolling in and a vociferous Ming military censor with an axe to grind got involved, the defeat embroiled large segments of both Chinese and Korean officialdom, including the Korean king himself in a storm of controversy that threatened to undermine the entire Sino-Korean alliance. In the end Yang Hao was dismissed and King Sōnjo nearly abdicated his throne.⁶⁵

In terms of siegecraft, the siege of Ulsan comes the closest to a classic siege amongst the four under discussion here.⁶⁶ The allies pressed the attack for a total of thirteen days and were prepared to starve the defenders out. They almost definitely would have succeeded had the relief column not arrived and may well have succeeded even with the arrival of the relief forces if Yang Hao had decided to make a stand at the river that led to sea and prevented the reinforcements from effecting a landing. Again we see the importance of firearms as the Japanese were able to repulse assault after assault with concentrated musket fire. After Japan's defeat in the Battle of Pyōngyang in 1593, they had adopted the general strategy of establishing themselves in high fortified positions with narrow approaches so as to negate the effects of superior Chinese firepower. Attacking forces would therefore be subjected to concentrated musket fire along narrow approaches, inevitably sustaining very heavy casualties.

This principle was very much in evidence during the siege of Ulsan. The rugged terrain and narrow approaches leading up to the fortress proper made it difficult for the allies to get their big guns into position for use against the fortress walls. Instead they had to come in waves and tried to burn out the defenders with fire arrows as recorded by Keinen: “Since the doors had not yet been installed in the gate, the Chinamen were able to swarm inside, and they started shooting furiously with fire arrows from alongside the walls and from the bottom of the stone parapets. The smoke was so thick that no one could keep his eyes or his mouth open.”⁶⁷

⁶³ CXSL:1172(*Sōnjo sillok* 31st year, 96:15-16).

⁶⁴ FBZ:572.

⁶⁵ For details on this fascinating episode, see the excellent articles by Ledyard, 1988; Li Guangtao, 1982.

⁶⁶ For information on siege tactics and techniques in Medieval Western Europe, see Richard L.C. Jones. In Keen, 1999:163-185.

⁶⁷ Translated in Elison, 1988:35. For the original, see Keinen 2000:73-74.

Chronicles written by survivors on both sides of the siege attest to the terrible hardships suffered by all the troops and offer glimpses into the harsh realities of warfare in early modern East Asia. They are also reminiscent of accounts written by participants in the Korean War of the 1950s who often dwell upon the frigid cold of Korean winters. It was certainly no accident that many Japanese commanders pulled out of Korea shortly after the siege of Ulsan, including Keinen's own lord. Indeed Hideyoshi's generals were almost unanimous in advocating withdrawal. When he questioned them about the situation in Korea, they said, "Korea is a big country. If we move east, then we have to defend the west; if we attack to our left, then we are assailed on the right. Even if we had another ten years the matter still might not be resolved." Thereupon Hideyoshi complained of his advanced age and the fact that there appeared to be no way out of the quagmire and asked them, "If we were to stop the troops and sue for peace, what then?" At this the generals all answered, "That would be best."⁶⁸

Overall, things were relatively calm for most of 1598 as the Japanese slowly returned home and Hideyoshi's physical and mental condition steadily declined. The allies bided their time and maintained defensive positions, the Koreans consistently pressing for more aggressive action. There were occasional skirmishes as Japanese troops emerged from their strongholds to loot and Korean irregulars harassed the occupying troops. It was clear that the war was not going to be pressed by the attackers any longer and both sides were eager for a final resolution. By the time Hideyoshi died in the eighth month, only ten of the thirty leading Japanese generals remained in Korea and the five elders who now governed Japan for Hideyoshi's young son ordered the final withdrawal of remaining forces in Korea.⁶⁹ The allies determined to make them pay and decided to launch a series of final offensives on the treating Japanese. By the autumn of 1598 they had decided to launch a four-pronged assault on the Japanese positions at Ulsan, Sachön, and Sunchön, with another group patrolling the seas under the joint command of Yi Sunsin and the Chinese commander Chen Lin.

The main allied force of over 30,000 was under the command of Ma Gui and advanced towards Ulsan. Ma still believed defeating Katō Kiyomasa was critical to ousting the Japanese from Korea. The allied advance was effective, as Ma made good use of his numerical superiority and learned from his experiences earlier in the year. His forces managed to kill more than 2,200 Japanese and torch their provisions as they retreated and escaped to sea.⁷⁰ A clean victory was denied Ma, however, as his men were lured into a trap and were eventually forced to pull back, giving the Japanese the opportunity they needed to escape. Katō's men boarded their ships in the dead of night on December 14, just as their allies were sailing to their doom in the straits of Noryang.

⁶⁸ Cited in Li Guangtao, 1986:831.

⁶⁹ Kitajima 2002:93-94.

⁷⁰ See MS:6201.

The Siege of Sachön

This was another exciting and controversial battle, immortalized in Japanese art and called a defeat snatched from the jaws of victory by the Chinese scholar Li Guangtao.⁷¹ In it the allied Sino-Korean forces once again defeated the Japanese in a series of smaller engagements and forced them to the brink of capitulation in another siege, only to be undone by a bizarre episode that has still to be satisfactorily explained. With respect to the documentary evidence, on the Chinese side, we find patsies and fall guys and the usual charges of incompetence in battle, this time the blame falling upon commanders who were presumably unversed in the use of gunpowder, a surprising charge given that all Ming units were supposed to undergo firearms training in Beijing on a regular basis. The Korean sources are once more critical of their Ming allies, especially their disciplinary breakdown at the battle's key moment. Japanese sources, most notably the Shimazu family chronicles, emphasize the resolve of the doughty Japanese against seemingly overwhelming odds. According to these obviously embellished accounts, the Shimazu cut their way through the enemy with such acumen that more than 30,000 noses were taken, a figure that exceeds allied projections for the total number of troops even present at the battle. Additionally one might ask if the Shimazu were so completely and utterly triumphant, why did they not continue their advance and take the fight to their fleeing enemies as they promised after the battle?

The Chinese general Dong Yiyuan was charged with attacking Shimazu Yoshihiro and his son, Tadatsune, at Sachön. The decision to engage the Shimazu was part of the overall allied strategy to dislodge the invaders from their coastal strongholds once and for all. The ouster of the Shimazu was deemed the most important of any of the allied columns' actions because the Shimazu and their fortress were regarded as the linchpins in the Japanese foothold on the Korean peninsula. According to the Chinese and Korean records, Dong Yiyuan led about 15,000 men against the Japanese. Some Japanese sources, on the other hand, contend that Dong led as many as 200,000 men, reflecting the propensity for exaggeration that is typical in Japanese chronicles of this war, especially the family histories.⁷²

Sachön was actually comprised of two major fortresses and a number of outlying structures. The original structure was built by the Koreans and occupied by the Shimazu after the sack of Namwön in 1597. The newer castle was built by the Japanese between 1597 and 1598.⁷³ This structure was built on a hill overlooking the sea to the rear of the original fortress. The route leading to the castle was again narrow and easily defended, as was the preference of the Japanese. Both fortresses were defended by stone walls and wooden stockades. The perimeter defenses extended some forty *li* around the main structures.

⁷¹ Li Guangtao, 1972:260.

⁷² See CNE:316. It is possible that the Japanese are including the Korean forces in their figures, which are estimated to have been perhaps as many as 200,000, albeit scattered over the entire country. See FBZ:603.

⁷³ See *Shimazu kokushi* 21:5b-6a.

In examining the Japanese defenses from afar, Mao Guoqi remarked that they looked like a snake stretching to the sea and all they had to do was cut off the snake's head (Shimazu Yoshihiro) and the whole snake would die.⁷⁴ After breaking their camp at Chinju and crossing to the south bank of the Nam River, the allies advanced steadily under cover of night. Advance scouts took twelve Japanese heads in a skirmish at Kūmyang.⁷⁵ Riding the tide of victory, they continued to seize outposts and burn wooden stockades, thereby greatly damaging Japanese morale. Dong Yiyuan, however, was cautious and decided to halt his army for seven days to await news of the army to his west. The Korean general Chōng Chaenyōng, on the other hand, wanted to take the fight to the enemy. Finally, on the twenty-seventh day of the ninth month, Dong acceded to Chōng's requests and assembled 2000 infantry and 1000 cavalry to join Chōng, who had 4000 troops under his banner, and they advanced towards Sachōn.⁷⁶ Upon reaching the outermost defenses of Sachōn, the allies were engaged in furious combat by the enemy. The fighting was especially thick in the middle ranks and the Sino-Korean forces managed to kill a Japanese officer in resplendent armor, allegedly with a single arrow from the bow of one Fang Shixin, in addition to killing 130 regular soldiers.⁷⁷

The allies estimated that the defenders had no more than 10,000 *shi* of provisions within the fortress and had inside information that there was only one well within the stronghold, meaning that the defenders certainly could not hold out for long.⁷⁸ One of the Chinese commanders, Mao Guoqi, whom the reader will recall had survived the siege of Ulsan, was uncertain, however, suspecting some sort of ruse. Nevertheless, armed with this inside information and possibly assistance, the allies managed to burn a great number of outer buildings and capture two more stockades, even as the defenders sent forth small units to disrupt these operations. As a result, the old fortress was also seized with relative ease, as the Japanese retreated to the fortress closer to the sea.

At this juncture the attackers pursued the Japanese back to the walls of the old fortress itself before pulling back a bit. Japanese records indicate that Shimazu Tadatsune was itching to fight, while his father counseled staying inside the sturdy fortress walls. Nonetheless, Tadatsune did manage to shoot a couple of attackers with arrows from atop the fortress walls.⁷⁹ Meanwhile, the allied commanders debated their course of action as well. Some wanted to wait for further reinforcements to arrive from Tolsan. Chōng Chaenyōng in particular argued that since there were no wells in the city, it would be best to simply station enough men around the city to prevent an escape and wait as morale declined. Eventually thirst would force the weakened garrison to come forth to do battle. Mao Guoqi concurred, reasoning that even though the allies had won several skirmishes, they had

⁷⁴ PRL:366.

⁷⁵ FBZ:626.

⁷⁶ FBZ:627.

⁷⁷ FBZ:627; Yi Hyōngsōk, 1974:1560, which cites another Korean source.

⁷⁸ See Yi Hyōngsōk, 1974:1561.

⁷⁹ CNE:316.

killed or captured relatively few and victory was by no means certain. However, Dong Yiyuan, perhaps over-confident on account of the relatively easy victories he had already gained and belittling the fighting skills of the Japanese according to some accounts, was in favor of pressing the attack immediately. Addressing the other commanders he supposedly said heroically as he stroked his beard, "When the thunder claps, who has time to cover his ears?"⁸⁰

So, on the first day of the tenth month, the full-scale assault on Sachōn began. The Chinese commanders Mao Guoqi, Peng Xingu and Ye Bangrong led three infantry divisions in the frontal assault. Cavalry units under Ma Chengwen and others were deployed to the left and right in supporting positions. The allied troops hit the walls again and again with cannon fire and battering rams from dawn until mid-afternoon. The Japanese responded in kind. Though one of the outlying forts remained in Japanese hands, the allies decided to concentrate on the main prize. The Japanese knew they were in a tough spot and Shimazu Yoshihiro even remarked to one of his subordinates that, "If reinforcements don't come soon, this will be my grave."⁸¹ The Korean general Chōng Chaenyōng was alongside Peng Xingu in the vanguard, smashing the gate with a great battering ram.

Finally, on the third day of the tenth month of 1598, the allies managed to breach the walls. Just as they were streaming in to finish off the enemy, however, a magazine of gunpowder exploded, though it is still unclear whether the explosion was touched off accidentally by the attackers or intentionally by the defenders. The allied forces panicked amidst the confusion, horses and men stampeding one another in their haste to retreat. Hao Sanpin, Mao Guoqi and Ye Bangrong tried to rally the allied forces for a counterattack while waiting for nearby reinforcements, but their efforts met with little success. Thus, with one unanticipated explosion were all their prior achievements undone. After a quick meeting the Ming generals decided to adopt a defensive stance, at least temporarily. And as word of the debacle spread through the countryside, refugees started streaming north towards Hapchōn.⁸²

It is still unclear whether the explosion was touched off accidentally by the attackers or intentionally by the defenders. Most Chinese accounts charge that Peng Xingu, who was said to be unfamiliar with gunpowder in spite of his previous service in the capital guards, ignited Japanese gunpowder stores as he forced the gates open with cannon and battering rams.⁸³ This is born out by some of the Korean records as well.⁸⁴ But other sources maintain that the Japanese actually set a trap for the attackers. Realizing he was sorely outnumbered, Shimazu Yoshihiro dispatched some trusted retainers to steal outside the walls and plant gunpowder filled jars under the ground just outside the main gate. The defenders initially did

⁸⁰ Cited in Yi Hyōngsōk, 1974:1560.

⁸¹ Cited in Li Guangtao, 1972:261.

⁸² Yi Hyōngsōk, 1974:1561-1562.

⁸³ for example, SDZK:57; PRL:371. Dong Yiyuan's *Ming shi* biography also states that the Japanese set off the explosion on purpose. See MS:6214. Also see the Korean account in CXSL:1375-1376 (*Sōnjo sillok* 31st year, 105:17), which blames Mao Guoqi's subordinates. A Japanese version of events can be found in *SI*:757-760. Also see *Shimazu kokushi* 21, 8b-12a.

⁸⁴ Yi Hyōngsōk, 1974:1560.

what they could to hold the gate, but when it became obvious it was going to fall, they raised a cry and the explosion was set off just as the attackers started breaching the defenses.⁸⁵ Still another version of the event suggests that the Chinese battering ram was equipped with explosives that discharged either by accident or were intentionally set aflame by the Japanese at the key moment.⁸⁶

In any case, the explosion created chaos in the allied ranks as smoke and flames filled the breach they were trying to scramble through. Dong Yiyuan himself barely escaped with his life. The defenders took advantage of the situation to sally forth and inflicted heavy losses on the allied troops, though allegations of taking over 30,000 heads are almost certainly greatly exaggerated.⁸⁷ Nevertheless, it is said that only 50-60 of Peng's contingent of 3000 men survived the attack and Mao Guoqi lost 600-700 more.⁸⁸ Korean sources tend to agree with these figures.⁸⁹ Even worse from a military standpoint, the Japanese recovered valuable supplies and provisions.⁹⁰ Dong Yiyuan then called for a general retreat to Sangju to await reinforcements. The Japanese did not pursue them because they lacked both the necessary numbers and provisions. Subsequent censorial investigations called for the execution of the soldiers deemed responsible for the blunder, and Hao Sanpin and Ma Chengwen were beheaded in front of the troop because the cavalry units had been the first to bolt and were therefore deemed the most responsible for causing the panic. Peng Xingu, who according to most of the accounts was inexperienced in the use of gunpowder, actually blamed his Korean allies.⁹¹ Dong Yiyuan was given the chance to redeem himself by meritorious service, although he was demoted three grades in rank.⁹² Ironically enough, Peng Xingu was also given the chance to restore his rank and position through service.

In order to buy some time, Dong sent Mao Guoqi to negotiate with Shimazu Yoshihiro. Upon seeing his Chinese counterpart, Shimazu gloated, boasting "Today was a great victory for me. First I'll seize Seoul, then I'll head west and soon you'll see me in Liaodong!"⁹³ Dong was concerned when he heard this, and he dispatched a messenger west to warn Yang Hao's replacement, Xing Jie. Xing, on the other hand, was livid, saying, "Don't resume peace talks. I'll kill you before I

⁸⁵ This version is presented in *NC II*:203.

⁸⁶ Turnbull, 2002:220; *MSJSBM*:2378.

⁸⁷ Shimazu clan records claimed they took 38,700 Ming heads at Sachön, impossible if Ming and Korean records of troop strength are to be believed. See *Shimazu kokushi* 21:12a; *MSJSBM* :2378. Kitajima Manji notes that Shimazu claims that there were 80,000 enemy troops besieging Sachön seem greatly exaggerated. The Japanese erected a memorial to the Korean dead the next year at Koyasan Temple in Japan. See Kitajima, 2002:95.

⁸⁸ *PR*:372.

⁸⁹ The *Veritable Records of the Chosön Dynasty* provides an estimate of 7000-8000 dead. See *CXSL*:1372. (*Sönjo sillok* 31st year, 105:13)

⁹⁰ Yi Hyöngsök, 1974:1560. Korean sources indicate the loss of 12,000-20,000 *shi*(sok) of supplies.

⁹¹ Yi Hyöngsök, 1974:1560.

⁹² *SDZK*:57.

⁹³ Cited in Li Guangtao, 1972:262.

authorize doing that!"⁹⁴ Xing also said he was raising more troops to send against Shimazu, who reportedly lost color when he heard Xing's angry response to his threats. According to Chinese and Korean accounts, these warnings convinced the Japanese commander to withdraw and his men were forced to fight as they embarked on their ships and set sail for Sunchön, losing fifty men to Chöng Chaenyöng. Japanese chronicles unsurprisingly paint a different picture, maintaining that after this victory the allies lifted all their sieges and afforded the invaders the opportunity to effect an orderly retreat, noses in tow, so to speak.

When Dong Yiyuan entered the abandoned fortress on the seventeenth day of the eleventh month, there were only a few old and sick Japanese left, along with three female Korean prisoners. He also found a great deal of treasure, including gold, silks, decorative fans, and fancy carriages, all stolen from the Koreans.⁹⁵ The next day they burned the remaining Japanese built structures to the ground.⁹⁶ Within days the last battle of the war would end in a bittersweet victory for the allies in Noryang Straits where Yi Sunsin was slain in battle even as thousands of Japanese met their doom at the bottom of the sea.

As for the Battle of Sachön, it was indeed a military disaster for the allies. After all they were on the brink of cutting all the Japanese commanders off from one another and therefore poised to strike a blow that might have greatly changed the memory of the war in Korea, China, and Japan. But with their improbable victory, the Battle of Sachön became symbolic of the indomitable samurai spirit and willingness to fight on against seemingly insurmountable odds. It also proved to be very lucrative for the Shimazu clan. Their fief was greatly increased upon their return to Japan and Shimazu Tadatsune was awarded a ceremonial ancestral blade.⁹⁷ Their alleged taking of 38,700 noses became an established part of Japanese folklore. Throughout the ensuing Tokugawa era in Japan, Korean envoys were reminded of the atrocities committed by the Japanese whenever they visited Kyoto.

But as devastating as the defeat may have been initially, in the broader strategic sense it meant very little. In this sense, the Battle of Sachön was similar to the debacle at Ulsan earlier in the year. It had clearly been a tactical defeat for the allies, but the Japanese were not in a position to take advantage of their success. Despite his boastful words to the contrary, Shimazu Yoshihiro was well aware that he had no real chance of advancing towards Seoul. He had managed to buy himself some breathing space, but the odds were clearly stacked against him. The best the Japanese could do was make an orderly retreat, their version of "peace with honor" if you will. And given what happened in the subsequent Battle of Noryang Straits, they proved unable to do even that. Had the situation truly been as favorable as suggested by Japanese records, they surely would not have lost thousands of men in these final engagements. By the fall of 1598, the war in Korea was lost and all

⁹⁴ Cited in Li Guangtao, 1972:262.

⁹⁵ *PRL*:381.

⁹⁶ *FBZ*:634.

⁹⁷ Yi Hyöngsök, 1974:1563, citing *Seikan roku*.

the Japanese commanders knew it. The first order of business was getting back to Japan for the showdown between the supporters of Hideyoshi's young heir, Hideyori, and those of Tokugawa Ieyasu, who was destined to become Japan's next shogun, in large part because he had managed to avoid getting himself entangled in Hideyoshi's Korean adventure.

The Siege of Sunchŏn

With the final siege under consideration here, the siege of Sunchŏn, we find many of the same historiographic tropes we have already discussed in evidence. Again when reading Korean sources, the Chinese come off as being rather half-hearted in their efforts against the Japanese, not to mention downright avaricious and duplicitous. Both Liu Ting, the Chinese commander on land, and Chen Lin, the Ming commander of naval operations, are accused of accepting or soliciting bribes from the Japanese commander, Konishi Yukinaga. Both are also portrayed as arrogant bullies who constantly needed to be browbeaten or shamed into proper behavior by their Korean counterparts. As might be expected, the Chinese sources paint a much different picture. While the Ming commanders are understandably cautious, they are not unwilling to engage the enemy. And meetings with envoys of Konishi Yukinaga were arranged to facilitate his capture, not come to some sort of arrangement assuring his survival. It is interesting to note, however, that both of these portrayals of Chen and Liu are in keeping with their overall representations in the Ming literature. Both Chen and Liu were accused of accepting bribes or attempting to bribe other officials at various times during their careers. Yet nothing was ever substantiated. Indeed, it is difficult to find any high Ming official who was not accused of such actions. Moreover, both Chen and Liu had generally exemplary service records and both were amongst the most decorated military commanders of their day.

The Japanese accounts of this siege stress the fortitude and savvy of Konishi Yukinaga in both fighting and negotiating with foes at land and sea while he bought time as he awaited rescue by his allies. They also tend to bear out the fact that heavy fighting did take place, particularly on the landward side of the action. While Konishi certainly attempted to buy his freedom, it is not clear whether or not he really trusted his Chinese counterparts to live up to their end of any potential bargains, especially since Liu Ting had attempted to use false pretenses once to capture Konishi. Japanese versions of the siege also give a fair amount of credit to Yi Sunsin for his role in keeping the pressure on the invaders from the sea.

Getting to the siege itself, Liu Ting, who controlled about 24,000 allied troops, was ordered to attack Konishi Yukinaga at Sunchŏn as the other commanders were advancing on their targets.⁹⁸ His land troops were supported by a naval force of over 20,000 led by Chen Lin and Yi Sunsin. The full-scale allied offensive was launched late in the ninth month. Because Konishi's fortress of Yegyo at

⁹⁸ Liu Ting (1552-1619), better known to his contemporaries as Big Sword Liu (Liu Da Dao), was one of the most renowned and colorful of all the Ming generals. He earned considerable distinction fighting aboriginal rebels in southwest China prior to his service in Korea. He eventually died battling the Latter Jin forces in 1619 in Liaodong.

Sunchŏn was well fortified and additionally protected by mountains and the sea, Liu first tried to trick Konishi into surrendering by dispatching a subordinate to invite Konishi and fifty followers to meet with Liu and discuss some sort of arrangement whereby the Japanese would be allowed to withdraw.⁹⁹ Unsuspecting, Konishi agreed, and brought fifty retainers along with him to meet with Liu. In the meantime, Liu stationed men all around his tent and told them to wait for a signal to emerge from hiding and slaughter the guards and capture Konishi. When the Japanese commander arrived, Liu broke out the wine and they started talking. Unfortunately, the signal was not properly sounded and fighting broke out between the two sides. In fact Liu found himself in dire straits until a contingent of aboriginal tribespeople came to his rescue.¹⁰⁰ Konishi jumped on his horse and galloped away to safety. Japanese sources credit one Matsura Shigenobu with ferreting out the ambush and making sure his men were alert. Though Matsura was wounded, his valor enabled Konishi to escape.¹⁰¹

In spite of these problems, the next day Konishi remained very obsequious towards Liu, even sending him a female companion. This behavior was the basis for allegations that Liu was bribed by Konishi.¹⁰² Konishi's ploy failed, though, as Liu led his men in attacking the Japanese fortress. The allied forces killed ninety-two men and took the bridges leading up to the fortress. Chen Lin launched a simultaneous attack by sea. Chen's initial assault was successful as his squadron wiped out a large supply convoy.¹⁰³ Seeking to press his advantage, Chen sailed up the narrow islets in an attempt to land behind enemy lines. Undaunted, the Japanese troops rallied and drove their assailants back when the tide ebbed and stranded much of Chen's fleet. Chen himself narrowly escaped alive. Further skirmishes followed as allied troops assaulted the fortress via the narrow mountain approaches and were driven back. The Japanese tried to fight their way out the northeast corner of the stronghold, but were forced to retreat. Korean sources record there was much friction between allied commanders as they seemed unable to coordinate their efforts properly.¹⁰⁴

Though he managed to prevail temporarily, Konishi's time in Korea was just about up and he knew it. Shimazu Yoshihiro, fresh from his so-called victory at Sachŏn, was on the way and the Japanese commanders had all received the news of Hideyoshi's death. Konishi tried to buy time by parleying with both Liu and Chen as Japanese envoys brought Chen gifts of swords, wine and food, and visited with him several times in hopes of coming to some sort of peace arrangement.¹⁰⁵ Unresponsive to his overtures, the allies arrayed their fleet in the straits of Noryang, a narrow passage between Namhae Island and the mainland, the only

⁹⁹ *MSJSBM*:2378.

¹⁰⁰ *MSJSBM*:2378.

¹⁰¹ *SI*:752.

¹⁰² Park Yune-hee, 1978:237-240; *CBR*:437-438; *SI*:763.

¹⁰³ *SDZK*:56.

¹⁰⁴ See the discussion in Li Guangtao, 1972:266-274.

¹⁰⁵ *NC*:342-343.

route of approach for the Japanese navy coming from Pusan. The defenders of Sunchŏn managed to hold the Chinese and Koreans off long enough to start embarking troops on boats still moored there. This set the stage for the most famous naval engagement in Korean history, the Battle of Noryang Straits.

In this climactic battle the allied navy decimated the Japanese, sinking hundreds of ships and killing or capturing hundreds of Japanese soldiers. Some of these captives were later executed while others were actually enrolled into Chinese military units. The battle was bittersweet however, as the major Japanese commanders, including Konishi Yukinaga, were able to escape in the confusion and Korea's Admiral Yi Sunsin was struck by a musket ball and died in battle, after telling his trusted subordinates to conceal his death from the rest of the army. Nevertheless this battle served as a fitting exclamation point to the war and afforded the Koreans the opportunity to exact at least some small measure of revenge for the depredations they had suffered at the hands of the Japanese over the previous seven years.

In both the sieges of Sachŏn and Sunchŏn, we see the importance of firearms and topography as well as other elements of early modern siegecraft such as using negotiations and bribes to avoid casualties. We also see how a limited or imperfect understanding of firearms or gunpowder could create catastrophe within the ranks. Such incidents also demonstrate the inherent unreliability of early modern firearms in general, an issue discussed at length in Kenneth Chase's recent book on the subject.¹⁰⁶

In the larger context one gets a better sense of what Western historians such as John Keegan refer to as "the fog of battle" where decisions often had to be made in a split second and where accounts of what supposedly happened can often vary radically according to the teller. Scholars of Hideyoshi's Korean campaigns are extremely fortunate in that they have a seemingly limitless amount of source material to consult, but, as should be clear from the brief accounts given here, these sources are often confusing and contradictory and it is very difficult to determine precisely what happened in any given place or time. Still, such accounts yield great information about battle conditions and tactics and should be of great interest to military historians of other parts of the world.

Comparative Dimensions and Suggestions for Further Research

Historians of early modern Europe should find much of interest in these accounts as developments in Asia paralleled those in Europe to some extent with respect to siege warfare. For example, even though it was accepted that the allies, most particularly the Ming armies, enjoyed a decided advantage in sheer firepower, they were often unable to bring their big guns to bear in battle due to terrain considerations and effective Japanese countermeasures. For, as historians of siege and gunpowder warfare in Europe have demonstrated large guns typically had a much slower rate of fire than smaller weapons and had to be brought uncomfortably close to the walls of a town or castle to be effective.¹⁰⁷ Commanders were often

¹⁰⁶ Chase, 2003.

¹⁰⁷ For example, see Keen, 1999:277.

understandably reluctant to sustain the kinds of casualties necessary to achieve results with their larger guns, even though the Ming armies(at least) often practiced what were essentially human wave attacks. At the same time there was a definite preference for incendiary attacks on the part of the allies, perhaps because fire arrows were cheaper and more portable than larger siege weapons and cannon. The accounts of sieges described here well illustrate this.

In addition to simply making more comparisons between Eastern and Western siege tactics and strategies, more comparative work needs to be done on actual fortifications and the importance of structures in determining the shape of combat. Geoffrey Parker has done a bit of work along these lines, especially with respect to how Japanese castles incorporated European and indigenous sensibilities to adapt to local realities of warfare, but much more work remains to be done.¹⁰⁸ As Parker himself notes, Chinese realities were different and their cities were capable of withstanding massive artillery barrages by European armies even in the nineteenth century. As a result their tactics differed somewhat when approaching a siege. Additionally, they were unfamiliar with Japanese fortress design, which was replicated in Korea as much as possible. This undoubtedly worked to the advantage of the Japanese, who had been perfecting siege tactics over more than a century of civil war prior to the invasion of Korea.

Likewise, the relationship between technology and tactics certainly deserves further study, though as European historians have found, it is often surprising how little relationship there was between the simultaneous development of firearms tactics and technology.¹⁰⁹ Throughout the war the combatants experimented with different weapons and tactics, including using different types of rockets, primitive time bombs, and grenades. Yet there seems to have been little systematic implementation of particular tactics, although there were repeated attempts to standardize Korean training utilizing the southern Chinese style drills and formations pioneered by Qi Jiguang, as mentioned above. The Japanese were more consistent, but again actual battlefield actions appear to have been largely dictated by commander and circumstance. A comparative look at the evolution of standardized training in Asia and Europe would be instructive. On paper at least the Chinese had standardized training methods throughout the Ming period but again following the regulations seemed to be up to the whims of individual commanders.

In conclusion I would suggest that as perhaps the most richly documented conflict in early modern East Asia with a voluminous amount of extant source material produced by all three sides(in marked contrast to say accounts of domestic war in China for which generally only Chinese records survive), this war demands further study from both historians of Asia and comparative military his-

¹⁰⁸ Parker, 1996:142-145. Japanese castles were typically built on hills overlooking plains and incorporated a series of walls and smaller towers in winding circles around the castle, not entirely unlike the *trace italienne* design used in Europe. See Parker, 1996:12-14.

¹⁰⁹ Hall, 1997:130. Hall argues that firearms tactics and technologies followed their own respective courses, dependent more upon independent local conditions and personal preferences rather than mutually reinforcing factors. For example, methods of corning gunpowder that were more effective for small arms were still used for heavy ordnance because the tactical doctrine of the time in Europe emphasized the use of guns in sieges over mobile field operations.

torians. A growing body of literature is emerging in Western languages that should allow historians not trained in Asian languages to at least begin to scratch the surface of the conflict and offer their insights based on our much better understanding of siege warfare and tactics in Europe and the Middle East.

Moreover, the study of wars and sieges should not be perceived as solely the province of the military historian. As should be clear from the accounts given herein, surviving documents provide lots of information about the societies that produced them, especially with respect to the social and military values of the participants. For example, siege accounts produced by Chinese and Korean chroniclers often relate tales of Confucian loyalty, filial piety, or widow chastity. A prime example of this would be the various legends associated with the Korean kisaeng martyr Nongae's heroic sacrifice following the Chinju massacre of 1593. Japanese accounts, on the other hand, are more likely to extol the virtues of samurai bravery and battle prowess.

Lastly, siege accounts often provide glimpses into the lives of ordinary people and how war affected their lives such as in Keinen's account of those enslaved by the Japanese. Such a topic certainly has contemporary significance, bombarded as we are every day by images of global conflict and the potential of said conflict spreading into new areas. In traditional times soldiers conscripted or volunteering to serve in armies generally came from less affluent segments of society, at least in China and Korea, and military accounts are one of the few places in which we can recover their voices. While the study of samurai history has long enjoyed pride of place in Japan, it is only recently that historians of China have turned their attention to China's long and storied military past, and to my knowledge Korea still lags behind China in this regard. Still it seems as if the recent trend towards the study of Chinese military history promises to open up vast new vistas of China's past for the benefit of both Asianists and comparative military historians. One would hope that the same will prove to be true for Korea since given the current tensions on the Korean peninsula, a more sophisticated understanding of Korea's military past and its martial traditions may be more relevant than ever.

ABBREVIATIONS

CBR	<i>Chingbirok</i>
CNE	<i>Chosen no eki</i>
CXSL	<i>Renchen Wohuo Chaoxian Shiliao</i>
FBZ	<i>Zaizao fan bang zhi (Chaejo pongbang chi)</i>
MS	<i>Mingshi</i>
MSJSBM	<i>Mingshi jishi benmo</i>
NC	<i>Nanjung chamnok</i>
PRL	<i>Liang chao pingrang lu</i>
SDZK	<i>Wanli san da zheng kao</i>
SI	<i>Seikan iryaku</i>

GLOSSARY

Chen Lin	陣隣	Pusan	釜山
Chen Yin	陳寅	Pusan	釜山
Chiksan	稷山	Pyökchegwan	碧蹄館
Cho Kyöngnam	趙慶男	Qi Jiguang	戚繼光
Chölla	全羅	Sachön	泗川
Chöng Chaenyöng	鄭起龍	Sansöng	山城
Chönju	全州	Seoul	漢城
<i>chösen nichinichiki</i>	朝鮮日々記	Shi	石
Chosön	朝鮮	Shimazu Tadatsune	島津忠常
Ding Yingtai	丁應泰	Shimazu Yoshihiro	島津義弘
Dong Yiyuan	董一元	Sönjo	宣祖
Fang Shixin	方時新	Sösaengpo	西生浦
Han	漢	Sui	隋
Hao Sanpin	郝三聘	Sunchön	順川
Imjin waeran	壬辰倭亂	Taikö	太閤
Katö Kiyomasa	加藤清正	Tang	唐
Kaesöng	開城	Tödö Takatora	藤堂高虎
Keinen	慶念	Tokugawa Ieyasu	德川家康
Khubilai Khan	成吉思汗	Tolsan	突山
Konishi Yukinaga	小西行長	Toyotomi Hideyoshi	豊臣秀吉
Koryo	高麗	Üju	義州
Kümyang	金陽	Ukita Hideie	宇喜多秀家
Kwön Yul	權慄	Ulsan	蔚山
Kyöngsang	慶尙	Wajö	倭城
Li Rumei	李如梅	Wanli	萬曆
Liu Ting	劉綎	Wön Kyun	元均
Ma Chengwen	馬呈文	Xing Jie	邢玠
Ma Gui	麻貴	Yalu	鴨綠
Mao Guoqi	茅國器	Yamato	大和
mimiZuka	耳塚	Yan	燕
Ming	明	Yang Hao	楊鎬
Mori Hidemoto	毛利秀輝元	Yangsang	梁山
Namwön	南原	Ye Bangrong	葉邦榮
<i>Nanjung Chamnok</i>	亂中雜錄	Yegyo	曳橋
Niu Boying	牛伯英	Yi Hangbok	李恒福
Noryang	露梁	Yi Pöngnam	李福男
Öta Kazuyoshi	太田一吉	Yi Sunsin	李舜臣
Peng Xingu	彭信古	Yi Tökyöng	李德馨

REFERENCES

Primary Sources

- Chingbirok* 懲毖錄. Yu, Sōngnyōng 柳成龍, att. In *Renchen zhi yi shiliao huiji* 壬辰之役史料匯輯, Wu Fengpei 吳丰培, et al. comps. vol. 2. Beijing: Quanguo tushuguan wenxian suowei fuzhi zhongxin chubanshe. pp.257-470. 1990.
- Imjin chōllansa*. 壬辰戰亂史. Yi, Hyōngsōk 李燭錫, att. 3 vols. Seoul: Sinhyōnsilsa. 1974.
- Jixiao xinshu* 紀效新書. Qi, Jiguang 戚繼光, att. Taipei: Wenhai chubanshe. 2000.
- Liang chao pingrang lu* 兩朝平攘錄. Zhuge, Yuansheng 諸葛元聲, att. Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju. 1969.
- Mingshi* 明史. Zhang, Tingyu 張廷玉, et al. 12 vols. Taipei: Dingwen shuju. 1994.
- Mingshi jishi benmo* 明史紀事本末. Gu, Yingtai 谷應泰. In *Lidai jishi benmo* 歷代紀事本末. 2 vols. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju. 1997.
- Nanjung chamnok* 亂中雜錄. Cho, Kyōngnam 趙慶男, att. In *Imjin waeran saryo ch'ongso* 壬辰倭亂史料叢書. Han Myōnggi, et al. comps. vol. 7-8 of History section. Chinju: Chinju National Museum. 2000-2002.
- Seikan Iryaku* 征韓偉略. Kawaguchi Chōju 川口長孺, att. In *Renchen zhi yi shiliao huiji* 壬辰之役史料匯輯. Wu Fengpei, et al. comps. vol. 2. Beijing: Quanguo tushuguan wenxian suowei fuzhi zhongxin chubanshe. pp.471-774. 1990.
- Shimazu kokushi* 島津國史. 1905. 10 vols. Tokyo: Seikyō kappan insatsujo.
- Wanli san da zheng kao* 萬曆三大征考. Mao, Ruizheng 茅瑞徵, att. In *Ming-Qing shiliao huibian* 明清史料匯編. Shen Yunlong. comp. vol. 58. Taipei: Wenhai chubanshe. 1971.
- Zaizao fanbang zhi*(*Chaejo pōnbang chi*) 再造藩邦志. Sin, Kyōng 申昞, att. 2 vols. Taipei: Guiting chubanshe. 1980.

Secondary Sources

- Bacon, Wilbur D. 1961. "Fortresses of Kyōnggi-do." In *Transactions of the Korea Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society* 37. pp.1-64.
- Batten, Bruce L. 2006. *Gateway to Japan: Hakata in War and Peace, 500-1300*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.
- Berry, Mary Elizabeth. 1982. *Hideyoshi*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Chase, Kenneth. 2003. *Firearms: A Global History to 1700*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Choi, Byōnghyōn, trans. 2002. *The Book of Corrections: Reflections on the National Crisis During the Japanese Invasion of Korea, 1592-1598*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Elison, George. 1988. "The Priest Keinen and his Account of the Campaign in Korea, 1597-1598." In Motoyama Yukihiko, ed. *Nihon Kyōikushi ronsō* 日本教育史論叢: *Motoyama Yukihiko kyōju taikan kinen rombunshō* 本山幸彦教授退官記念論文集. Kyoto: Shimbunkaku. pp.25-41
- Ha, Tae-hūng, trans. 1981a. *Nanjung ilgi* 亂中日記: *War Diary of Admiral Yi Sunsin*. Seoul: Yonsei University Press.
- Ha, Tae-hūng, trans. 1981b. *Imjin Changch'o* 壬辰狀草: *Admiral Yi Sunsin's Memorials to Court*. Seoul: Yonsei University Press.

- Haboush, Jahyun Kim. 2003. "Dead Bodies in the Postwar Discourse of Identity in Seventeenth-Century Korea: Subversion and Literary Production in the Private Sector." In *Journal of Asian Studies* 62.2, May. pp.415-442.
- Hall, Bert S. 1997. *Weapons and Warfare in Renaissance Europe: Gunpowder, Technology, and Tactics*. Blatimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Hawley, Samuel. 2005. *The Imjin war: Japan's Sixteenth-Century Invasion of Korea and Attempt to Conquer China*. Seoul: Royal Asiatic Society, Korea Branch.
- Ishihara, Michihiro 石原道博. 1963. *Bunroku keichō no eki*. 文祿慶長の役. Tokyo: Hanawa shobo.
- Keen, Maurice, ed. 1999. *Medieval Warfare: A History*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Keinen 慶念. 2000. *Chōsen nichinichiki o yomu: shinso ga mita Hideyoshi no Chōsen shinryaku* 朝鮮日々記を読む: 眞宗僧が見た 秀吉の 朝鮮侵略/朝鮮日々記研究会編. Kyoto: Hōzokan.
- Kitajima, Manji 北島万次. 2002. *Hideyoshi no Chōsen shinryaku* 秀吉の朝鮮侵略. Tokyo: Yamakawa kobunkan.
- Kuwata, Tadachika 桑山忠親 and Yamaoka Shōhachi 山岡莊八. 1965. *Chōsen no eki* 朝鮮の役. Tokyo: Tokuma shoten.
- Ledyard, Gari. 1988-89. "Confucianism and War: The Korean Security Crisis of 1598." *Journal of Korean Studies* 6. pp.81-120.
- Lee, Ki-baik. 1984. *A New History of Korea*. Trans. by Edward Wagner. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Lee, Peter, trans. 2000. *The Record of the Black Dragon Year*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.
- Li, Guangtao 李光濤. 1969. "Ming ren yuan Han yu Yang Hao" Weishan zhi yi 明人援韓與楊鎬蔚山之役. *Lishi yuyan yanjiusuo jikan* 41.4. pp.545-566.
- Li, Guangtao 李光濤, comp. 1970. *Chaoxian Renchen Wohuo shiliao*. 朝鮮壬辰倭禍史料 5 vols. Taipei: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan lishi yuyan yanjiusuo.
- Li, Guangtao 李光濤. 1971. "Ming ren yuan Han yu Jishan da jie" 明人援韓與稷山大捷. *Lxishi yuyan yanjiusuo jikan* 43. pp.1-14.
- Li, Guangtao 李光濤. 1972. *Chaoxian Renchen Wohuo yanjiu* 朝鮮壬辰倭禍研究. Taipei: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan lishi yuyan yanjiusuo.
- Li, Guangtao 李光濤. 1982. "Ding Yingtai yu Yang Hao: Chaoxian Renchen Wohuo luncong zhi yi" 丁應泰與楊鎬 朝鮮任晨倭禍論叢之一. *Lishi yuyan yanjiusuo jikan* 53. pp.129-166.
- Li, Guangtao 李光濤. 1986. *Ming-Qing Dang'an lunwenji* 明清檔案論文集. Taipei: Lianjing chubanshiye gongsi.
- Ōta, Hideharu 太田秀春. 2002. "Gunbu ni yoru Bunroku-Keichō no eki no jōkaku kenkyū" 軍部文祿慶長の役の城郭研究 *Gunji shigaku* 38.2, September. pp.35-48.
- Park, Yune-hee. 1978. *Admiral Yi and his Turtleboat Armada*. Seoul: Hanjin Publishing.
- Parker, Geoffrey. 1996. *The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500-1800*. 2nd edition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Sun, Laichen. 2004. "Ming China and Korea, c. 1368-1600: With Special

Kenneth M. Swope

- Reference to Gunpowder Technology.” Unpublished conference paper.
- Swope, Kenneth M. 2001. “The Three Great Campaigns of the Wanli Emperor, 1592-1600: Court, Military, and Society in Late Sixteenth-Century China,” PhD dissertation submitted to University of Michigan.
- Swope, Kenneth M. 2002. “Deceit, Disguise, and Dependence: China, Japan, and the Future of the Tributary System, 1592-1596.” In *The International History Review* 24.4, December. pp.757-782.
- Swope, Kenneth M. 2003a. “All Men Are Not Brothers: Ethnic Identity and Dynastic Loyalty in the Ningxia Mutiny of 1592.” In *Late Imperial China* 24.1, June. pp.79-129.
- Swope, Kenneth M. 2003b. “Turning the Tide: The Strategic and Psychological Significance of the Liberation of Pyongyang in 1593.” In *War and Society* 21.2, October. pp.1-22.
- Swope, Kenneth M. 2004. “A Few Good Men: The Li Family and China’s Northern Frontier in the Late Ming.” In *Ming Studies* 49. pp.34-81.
- Swope, Kenneth M. 2005. “Crouching Tigers, Secret Weapons: Military Technology Employed During the Japanese Invasion of Korea, 1592-1598.” In *Journal of Military History* 69.1, January. pp.11-43.
- Swope, Kenneth M. Forthcoming. “War and Remembrance: Yang Hao and the Siege of Ulsan of 1598.” In *Journal of Asian History*.
- Turnbull, Stephen. 2002. *Samurai Invasion: Japan’s Korean War, 1592-1598*. London: Cassell & Co.