Anti-Christian Ideas and National Ideology: Inoue Enryō and Inoue Tetsujirō’s Mobilization of Sectarian History in Meiji Japan

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ABSTRACT
Christian and anti-Christian ideas played a major role in the formation of modern Japanese national ideology. This article focuses on the construction of a sectarian history of the Tokugawa state as one part of the anti-Christian ideological writing of late nineteenth early twentieth century Japan. Academic and semi-academic writing on history and philosophy at this time was intimately connected with the major political debates which accompanied the introduction of the Imperial Constitution and the Imperial Rescript on Education. This article argues that these debates in many ways determined how these markers of state ideology would be interpreted in the future. Focusing particularly on the works of Inoue Tetsujirō and Inoue Enryō, this article shows how centrally historical discourses of sectarianism were deployed in the debates of the Meiji period, and how the historical, political and philosophical writings of figures like Enryō and Tetsujirō were integrated—both with each other, and with the pre-Meiji historical past.

Keywords: Nation, Modernity, Christianity, Confucianism, Buddhism, Philosophy

Introduction

If we wish to establish a constitution now, first we must look for a central axis for our nation, and establish what we should say that central axis is. Without a central axis, then at times when governance is left to the disordered arguments of the masses, ordered governance will be lost, and thereby the nation lost. If we have any wish to make the nation a nation which will survive and rule the people, then we must consider this matter deeply, and plan so that the instrumentality of rule is not lost. In Europe, the seed of constitutional government has existed for around a thousand years. Not only the training of each person in this system, but the existence of religion, and the employment of religion as a central axis, deeply embedded in the minds of the people, has ultimately unified the minds of the people. In our country, however, religion does not possess this kind of power. Not one of our religions is capable of acting as the central axis of the nation. While at one point the power of Buddhism was very strong, capable of binding together people of all stations, these days that power has declined. Shinto is a
learning based on the teachings of our imperial ancestors, but its power as a
religion to direct the minds of the people is weak. In our country, the only thing
that can be used as a central axis is the imperial house. Therefore, in the drafting
of the constitution, we must focus our minds on using this point, raising up
imperial rule, and striving that it not be restrained.1

In 1888, possibly the most important political figure in Meiji Japan, the man credited
with authoring the Constitution of the Greater Japanese Empire, Itō Hirobumi,
opened the first meeting of the council of state called to draft the constitution with
these words. This text is probably the best example of the explicit way that the
emperor-centric ideology of modern Japan was formed in reaction to a perceived
model of the ideological role of Christianity in Europe. The importance of the
manufacture of a national ideology was clearly articulated by the political leaders
and thinkers of early Meiji Japan during the process of national construction.
Ideology was seen as a necessary tool, not only for establishing national independence,
but also, as the quote above illustrates, for the Japanese elites to maintain their control
over the “disordered masses”. Japanese elites closely examined the political systems
of contemporary Europe, and were completely open about justifying the worth of
ideas in terms of their utility in creating a unifying and exclusivist national ideology
of control based on those examples.

The construction of a modern national ideology in Japan can thereby, on the
one hand, be described as an attempt to replicate modern western constructs of
social control. Conversely, the basis of what became the content of modern national
ideology in Japan was clearly indigenous. This is clear from the fact that the basic
tenets of modern Japanese ideology were derived from Tokugawa intellectual
constructs.2 In this sense, the process whereby the intellectual tools of social control
in modern Japan, or what we might otherwise refer to as modern Japan’s ideology,
was constructed, possessed an inherent contradiction. On the one hand, there was
a trend of replicating western socio-political constructs, on the other hand there was
a trend of emphasizing the continuity of certain pre-and early-modern Japanese
values and beliefs. This latter emphasis sought to replace the role that nationalist
Japanese thinkers perceived religion (Christianity) playing in Europe.

One of the important features of modern (Western) imperial nations as
observed by Japanese intellectuals in the late nineteenth century was a unifying
“national ethic” or “national religion” which played a clear ideological role in unifying
and hierarchically ordering the nation domestically, and in differentiating the nation
from others internationally.3 In late nineteenth century Europe, where many important
Japanese visited to find the model of a modern state, the prevailing way of thinking


2 The intellectual roots of tennōsei ideology are often traced to Tokugawa Mito Learning scholars,
in particular Fujita Yūkoku’s defence of the primacy of imperial rule in his 1791 text Seimeiron (this can
be seen by reference to the text, for instance in Bitō Masahide et al. eds. 1973(53):13). The concept of
kotutai, of central importance in tennōsei ideology, is derived from the writings of Yūkoku’s disciple, the
most famous Mitogaku scholar, Azawā Seishisai. Discussion of the links between the formation of the
kotutai concept and anti-Christian discourse can be found in “Mitogaku no tokushitsu” in Bitō Masahide
et al. eds. 1973:579, and in Wakabayashi 1986:143-144.
about nations was that “national character”, often defined in terms of religion or race, was the essential element in forming the modern nation. Accordingly, it naturally seemed crucial to influential Japanese coming home from Europe that the “national ethic” of Japan be based in traditional or essentially “Japanese” practice demonstrated historically, which differentiated Japan from other nations, especially the western imperial powers who constituted the major foreign threat. For the Japanese government to drive the Japanese people in the late nineteenth century to value tradition over the West, however, would have been highly problematic given that one of the main government objectives was to “modernize” the country, largely along the western lines.

Understanding these background problems and contradictions is the key to understanding the importance of anti-Christian ideas, discourses and propaganda in modern Japan. Anti-Christian discourse presented a rhetoric which could be used to define a conception of Japan which was different (and potentially opposed) to the West on religious or ethical grounds, while not in any way rejecting western military, industrial, scientific, or political technologies, nor the rationalistic intellectual frameworks which supported them. To put it another way, anti-Christian discourse provided a convenient rhetorical device which allowed Japanese elites to delineate an opposition to the West, without setting Japan in opposition to the sociological and technological systems of Western imperialism.

In Japan, as in European nations, because the “national ethic” was seen to be an ideological construct which should be based on historically justified conceptions of an organic nation, the construction of national history came to play a core role in the authentication of ideology. As will be discussed below, the anti-Christian discourse in modern ideology was intimately linked to the construction of a history of pre-restoration Japan which privileged Tokugawa sectarianism as a core defining feature of a historically constructed exclusivist image of Japan and its “national ethic”.

The construction of ideology and the project of national history construction in Japan are both generally seen as having solid bases in late Tokugawa political thought. As modern intellectual paradigms, embedded in modern political structures and academies, however, they were both first articulated as modern institutions that came into being in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. This article will firstly confirm the core role of anti-Christian discourse in the social construction of ideology in the political debates of this period, before returning to look more broadly at the way Tokugawa sectarianism was historicized, in both the modern academy at the turn of the nineteenth century, and before that through the late Tokugawa and early Meiji periods. Through this examination we will seek to introduce the key linkages between the modern ideology construction of the late nineteenth century, and the anti-Christian sectarianism of the Tokugawa period. This examination will be conducted through a focus on two major figures of the

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3 On this trend, see Watanabe Hiroshi 2005.
4 See, for instance, a text written by Inoue Tetsujirō immediately after returning from his studies in Germany, his introduction to his commentary on the Imperial Rescript on Education, Inoue Tetsujirō 1890:2-3.
debates of the mid-Meiji period: Inoue Tetsujirō(1855-1944) and Inoue Enryō (1858-1919).

**Institutionalizing ideology: Meiji political debate and anti-Christian discourse**

While the Meiji Restoration of 1868 is often referred to as the start date of “modern Japan”, in reality most of the central institutional structures of a modern state, like a constitution for instance, were not realized in Japan until the late 1880s and early 1890s. Not only the ideology of the modern Japanese state, but indeed its basic political inclination, were being widely debated and questioned through most of the 1870s and 1880s. The establishment of institutions and ideological symbols, like the *Constitution of the Greater Japanese Empire* (the *Imperial Constitution*) and the *Imperial Rescript*, the social embedding of these institutions, and the attribution of set political meanings to these symbols, occurred in the late 1880s and early 1890s. The meaning of “Imperial Rule” in administrative practice, the precise role of the aristocracy in government, the qualifications for common Japanese to vote, the power the democratic assemblies they voted for would have, the basic rights of women: all these issues were to some extent still up for grabs between 1868 and the late 1880s or so.

The world in the late nineteenth century was burgeoning with a wide range of political ideas advocating everything from inclusive kinds of democracy with voting rights for women and the lower classes on the one hand (still revolutionary ideas largely unimplemented in the northern hemisphere nations of this time), to ideas of genetic determinism and the rejection of free will on the other. These ideas, in particular both radical liberal democratic, and social evolutionary and genetic determinist ideas from Britain, together with conservative political thought from Germany, heavily affected political debates within the Japanese elites during the late nineteenth century. As a result, through the 1870s and 1880s debates which began among small groups of the educated elite such as the short-lived *Meirokusha* group, spread to become debates between burgeoning middle class movements. On the one side stood the liberal movement for liberty and civil rights [ *[jiyūminken undō]* ], from which emerged publishing groups like *Minyūsha*. On the other stood the conservatives, who set up reactionary publishing groups like *Seikyōsha* to oppose the liberals. The *Meiroku* debates of the early 1870s are often described as a debate between those advocating “rights” and those advocating “loyalty”, while the evolved form of these debates in the late 1880s and 1890s is often described as a debate between those advocating “egalitarianism” [ *[heimin shugi]* ] and those advocating “nationalism” [ *[kokusui shugi]* ]. Even in the late 1880s, however, the former dichotomy was a highly visible point of conflict in the debates between the liberals and conservatives. The movement for liberty and civil rights, through their

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5 A period sometimes referred to as the “second restoration”. For instance, see Satō Yoshimaru 1998:10.

6 *Minyūsha* published the left wing journal *Kokumin no Tomo*. *Seikyōsha* was formed by the conservatives primarily to counter this journal with the publication of their own reactionary periodical *Nihonjin*. For research on the formation and activities of these groups and their publications, see Nishida Tsuyoshi et al. ed. 2003; Satō Yoshimaru 1998.
Minyūsha voices, advocated civil rights and democracy, whereas their opponents argued for continuity of power and loyalty to the sovereign.

**a) The Imperial Constitution and The Imperial Rescript on Education**

The promulgation of the Imperial Constitution in February 1889 was part of a process of state containment of the parameters of these debates by laying down legal and symbolic frameworks which institutionalized and privileged certain positions. The constitution gave limited civil and democratic rights to most Japanese males. But it also institutionalized important parts of the conservative (loyalty) position in the debates of the previous decades by making the government Emperor centered and consequently potentially centralist and authoritarian, by giving virtually no political rights to females, and by severely limiting both the civil and democratic rights given to the male citizenry.

In particular, the promulgation of the Imperial Rescript on Education in October 1890 is seen as having importantly strengthened the conservative position. It is seen as having institutionalized state codification and compulsion of “Emperor worship”, and justified limits on civil rights, in particular the rights of freedom of faith and expression. Moreover, its overall tone is usually described as being inherently anti-egalitarian. In this way, the Constitution and the Rescript came to be seen as part of a set of markers indicating the crystallization of a particularly statist ideological direction of the modern Japanese nation.7

In the late 1880s and early 1890s, as the Imperial Constitution and the Imperial Rescript on Education were being promulgated and their effects debated, anti-Christian discourses in Japan at the same time reached a peak of popularity and influence. At this same moment, the nature of that anti-Christian discourse, which had been a noteworthy presence in Japanese political thought since the beginning of that century, also transformed dramatically.

The anti-Christian discourse of the late Tokugawa and early Meiji period rarely used contemporary or universal arguments. Rather, it was anti-Western, relying on conservative Chinese Confucian arguments, and xenophobic Japanese images of Christians left over from the seventeenth century anti-Christian pogroms.8 The very modern discourse which emerged in the late 1880s, however, utilized contemporary western philosophy attacking Christianity. This discourse was nationalist, but was also (at least nominally) pro-rationalist, and often pro-western. Indeed, utilizing the argument that “Western philosophy” stood in opposition to “religion” was the key point in many anti-Christian texts of the 1880s and 90s.9 Indeed, on a larger level the conservative or loyalty side in the political debates against liberals and democrats

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7 For instance, Andrew Barshay argues that: “There can be no question that the promulgation of the Constitution, Education Rescript, Rescript to Soldiers and Sailors, and other hortatory edicts, represents the crystallization of an enabling ideology that combined with the proven power of official bureaucracy stamped Japanese political evolution with a heavily statist character,” Barshay 1988:10.

8 Anti-Christian discourse was not particularly popular through the mid-Tokugawa period. Its resurgence in popularity dates from the end of the eighteenth century to the earliest. Most of the classic anti-Christian texts from this period like Miura Baien’s Samidareshō and Aizawa Seishisai’s Kikōben show the trend of using contemporary Chinese arguments mixed with images from the early Tokugawa period. These texts will be discussed further below.
during this period was increasingly employing complex western philosophical ideas to support their arguments. A favourite was Spencerian social organism theory, but Neo-Kantian philosophy was also beginning to be employed to argue for organic and particularistic ideas of identity which were then inevitably used to justify “traditional” social hierarchy.

Yet the new anti-Christian discourses that developed as part of this trend used not only modern western philosophical and scientific arguments. They also ultimately utilized the anti-Christian traditions of the Tokugawa period as well. They did this, however, not simply by appropriating arguments and imagery from the earlier traditions as had been done all through the 1800s, but more pertinently by shaping modern conceptions of national history based on dichotomies constructed around Tokugawa anti-Christian imagery. These constructs embedded an anti-Christian position as part of the base understanding of the natures of Japanese philosophy and history. Consequently, these arguments, which linked the conception of what was to be “Japanese” to the constructs which opposed to the Christian other, became enmeshed in the systems of education and academia. Just as certain conservative political ideas had been privileged through institutionalization in the Constitution and the Rescript, so too this new anti-Christian discourse as national history was given endurance through a process of academic institutionalization.

The relationship between anti-Christian discourses and modern writings on history and philosophy was strengthened because the key leaders of the anti-Christian debates of the early 1890s also played leading roles in the establishment of the disciplines of “national history”, and “Eastern philosophy” in the modern academy in Japan. Figures like Inoue Tetsujirō(1855-1944) did not simply appropriate early Tokugawa anti-Christian arguments while others had done over the 250 years before him. Rather, he partly constructed and utilized a history, or perhaps we should say a historiography of Japan in the Tokugawa period which sought to prove through history that “Japanese thought” and “Christian thought” were irreconcilable opposites.

Inoue Tetsujirō was one of the first graduates of the philosophy department at the University of Tokyo. In 1882 he was appointed associate professor at the University of Tokyo in charge of teaching “Eastern philosophy”. In October 1890, immediately after returning from his studies in Germany, he was appointed the first Japanese full professor in the philosophy department at the University of Tokyo. In most histories of the period he is remembered as not only one of the great conservative ideologues of Meiji Japan, but most importantly as representing state ideology's occupation and utilization of the modern academy. Inoue was the key figure in the political debates which led to the Imperial Rescript on Education coming to be perceived as the key plank of statist ideology. Inoue's role in this process was in affecting the way the Imperial Rescript on Education was interpreted. This was achieved primarily through his employment of anti-Christian discourse.

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9 The classic example is Inoue Testujirō 1893, but Inoue Enryō had employed Western philosophy against Christianity as early as 1886 in Inoue Enryō 1886a.
The general image we have today of the ideological significance and symbolism of the *Imperial Rescript on Education*, a document which in itself does not even fill one page, is due mainly to the way it was attributed political meaning by Inoue and others after its promulgation. The *Rescript* came to be perceived as an institutional symbol of statist authoritarianism predominantly not through its contents, but more overwhelmingly through the way it was interpreted and given political meaning in the political debates of the early 1890s. Examination of these debates gives us a good insight into the centrality of anti-Christian discourses in mainstream public debate at this time.

The main way the *Rescript* was drawn into the central arena of public debate was through a controversy which erupted during its introduction to schools in January 1891. The Ministry of Education had set out detailed guidelines for the conduct of a ceremony to be held in all schools to introduce the *Rescript* to the staffs and students. The students and teachers were to line up individually in front of a copy of the *Rescript* and bow in worship to the Emperor's seal attached to the document. During the conduct of this ceremony at the premier school in the country, Tokyo First Higher Middle School [Daiichi kōtōchūgakkō], a Christian teacher, Uchimura Kanzō (1861-1930), citing Christian teachings against idolatry, refused to pay worship to the Emperor's seal. This became known as the “Uchimura Kanzō lese-majesty incident” [Uchimura Kanzō jūkei jiken].

Uchimura’s “disrespect to the Emperor”, as it was widely and excitedly reported in newspapers shortly after the event, triggered a huge media attack on Uchimura in particular and Christians in general. In over 50 different publications and at least 200 different essays, Uchimura was attacked for being disrespectful to the Emperor in an array of colorful language strong enough to incite attacks on Christians and drive Uchimura and his family out of Tokyo. While some Christians and the Christian media, as well as some writers in the popular left-wing journal *Kokumin no tomo*, came to Uchimura's defence, the media coverage in general involved little debate and lots of what in contemporary Japan would be called “media bashing.”

Then in November 1892, just as the heat was dying down on Uchimura, Inoue Tetsujirō gave a speech where he argued, for the first time publicly, that Christianity and the Japanese nation were inherently incompatible. This transformed the debate from a largely tabloid affair centring on Uchimura's personal conduct, to a highly politicized mainstream intellectual debate about the question of whether Christianity itself was compatible with the Japanese state. The significance of this debate was that for the first time the *Constitution* and the *Rescript* were deployed by conservatives to argue that there were certain ideas (in this instance labeled “Christian”) which were irreconcilable with the modern Japanese nation. In other words, the modern

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11 For the classic research on this incident, supplying excellent details not only of what happened before and during the incident itself, but more importantly an in-depth survey of the media reaction to the event, see Ozawa 1980. One of Uchimura's most faithful non-Christian supporters was Tokutomi Sohō, then a central figure in running *Kokumin no tomo*. Tokutomi not only defended Uchimura in writing, but more concretely lent him money and assisted him in getting out of Tokyo and set up in less dangerous situations in the countryside. Ironically, by the mid 1930s Tokutomi transformed into one of the most vocal anti-Christian right-wing ideologues.
Japanese nation, as symbolized through these institutional documents, was presented as a political body which inherently excluded certain kinds of ideas.

b) Religion versus Education
From January 1893 Inoue published a series of essays entitled The Clash Between Education and Religion[Kyōiku to shūkyō no shōtotsu], where he argued that Christianity and the nation state were incompatible, and that Christianity was inherently anti-nationalist. The publication of The Clash Between Education and Religion opened a huge debate of the same name which continued through all of 1893 and, unlike the earlier discussion on the Uchimura Kanzō incident, engaged many of the most important intellectuals and political commentators in Japan. Inoue's series of essays, published as one book in April 1893, was quoted in nearly all of the many hundreds of articles and essays which constituted the debate. The Clash Between Education and Religion thereby stands as the key document to understanding how the controversy around the Rescript was turned into an anti-Christian debate which ended up attaching particular conservative interpretations to the Rescript itself.

Close examination of the main arguments in the so-called “Debate on the Clash Between Education and Religion”, most of which were initiated in the text of the same name by Inoue, gives us an important insight into how the meanings we now associate with the Rescript were originally established in the public sphere. The linkage between the publication of The Clash Between Education and Religion and the Uchimura Kanzō Incident is clear from the copious references that Inoue makes in The Clash Between Education and Religion both to the incident, and to the Imperial Rescript on Education. Inoue himself, however, described the purpose of his book quite differently in its introductory passages.

Although here Inoue argues that The Clash Between Education and Religion searches for truth, the pivotal term in the book appears to be not “truth”, but “national ethic”. The basic line of The Clash Between Education and Religion is made clear in the following passage, where Inoue clearly sets up Christianity and the Rescript as polarized opposites.

12 The best compilation of sources from this debate remains a book published as the tail end of the debate was still going on by one of the more intellectually inclined Buddhist aligned anti-Christian publishing house, Tetsugakushoin: Seki 1893, reprinted by Misuzu Shobō 1988.
13 Inoue Testujirō 1893:21-30, 39, 85, 98.
14 Inoue Testujirō 1893:12.
Our Japan has also (like Europe) possessed its own kind of national ethic since ancient times. It is found in the Imperial Rescript and is the standard for education. Therefore, the reason why the main intent of the Rescript cannot be resolved with Christian teachings is that the very roots from which these teachings spring are different. The fact that Christianity and the Rescript cannot even be slightly resolved should cause any Christian to waver.\(^{15}\)

Inoue condemns Christianity because, as he sees it, it is inherently opposed to “the national ethic”, as symbolized by the Rescript. In Inoue’s argument, however, the Rescript is not seen simply as symbolizing “the national ethic”, but moreover as being the basis of it. Inoue sees the Rescript as a rendering in language of an ethic organic to the Japanese nation.

The Rescript is a rendering in writing of the ordinary practical ethics as they were practiced in Japan in its original state.\(^{16}\)

Ironically enough, if we look at what is actually written in the Rescript itself we see that what is “rendered in writing of the ordinary practical ethics as they were practiced in Japan in its original state” are actually the five relations of (originally Chinese) Confucian ethics. This is actually acknowledged in the text of Inoue’s The Clash Between Education and Religion.\(^{17}\)

It is impossible to deny that Christian teachings are the direct opposite of the teachings of Confucius and Mencius which centre on “ruling the country and regulating the house”. Therefore, from that we should be able to deduce that it would be difficult to align Christianity with the spirit of the Rescript.\(^{18}\)

Inoue argues that while Christianity is antithetic to the state, Asian religions, by which he means Buddhism, Confucianism and Shinto, are not. The attack on Christianity thereby in large part relies on why it is different to these Asian religions. In a phrase often used to summarize Inoue’s argument he states:

There are four main points where Christianity is different to the Asian religions. Firstly, it does not put the state first, secondly, it does not value loyalty [to the social order], thirdly, it places import on unworldly things and undervalues the social world, fourthly, their concept of benevolence to all\(\text{hakuai}\) is like Mozi’s, it is a non-discriminatory egalitarian form of benevolence.\(^{19}\)

\(^{15}\) Inoue Testujirō 1893:39.  
\(^{16}\) Inoue Testujirō 1893:33.  
\(^{17}\) It is intriguing that in 1893, three years before the outbreak of the first Sino-Japanese War, the main problem with Christianity for Japanese nationalists like Inoue was that it was “different to Eastern teachings”. Eastern teachings here clearly means the Confucian five relations.  
\(^{18}\) Inoue Testujirō 1893:106.  
\(^{19}\) Inoue Testujirō 1893:125.
In order to examine Inoue’s approach to each of these “four points”, in particular the rather complex last one, it is necessary to go back before the 1893 “Debate on the Clash Between Education and Religion”, to Inoue’s activities in 1890.

Inoue had already lain much of the groundwork for his 1893 attack on Christianity through his involvement in authoring the official Ministry of Education commentary on the *Imperial Rescript on Education* in 1890. One of the most direct and obvious ways that a particular politically loaded interpretative tradition came to be attached to the *Rescript* early on, even before the Uchimura controversy broke out, was through the publication of Inoue Tetsujirō’s official commentary on the Rescript, *The Rescript Explicated* (*Chokugo Engi*). This was a lengthy work consisting of over 150 pages of commentary on the original one page *Rescript*. The Ministry of Education had commissioned Inoue to write the commentary immediately after his return from Germany. *The Rescript Explicated* was issued by the Ministry of Education to all schools together with the actual *Imperial Rescript on Education* in January 1891.

Looking at the *Imperial Rescript on Education* itself, the first thing to strike a present day reader is the way the *Rescript* seems to be dominated by Confucian ideas. In particular, by references to the so-called Five Relations of Confucian ethics—that is the Confucian ethics concerning the relationships between sovereign and vassal, parent and child, husband and wife, siblings, and friends.

Our Imperial Ancestors have founded Our Empire on a basis broad and everlasting and have deeply and firmly implanted virtue; Our subjects ever united in loyalty and filial piety have from generation to generation illustrated the beauty thereof. This is the glory of the fundamental character of Our Empire, and herein also lies the source of Our education. Ye, Our subjects, be filial to your parents, affectionate to your brothers and sisters; as husbands and wives be harmonious, as friends true; bear yourselves in modesty and moderation; extend your benevolence to all; pursue learning and cultivate arts, and thereby develop intellectual faculties and perfect moral powers; furthermore advance public good and promote common interests.

Inoue focused on these Confucian contents praising the *Rescript* for its role in, “Inculcating the virtues of filial piety, respect for authority, loyalty and faith, and cultivating the righteous path of collective patriotism.” Throughout *The Rescript Explicated*, the phrase, “Filial piety, loyalty, faith, and the doctrine of collective patriotism”, is repeated like a mantra. But why does Inoue feel that this “doctrine” is so essential, This is explained in terms of his view of the international climate of his

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20 Nakajima Michio 1990.
21 Monbushō 1931. As has been pointed out and discussed by Watanabe Hiroshi, the virtue relating to the relationship between husband and wife has been changed from “distinctiveness” in the original Chinese to “harmonious” in the Japanese of the *Imperial Rescript on Education* (and indeed in previous Japanese explications of these relations since the Tokugawa period). This is the only divergence from the standard Confucian relations paradigm. Discussion of the significance of this divergence can be found in Sekiguchi Sumiko 2005:311-330.
time. In the introduction to *The Rescript Explicated*, Inoue argues that Japan and China are the only countries which remain sovereign states, not having fallen to aggressive Western imperialism. China, however, Inoue points out, is not developing, and therefore Japan is the only country which can be relied upon not to fall to the West. This leads Inoue to the conclusion that, “we must consider that we are surrounded by enemies on all four sides.”\(^{22}\) In this manner, Inoue's introduction to *The Rescript Explicated* frames his argument, and indeed the message of the *Rescript*, in terms of a reaction to the perceived external threat.

Throughout *The Rescript Explicated*, Inoue presents as a defence against this threat the ultimate weapon of “the unity of the mind of the people.”\(^{23}\) This phrase appears on nearly every page of the introduction to *The Rescript Explicated*. The use of this term is linked to an emphasis on social homogeneity and integration of the Japanese people seen throughout the commentary. For instance, on his commentary to the passage, “Our subjects ever united in loyalty and filial piety have from generation to generation illustrated the beauty thereof,” Inoue writes as follows.

> The nation state must be one body, that body must be drilled in one and only one doctrine. We definitely must not create two or three minds of the people.\(^{23}\)

“The unity of the mind of the people” is one of several key terms which Inoue establishes in connection with the *Rescript* through his commentary in 1890, and then employs to attack Christianity and liberalism during the debates of 1892-4. This is despite the fact that this term does not appear in the *Rescript* itself. One term that does appear in the *Rescript*, and which Inoue uses liberally in his attacks on Christians, egalitarians and liberals in 1893 is “loyalty and filial piety”. For instance, in his commentary on the *Rescript* phrase, “This is the glory of the fundamental character of Our Empire[kokutai], and herein also lies the source of Our education,” Inoue writes as follows.

> If the masses and the aristocracy are loyal to their king and filial to their fathers, then there will be high moral standards. Therefore, if perchance there are teachings in the world which stand in opposition to this state of affairs, there is not the slightest need for our country to inquire into them.\(^{24}\)

\(^{22}\) Inoue Tetsujirō 1890:2.

\(^{23}\) Inoue Tetsujirō 1890:10. Throughout this article I have translated minshin literally as “mind of the people”. An even more literal translation would be “mind/body of the masses”, and a smoother and more standard translation would be “public sentiment”. For instance in this quotation, a smoother and more modern sounding translation of the last sentence would be: “we definitely cannot allow a pluralist public sentiment.” However, while “public sentiment” might be the best translation for this and many of the other usages of this phrase quoted in this article, for some of the other usages it would not work. In particular, in later quotations from Inoue Enryō which link this phrase to social organism theory, I think it is necessary to stay with the literal translation. In the interests of standardization, I have used this same more literal translation throughout.

\(^{24}\) Inoue Tetsujirō 1890:12.
Attacks on Christianity in Japan traditionally emphasized the Confucian idea of “loyalty and filial piety”, and argued that the Christian practice of placing loyalty to God above all others diminished both the authority of the sovereign and the cultural practice of ancestor worship. Of course these kinds of arguments had also been used continuously by the conservative camp against liberals and others advocating civil rights over the previous twenty years. Inoue's emphasis on and interpretation of these arguments in an official Ministry of Education commentary issued to schools also added a particular political color to his explanation, and consequently the nation's reception of the Rescript. In this way, we can see that even back in 1890, before the Uchimura Kanzō's incident had even occurred, Inoue had already begun to attribute a particular meaning to the Rescript which emphasized loyalty to the nation and set that loyalty in a paradigm of opposition to a perceived threat.

The most interesting point, however, in Inoue's arguments both in his 1890 commentary on the Rescript, and in The Clash Between Education and Religion, concerns his attitude to a part of the Rescript which revolves around the key term hakuai. That part of the Rescript, in its official English translation simply exhorts the people to: “extend your benevolence to all.” Hakuai, the Japanese word translated as “benevolence to all” in the official Ministry of Education English translation of the Imperial Rescript on Education, is originally a Chinese word boai, which appears in some of the Confucian classics and also in the works of the ancient Chinese philosopher Mozi, where it is often translated into English as “philanthropy”. This is quite close to the literal translation of the combination of two Chinese characters making up the word: “broad love” or “broad caring”.

In the history of Chinese philosophy, the meaning of this term has been a traditional point of contention. Many commentators use the term to describe the philosophy of Mencius, one of the key Confucian texts. Others point out that the word boai/hakuai does not actually appear in Mencius, rather it is a term favored by Mozi, a philosopher explicitly condemned in Mencius for having a conception of love which is too un-differentiated and universal.

In The Clash Between Education and Religion, Inoue uses this latter tradition to deploy Mencius against an egalitarian interpretation of hakuai as “benevolence for all”. First Inoue points out that the word hakuai does not appear in Mencius nor in the Analects of Confucius, but only in a less central Confucian text the Xiaojing [Classic of Filial Piety]. He then argues that the term is rather associated primarily with Mozi. He then refers to the section in Mencius where Mozi is condemned for his heretical non-Confucian idea of “love without differentiation” [Jp:ken'ai, Ch:jian'ai]. Often glossed in Japanese as hakuai/boai, the word ken'ai/jian'ai is the key to an important section of Mencius which Inoue deploys in the debate. A standard English translation of this section of Mencius reads as follows.

Yang advocates everyone for himself, which amounts to a denial of one's prince; Mo(zi) advocates love without discrimination[jian'ai], which amounts to a denial of one's father. To ignore one's father on the one hand and one's prince on the other, is to be no different from the beasts [...] If the way of Yang and Mo does not subside and the way of Confucius is not proclaimed, the people will be deceived by heresies and the path of morality will be blocked.25
Of course, Inoue could not reject the term *hakuai/boai* out of hand, because it appears in the *Rescript*. So instead, he established a “Confucian kind of *hakuai*” (which was “differentiated”), which he sets up in a dichotomy against a “Mo-ist and Christian kind of *hakuai*”, which he labels using Mencius’ term *ken'ai/jian'ai* [love without discrimination] and which he condemns as heretical and dangerous.\(^{26}\)

Employing this philological tradition nominally against the Christians in *The Clash Between Education and Religion*, Inoue argues that the Christian idea of *hakuai*, like Mozi’s, is the absolute opposite of the Confucian (and therefore for Inoue, interestingly; the “Asian”) form of *hakuai*. He argues that Mencius developed a gradation/order [*junjo*] in the concept of *hakuai*. This “Confucian *hakuai*”, Inoue argues, is “discriminatory” [*yūsabetsuteki*] (meaning it discriminates between different categories of people) and thereby possesses order [*junjo*]. The Christian *hakuai* is likened to the heterodox non-Confucian thinker Mozi’s nondiscriminatory *hakuai* and is thereby, like Mozi, set up as a heterodoxy opposed to the Confucian order, and condemned.\(^{27}\)

In *The Rescript Explicated*, Inoue first heaps praise on the positive implications of “benevolence to all”, before going on to point out the dangerous ways this phrase can be used and warning against a misinterpretation of the meaning of the term.

But, in terms of benevolence to all [*hakuai*], there must be an order/gradation. If you throw away your own family and put another family first, or if you put another country before ours, then that is not being “benevolent to all”. If you do not distinguish between those who are close and those who are not, if you do not discriminate between us and them, if you love all equally, if you do not set up a gradation or ranking, then you would love people from all nations equally, and as a result your passion for loyalty and patriotism would vanish. That is why all people should put the duty of serving our Emperor and loving our Country first.\(^{28}\)

In the *Rescript* itself, this kind of interpretation is not alluded to in any way whatsoever. There is no limitation placed on the idea of “extending your benevolence to all”. But in his commentary Inoue places a heavy political spin on the idea, and tries to limit its applicability. *Hakuai*, “benevolence to all” as the official Ministry of Education’s translation of the *Rescript* quite accurately coins it, is indeed a value present in the East Asian philosophical tradition. But the meaning of that value in the Confucian tradition is open to interpretation and has been a point of political argument for millenniums. The interpretation of this phrase found in *The Rescript Explicated* and *The Clash Between Education and Religion* is one example of the way Inoue seeks to limit or direct the Confucian framework of the *Rescript* in a particularly conservative and exclusivist direction.

\(^{26}\) Inoue Testujirō 1893:116-119.
\(^{27}\) Inoue Testujirō 1893.
\(^{28}\) Inoue Testujirō 1890:69-70.
Inoue’s argument, however, does not rely simply on this criticism of Christianity as being un-Asian and heterodox. Inoue’s attack on Christianity and its conception of hakuai is also carried out on a much more openly political level. That is by linking the heterodox (Mo-ist/Christian) conception of hakuai with the concept of egalitarianism. Inoue writes:

According to Christianity, beneath God all human beings are absolutely equal. There is not even a hierarchy between men and women. This is basically social egalitarianism. But in Japan and China we have from olden days had a custom of hierarchy between men and women and scholars should follow this pre-existing custom.

Political and philosophical arguments over the concept of equality had already played an important role in Meiji intellectual history during the 1870s amid the Meiroku scholars. The debate between Meiroku members, Fukuzawa Yukichi, Nakamura Masanao, Katō Hiroyuki, Mori Arinori and Sakatani Shirosi over equality between men and women is well documented. In that debate, initially carried on in terms of the parameters of liberal philosophy, the husband and wife ethics in the “Five Ethical Relations” system of Confucian philosophy were quickly employed on both the conservative and progressive sides of the argument. Of course, the hot political issue lying behind the Meiroku debate over equality between women and men, and equal rights for men and women, was the contemporary political issue of civil rights itself. The argument about social egalitarianism in The Clash Between Education and Religion in the same way takes gender relations as a field of argument, but of course underlying the issue of gender the issues of human freedom and human rights themselves are insinuated. This is really the key issue lying behind Inoue’s use of the word junjo [ranking/order]. The nominally anti-Christian argument is clearly feeding the ongoing major political debate of the period: rights versus loyalty, liberalism versus conservatism.

As is made obvious in his introduction to The Rescript Explicated, the key point of the Rescript for Inoue is its role in creating one homogenous people, united out of a sense of loyalty. Unwavering loyalty to the units of state and house by a united mass is seen by Inoue as the message of the Rescript. This is a vision of society held together by vertical hierarchical bonds. On the other hand, the idea of “benevolence to all” not only offers the terrifying prospect of people being benevolent to others outside their own family or nation, but also of social bonding on a horizontal level.

Looking at Inoue’s entire argument surrounding the concept of hakuai as outlined in The Clash Between Education and Religion, it is difficult not to see it as part of an overall reaction against liberalism in general, and democratic movements in particular. Twenty years earlier, in one of the most famous anti-Christian works of

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29 Inoue Testujirō 1893:131.
30 This debate began with the serialization of Fukuzawa Yukichi(2003). A good selection of the articles which further constituted this debate, particularly from Meiroku zasshi and Minkan zasshi, can be found in Yoshino Sakuzō ed. 1928. Closer referencing, a detailed explication and discussion of this debate can be found in Paramore 2004:97-115.
the early Meiji period, Yasui Sokken (1799-1876) railed against Christianity as a Trojan horse through which representative government would be hoisted on Japan. Sokken’s anti-Christian treatise, Benbō, included a preface written by Shimazu Hisamitsu, the leader of the Conservative party at the time.31 Yamaji Aizan famously analyzed much of the so-called anti-Christian argument of Sokken in terms of conservative attempts to put a lid on calls for democracy in the 1870s.32

Inoue’s four main debate points outlined in The Clash Between Education and Religion and quoted above dominated the debate of the same name which followed. In 1893 alone, a countless number of articles, books and essays appeared addressing the debate question. Some of the most important of the anti-Christian essays which appeared in 1893 were collected as an edited edition by Seki Kōsaku and published in October of the same year by Inoue Enyō’s publishing house, Tetsugakushoin. This collection remains today as one of the best compilations of the arguments of this debate.33

Some of the articles collected focused on the loyalty issue, basically punching home arguments which had been fairly widely used for a long time. Others, such as “How Christianity debilitates the nation” by Washio Junkei, addressed the question more subtly, expanding on Inoue’s discussion of the hakuai issue to present a dichotomy between universalism and particularism, where the anti-Christian case is argued as a championing of particularism.

Universalism can be expressed in other words as a doctrine of philanthropy [hakuai shugi]. Nationalism is in other words a doctrine based on patriotism. But if philanthropy is the broad love of all-under-heaven, and patriotism is love of one’s own country, it would seem that their intentions must be different. If that is so, is it then impossible for one who has forthrightly taken up the doctrine of patriotism to avoid a conflict with the doctrine of philanthropy? If that were the case, then where on earth could one find citizens of a nation prepared to practice philanthropy?

If one nation is one part of the world, then the happiness of the world must come into being through the happiness of each nation. If all the nations of the world each cultivate their individual uniqueness, then the world will be cultivated. For each individual nation’s uniqueness to be cultivated and developed, people should be patriotic to each of their individual nations. That being the case, patriotism is in fact philanthropy. What we call nationalism is in fact where true philanthropy resides.34

As a result of the debates which pursued anti-Christian themes during the early 1890s, the meaning of the Imperial Rescript on Education in the public sphere

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31 This introduction can be found in Nakamura Yukihiko and Okada Takehiko eds. 1972(47):246-247.
32 Yamaji Aizan 1971:394.
33 Seki Kōsaku 1893.
34 Washio Junkei 1893; Seki Kōsaku 1998:302-303. Washio went on to become one of the most influential intellectual historians in the mid twentieth century. His post-WWII compilations such as Nihon shiisō tōsō shiryō continues to be used as important texts today.
became framed within a particular discourse. That discourse affected certain meanings to the symbolism of the Rescript which were not in the original text. It framed the Rescript in the context of international imperial competition. It presented the Confucian values of the Rescript in contrast against Christian ideas. It presented the Rescript as a representation of particularism against universalism. Most importantly, underlying all these, it interpreted the Confucian terminology of the Rescript in a particularly conservative and politically loaded way, presenting the Rescript in opposition to liberal democratic ideas.

Thus, the promulgation of a key symbolic text of the new modern state, the Imperial Rescript on Education, through a massive public debate which centered on anti-Christian discourse, ended up being associated with a particular form of nationalism which used cultural particularism to argue for a conception of “national ethic” which directly supported the conservative loyalty side in a debate going to the center of what kind of political system the new nation would adopt. The so-called “anti-Christian” side of the debate was dominated by arguments which intersected directly with the conservative side in the contemporaneous political confrontations, and which in particular labeled social egalitarianism as an affront to national loyalty, associating it with the foreign creed.35

Defining the nation in history: anti-Christian discourse and the history of Japanese Philosophy

As mentioned above, the key term in Inoue’s The Clash Between Education and Religion and in the debate itself was “national ethic”. The Rescript was cast as the embodiment of the “national ethic”, which itself was seen as having originated in an organic Japanese past. Because the “national ethic” was justified by its alleged roots in the organic past, the role of history in demonstrating that ethic’s existence in a “national history” construct was vital. In the modern academy, it was Inoue Tetsujirō himself who played the central role in creating a “national history” which supported the conception of “the national ethic” through the manufacture of an ideological history of ideas in Japan.

The construction of ideology and the project of national history construction in Japan, however, are both generally seen as having solid bases in the late Tokugawa political thought of the eighteenth and early to mid nineteenth centuries. The invention of a history which projected an image of anti-Christian discourse as a central element in the establishment of Tokugawa rule in the late sixteenth early seventeenth century began in these same, predominantly early nineteenth century late Tokugawa period attempts to construct historical and ideological discourses in response to the decline of shogunate rule. These projects of ideological and historical

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35 The success of the anti-Christian discourse of the debates of the early 1890s in establishing this interpretation of the Rescript is demonstrated by the fact that many Christian commentators, most notably Uchimura Kanzō himself, steered clear of making any comment which detracted from the definition of the Rescript framed by Inoue and others. Instead, the intensity of the attacks upon their Christianity forced players like Uchimura to focus their debating efforts on proving that Christianity was also in favor of loyalty to the nation. Indeed, Uchimura Kanzō’s early support for the first Sino-Japanese war in 1894, which he later withdrew, is often explained in terms of the political climate which had been established during the debates of the early 1890s.
construction are most commonly identified with Mito domain Confucian scholars, the so-called Mitogaku tradition. Inoue Tetsujirō’s historical outlook in relation to the social role of Confucianism, indeed of thought in general, and in particular his anti-Christian discourse were clearly heavily influenced by Mito and other late Tokugawa scholarship. In order to provide a context to Inoue’s construction of a history of Japanese philosophy which privileged anti-Christian discourse, it might be helpful to first briefly examine these eighteenth and early to mid nineteenth century Tokugawa historical and ideological discourses, focusing on in particular the “resurrection” of a dormant anti-Christian discourse within them.

a) The Background of Tokugawa Historiography and Sectarianism

The Mito Learning [Mitogaku] tradition is generally considered to represent both the beginnings of ideology building, and the beginnings of “national history” writing. The beginnings of the creation of a national history for Japan is usually traced back to the historical writings of the Mito Learning scholars, in particular their Dai Nihon shi [Great History of Japan] project. Mito Learning scholars are also generally credited as important intellectual patrons of the “Revere the Emperor, Expel the Barbarians” [sonnō jōi] creed which was so influential in the late Tokugawa and the Restoration period [bakumatsu ishinki]. These two projects of ideology building and history creation were of course intimately linked. Historical constructs, especially from the beginning of the Tokugawa era (the beginning of the regime the Mito scholars were politically beholden to) became important elements for Mito scholars in designing ideological constructs which justified Tokugawa rule. Mito Learning scholars, because they themselves were often of low samurai station and under the patronage of a politically important Tokugawa lord, tended to reflect the political inclination of their patrons quite faithfully. The conception of national history represented by the Dai Nihon shi project was heavily influenced by the political agenda of the Tokugawa Mito domain lord, particularly from the beginning of the nineteenth century when the Tokugawa regime began to face problems serious enough to threaten its existence.

During the early nineteenth century educated Japanese began to realize that important domestic economic and structural problems, which had been pointed out since the seventeenth century, were reaching critical states. At the same time, some educated Japanese and the Mito scholars in particular, were becoming increasingly concerned by the threat of Western imperialism. Concern over this threat created a strong anti-Western discourse. This anti-Western discourse, while obviously caused

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36 Begun by the second lord of Mito in 1657, the Dai Nihon shi project continued on in one form or another until the end of the nineteenth century. The development of the Dai Nihon shi was heavily influenced in the early and mid nineteenth century in particular by the Mito Learning movement’s emphasis on loyalty to the Emperor. Figures in the history tended to be judged fairly harshly on these terms as either “loyal retainers” or “rebel retainers”.

37 The same economic problems relating to land usage and administration recurcd consistently through the Tokugawa period. Reforms of the administration of land at a regional level were recommended as early as the 1640s by Kumazawa Banzan, and mid-Tokugawa intellectuals like Ogū Sorai and Arai Hakuseki pointed to the problems and recommended drastic reforms to the central government in the early eighteenth century.
by the perceived Western military threat, tended to concentrate increasingly on the fact that the Westerners were “Christian”. Christianity was a useful target to criticize not only because the religion had been officially proscribed and demonized in popular literature since the mid seventeenth century, but also because Christianity was a universal evil which could be applied to all the Western intruders, be they Russian, British or American. This can be seen in one of the earliest texts in the resurgence of anti-Christian discourse in the late Tokugawa period, Miura Baien’s *Samidareshō*.

I have heard that when the Westerners want to take a country, they consider the use of arms to be simplistic. When they want to take a country they first assist it with gold, silver, grain and textiles, help the poor, and use medicines to save the sick. Skillfully confusing the people, they finally employ the doctrine of the Christian trinity to control the peoples’ minds, making them think that they are no different to their sovereigns and fathers. Seeing that they have drawn the people to their own will, they complete the job simply by bringing an army which under such conditions cannot fail to succeed in one stroke [...] They are the greatest enemies of Japan [...] I have heard the Westerners are currently moving into the northern reaches of the Ainu lands [Hokkaido]. Our nation must occupy the north.38

Here images associating Christian activity with the use of strange medicines and aid for the poor and marginal, images reminiscent of, and probably influenced by early Tokugawa anti-Christian texts like *Kirishitan Monogatari*, are discussed in relation to the Russian territorial threat.39 In other words, the late eighteenth century fear of Russian incursions to the North of Japan can be seen to feed into an anti-Western discourse influenced by the early Tokugawa representation of Christianity.

In addition to this representation of Christianity as symbolic of a Western expansionist threat, another argument against Christianity, favored particularly by Mito scholars, was that it would cause “disorder” by removing the underpinnings of the hierarchical Tokugawa social order. In the famous Mito scholar Aizawa Yasushiō’s treatise against Christianity, *Kikōben*, he mounted the following argument.

Sovereign and vassal, father and son, husband and wife, senior and junior, friend and comrade. The Five (Confucian) Relations are the part of humanity which cannot be avoided. This is Nature as created by Heaven. When it comes to ethics, there is not one of the barbarian ideas which cannot be torn apart because they are all just made up. So what is it that confuses their sense of the justice which should exist between their Kings and Vassals? It is that they teach that Heaven [God] entrusts the common people to the ruler and that that is what makes them kings. So (according to them) the sovereign rules in place of Heaven [God] and all the vassals and commoners in the realm respect the sovereign because they respect Heaven [God]. (According to them) Heaven [God] and Sovereign have

one basis. The barbarians thereby make their great kings from barbarian gods and from those kings make lesser kings. So there are two kings and two bases. Because of this mistake, they surely know of the existence of the Barbarian God, but they do not know about the existence of their King (they do not understand the basis of the position of the King). This is why the countries of the West are constantly in a state of murderous rebellion and war.40

In this way, Christianity was identified as not only symbolic of the Western military threat, but moreover as something inherently opposed to the Confucian ethical system and sure to upset the class order of Tokugawa Japan. This political use of the image of Christianity to identify anything against the Tokugawa class system as against a civilized (Confucian) conception of order itself had a precedent in the early Tokugawa writings of figures like Hayashi Razan.41

The most political utilization of anti-Christian discourse in the early to mid nineteenth century, however, especially for Shogunate aligned writers, was also the one most closely tied to a construction of history. This was to use early Tokugawa anti-Christian rhetoric to relate an image of early Tokugawa “success” in “expelling the barbarians” (meaning suppressing Christianity) to the national unifying role of the Shogunate of the present day. This kind of anti-Christian discourse, by focusing on the early Tokugawa past, presented the Tokugawa regime as the historical defenders of Japan against the West. At a time when the shogunate was subject to criticism for its inability to suppress the Western threat, the historical story of the suppression of the Christians was used to show the Tokugawa’s historical ability to crush the Western barbarians. Anti-Christian texts and the political motives of their writers were joined through a focus on this “history”.

The importance of early Tokugawa anti-Christian discourse to the anti-Christian discourse of the nineteenth century, already evident in the imagery used in the likes of Samidareshō,42 was made abundantly clear in the 1850s when a number of edited volumes of old anti-Christian works were published. Most of the Japanese anti-Christian documents used in twentieth century research are sourced from these volumes, which eminated from Mito Confucian scholars and Jōdo-shu Buddhist scholars in the 1850s and 1860s.

These publications came firstly from the Mito domain, editions reputedly collated by Aizawa Yasushi and published under the name of the Mito Lord Tokugawa Nariaki. The two most famous edited volumes were Hajashū which presented a collection of Chinese anti-Christian writings and Sokkyohen, a collection of Japanese anti-Christian writings. Sokkyohen included most of the main early Tokugawa anti-Christian texts used today to represent that period in history. It included Kirishitan Monogatari, Ha Kirishitan, Ha Daiisu and Taijijashiron among many others.43 In the introduction to Sokkyohen, Tokugawa Nariaki left no doubt as to the political

40 Aizawa Seishisai 1857.
41 The classic example is his letters to Ishikawa Jōzan contained in Hayashi Razan 1979:86-97.
purpose of the collection, emphasizing the role of the early Tokugawa shoguns in holding back the Christian barbarian tide.

The poison of this witchcraft should be described in its full extent. It is a barbarian heresy which would disorder the minds of men and steal their countries. It is a depravity of an earlier age. Nevertheless, under Ōtomo Sōrin’s influence Oda Nobunaga became involved with this religion. Later, Nobunaga realized its depravity and sought to ban it, but could not. When Lord Tokugawa Ieyasu took up the responsibility of suppressing the barbarians(became shogun), however, the first thing he did was to strictly ban the religion. His successors Tokugawa Hidetada and Tokugawa Iemitsu continued this policy. Their successors continued on this policy through the ages, burning their ships when they came."

Five years earlier Nariaki had opened his introduction to Hajashū with a slightly different version of this history, but still with the same basic message.

When the heresy(Christianity) entered the land of the Gods(Japan) Hideyoshi Toyotomi strictly banned it and Tokugawa Iemitsu then sternly cast them out. Tokugawa Hidetada and Tokugawa Iemitsu continued this good policy.

In this manner, Mito compilations of not only early Tokugawa anti-Christian texts, but even of Chinese texts, came with introductions which presented the Tokugawa expulsion of Christian barbarism from Japan as a point of focus. Perhaps surprisingly to some, the same can be seen in contemporaneous Buddhist compilations.

The main non-Mito source of publications of edited volumes of anti-Christian documents was the Jōdo-shū Buddhist sect, in particular a politically powerful scholar monk who went on to become a head of the Jōdo sect, Kiyū Dōjin(Ugai Tetsujō). Tetsujō produced two volumes seemingly modeled on the Mito Hajashū and Sokkyohen in the early 1860s. One a compilation of Chinese anti-Christian texts, Hekijashū, and another a compilation of mainly Japanese anti-Christian texts, Hekijakankenroku. This latter text included several texts also found in the Mito compilation, but surprisingly enough for a Buddhist produced text, it also included a number of Hayashi Razan and other Confucian anti-Christian writings. While the Mitogaku Confucians and Jōdo-shū Buddhists, were ostensibly religiously opposed groups, they historically shared in common close political links with the shogunate. The rehash of the distant shogunal past became a mainstay of propagandists who constructed history as their main attack weapon, the religious affiliations of the sources they used being of secondary concern. Tetsujō’s introduction to his compilation of Japanese anti-Christian texts, Hekijakankenroku, demonstrates a

44 Tokugawa Nariaki 1860.
45 Tokugawa Nariaki 1855.
46 The most obvious example of this phenomenon is a document written by Kiyū Dōjin in 1870, during the height of the new Meiji government’s attacks on Buddhism. In this document Tetsujō argues against government attacks on Buddhism primarily using Confucian arguments, see Kiyū Dōjin 1870.
similar approach to the history of the early Tokugawa shogunate as seen in Nariaki’s introductions.

In the Keicho era (1596-1615), Tokugawa Ieyasu perceived the depravity of this religion and strictly prohibited it. He employed laws to sweep aside this heresy and correct the peoples’ minds.\(^{47}\)

These compilations were incredibly important texts, laying much of the foundations for modern scholarship on anti-Christian discourse. Their role in the political context of their construction, however, is also very clear. These arguments represented strong vehicles of propaganda to support a regime being criticized as not up to facing off the Western threat. Many of the more lengthy texts contained in both \textit{Sokkyohen} and \textit{Hekijakankenroku} were dominated by manufactured exoticized images of Christians in the early seventeenth centuries and narration of the Tokugawa regime and its Confucian and Buddhist intellectual foot soldiers wiping away the Christian scourge. As the Tokugawa regime faced stiff internal opposition, and external pressure, the prior history of anti-Christian discourse from the earlier Tokugawa period came to be employed as an ideological tool, primarily by telling a story of the early Tokugawa period that attributed the wiping away of Christianity to the efforts of Tokugawa aligned intellectuals.\(^{48}\)

One particular point of interest in these edited volumes is the social utility they attribute to ideas. The edited volumes present intellectual texts and arguments as having been a responsible factor in seeing off Christians and Westerners from Japan. In other words, they assume ideas as playing a central role in determining the course of society, at least in the historical space of the early Tokugawa period. There is a striking similarity in the way these texts portray the social function of ideas and the way the social utility of ideas is described not only by Inoue Tetsujirō, but also by much of the late twentieth century scholarship on the Tokugawa period.

\textbf{b) Meiji Historiography and “Philosophy”}

Inoue Tetsujirō is remembered today primarily not for his role in the anti-Christian controversies of the early 1890s described earlier in this chapter, but rather for his role in the manufacture of national history. His most enduring academic works are those which he wrote during the first years of the twentieth century on what it is normal today to call the “intellectual history of Japan”, but which he referred to as “the history of Japanese philosophy”. As referred to earlier, in 1890 Inoue became the first Japanese to be appointed full professor in the department of philosophy at the University of Tokyo. Since his 1882 appointment as an associate professor, one

\(^{47}\) Kiyū Dojin 1861. This section of Tetsujō’s introduction is also included in Serikawa 1994:336.

\(^{48}\) As the shogunate began to collapse, the political utilization of this kind of anti-Christian historical writing was actually heightened. A good example is Sokkyohen itself, which was published in 1860, after the Tokugawa Nariaki and Mito aligned faction in the shogunate had been suppressed by those more open to negotiation with the West. In this way, the use of anti-Christian discourse by 1860 can be seen as part of the intra-shogunate as well as broader political debate. Similarly, shortly after the restoration, during the suppression of Buddhism, Kiyū Dojin used the historical role of Buddhism as part of the early Tokugawa order suppressing Christianity to argue against repression of Buddhism, see Kiyū Dojin 1870.
of Inoue's main duties at the University had been to take charge of the teaching of “Eastern philosophy”. The main academic contribution of his career is usually viewed in terms of his attempt in this post, especially during the late Meiji period, to integrate the teaching of East Asian thought, in particular Confucianism, into a Western academic framework, creating an intellectual history basis of the “national ethic” as “Japanese philosophy”.

The works of Inoue which have had the most lasting academic influence are his three volumes on the history of Confucianism in Japan published between 1900 and 1905: *The Philosophy of Japan’s Wang Yang-ming-ist School, The Philosophy of Japan’s Ancient Learning School and The Philosophy of Japan’s Zhu Xi-ist School*. The period of Inoue's life between 1890 and 1905 thereby represents in many ways the height of his influence. During this period he not only led one of the most popular intellectual debates of political consequence in the early 1890s, but moreover set the framework for how the intellectual history of Japan would be studied in a modern academic framework. These two enterprises were linked through the establishment of a historical narrative illustrating the “national ethic”.

As Western philosophical and scientific analysis became more common in Japanese public debate, arguments centered around the idea of ethics in general, and a “national ethic” in particular, became more reliant on definitions of the nature of philosophy, religion, and indeed knowledge themselves. As will be discussed below, conservative nationalists argued that the Japanese national ethic was organic to Japan and illustrated in “Japanese philosophy”. In terms of this argument, the definition of “Japanese philosophy”, something which had not been systematically attempted before, became a critical issue. The question of “what Japanese philosophy was” was closely linked to the Meiji attempt to define and deal with the broader Western concept of “philosophy” itself. The definition of what did or did not constitute “philosophy” was related to the sticky question of what useful social role (if any) should be attributed to “religion”. This was not only one of the continuing intellectual questions of early Meiji scholars, but as controversies like the brief suppression of Buddhism in the early 1870s demonstrated, one of the pressing political ones also. In the 1890s context, and particularly in Inoue's construction of “Japanese philosophy”, this question became increasingly integrated into national ideology. There had, however, already been significant political and philosophical discussion of this topic from the 1870s.

It is commonly suggested in English language scholarship that “the term ‘philosophy’ [tetsumaku] was coined by Nishi Amane in 1874 with the express purpose of distinguishing this new foreign import from Confucianism and Buddhism.” Indeed, the term *tetsumaku* was coined by Nishi Amane in his 1874 text *Hyakuichishinron* and Nishi's definition of *tetsumaku* does tend to suggest a contrast between Western philosophy on the one hand, and religious and ethical traditions like Buddhism, Confucianism and Christianity on the other. Thereby, the contrast in the Japanese language of our times between the word *tetsumaku*, representing Western philosophy,
and shisō (usually translated “thought”), representing religious and non-Western philosophical traditions, is often described as having been established by Nishi. The main point of Nishi’s definition of philosophy as tetsugaku in Hyakuichishinron, however, was not primarily to distinguish “Western” from “non-Western” thought, nor even for that matter simply to distinguish religious from non-religious thought. Rather, Nishi defined tetsugaku in terms of academic methodology. After outlining in detail the way various academic disciplines are separate, and support separate academic endeavors, Nishi went on to define “philosophy” in terms of those parameters.

Philosophy’, which I translate as tetsugaku and has been discussed in the West since ancient times, is the discipline which considers aspects of all these other individual disciplines, furthering truth, illuminating the human and heavenly ways, and establishing a methodology for learning in all disciplines [...] Therefore, discussions based on tetsugaku are able to deal with both spiritual and physical matters on different levels. By saying “on different levels” (in layers), I mean they must not be merged.

Here Nishi established philosophy as the central discipline of a Western academic pantheon where different disciplines are treated separately, where knowledge is compartmentalized to disciplines. He contrasted this with religious traditions, both in the West and East Asia, which consider what Nishi refers to as “spiritual” and “physical” dimensions in one “merged” paradigm. Nishi’s main point was thereby epistemological. While Nishi’s overall definition was not anti-religion, it did follow contemporaneous European trends in indicating a limitation on the scope of religion to the “individual”. Nishi expresses this as the differentiation between “ruling the people” [chijin], which he sees as a matter for law and state, and “cultivating the person” [shuko], which he sees as a matter for religion and the individual.

Thereby, we can see that even at this point where Nishi first introduced the word “philosophy” into the Japanese vocabulary, it was deeply associated with privileging an approach to knowledge based on modern academic categories. While a differentiation between “religion” and “philosophy” was already suggested to some extent in Nishi’s definition, that differentiation was more clearly articulated, and articulated in more overtly political terms, by others in the years that followed. How that differentiation became further articulated and defined thereafter is closely connected with the political use of anti-Christian discourse during the late nineteenth century.

Discussion of the delineation between “religion” and “philosophy” had been one of the key arguments in the “Debate on the Clash Between Education and
Religion”. One of Inoue Tetsujirō’s main arguments against Christianity was that educated people in the West had already rejected it on “philosophical” and “scientific” grounds. Interestingly, from the 1880s Buddhist intellectuals had already begun to use this device both to attack Christianity and to recommend Buddhism as a kind of philosophy. Inoue Enryō was the leader of these new wave Buddhist thinkers. He also became one of the main protagonists and anti-Christian publishers during the “Debate on the Clash Between Education and Religion.” More importantly, however, it was initially in the writings of Inoue Enryō that a new anti-Christian discourse, partially argued within western intellectual frameworks, emerged.

An important conservative intellectual, Enryō had close ties to Inoue Tetsujirō. Inoue Enryō had been sent to the University of Tokyo in 1880 with a scholarship from the Higashi Honganji Otani faction of the Buddhist Jōdo shinshū sect. He graduated from the philosophy department at the University of Tokyo in 1885, three years after Tetsujirō’s appointment there as an associate professor. The year before, in 1884, still a student, Enryō had established the Society of Philosophy[tetsugakkai], an organization which remains today the biggest academic association for the study of philosophy in Japan. Immediately after graduation Enryo founded Tetsugakushoin, a prominent intellectual publishing house, and the Tetsugakkkan, which went on to become Tōyō University.

When Inoue Tetsujirō came back from Germany in 1890 and was appointed full professor, he not only became one of the most active members and later the President of the Society of Philosophy, he moreover published many of his books, including The Clash Between Education and Religion, from Tetsugakushoin. In this sense, even though Inoue Tetsujirō’s philosophical and political lines, particularly in respect to Buddhism, were always different to Enryō’s, the activities of these two figures were nevertheless very closely related through the 1890s. It is generally accepted that Tetsujirō was influenced by Enryō, both in the way he used anti-Christian discourse and in his general conception of “philosophy” in a Japanese context.

In his 1886 text The Needle of Truth Enryō divided what he called the “sphere of learning” into three: 1) “the sciences”, which he defined as the individual scientific disciplines, 2) “physical philosophy”, which he defined as analytic and ethical philosophy, and 3) “meta-physical philosophy”, which he called “pure philosophy”, but which he also referred to as “religion.” But the “religion” Enryō indicates here is a religion he described as “religion as philosophy”, or “scientific religion”. Enryō

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54 For instance, Inoue Tetsujirō 1893:43-47.
55 See, in particular, Inoue Enryō 1886a and 1986b.
56 For more on Enryō’s life, see Josephson 2006:149-151. For more on Enryō’s philosophy and its political implications, see Paramore 2009:133-141.
57 Although most copies of this title found today, including the one used for references in this article, were sold by the publisher Keigyōsha, the first edition was simultaneously published by three publishing houses on the 10th of April, 1893, Keigyōsha, Bunsandō and Tetsugakushoin.
58 Sueki Fumihiko 2004:63.
59 Inoue Enryō 1886a(3):164; Sueki Fumihiko 2004:53.
described religion in these terms as “rational” and “universal”. In this sense, even though Enryō admitted “religion” into his definition of “philosophy”, he actually limited the inclusiveness of this category using the parameters of “science”. Christianity was excluded from the category of “scientific religion” (meta-physical philosophy) because “Christianity posits a master of Heaven and Earth actively controlling things.” In other words, because Christianity posits a determinant force above the natural sciences, it was excluded.

Heavily influenced by Hegelianism, Neo-Kantism and Spencerian social organism theory, Enryō’s definition of science became closely related to an idea of organic determinism. For Enryō, like many of his contemporaries in the West, scientific reality had come to have no subject and for this reason he famously rejected the idea of “free will”.

Those who reject this idea [free will] are called determinists. Determinists argue that each object and action does not occur because of people’s intentions, but rather that people’s thoughts and actions are all ultimately natural functions of the laws of nature. These laws are like the (karmic) laws of cause and effect. This means that it is not possible that things happen due to human will, but that it is also not chance that makes things happen. Each object and action cannot occur without a cause. There is an effect because first there is a cause. Effects happen because of causes. So whether the universal nature of our minds is unfathomable, or whether our will is free, this is because there is a proper cause, this has not arisen by chance. But because until now there has been nothing that clearly tells us what this cause is, the theory of free will has gained currency in the world. Recently, however, thanks to progress in the study of evolution, for the first time the ultimate cause has been illuminated and we have come to realize that will is not free. For this reason, most scientists in the world today espouse determinism. None of them teach free will. But the Christians still believe the old teachings and stick to their position that human will is originally free.

As Tetsujirō does several years later in 1893, here Enryō uses an argument which is nominally “anti-Christian” to attack the intellectual underpinnings of liberalism. In this case, free will. The importance of determinism and social evolutionism, however, went to the core of Enryō’s philosophical outlook. In Enryō’s most quoted exposition of his famous synthesis of Hegelian and Buddhist metaphysics, he concludes his explication of the synthesis of mind and substance, consciousness and reality, and explains his idea of the dialectic resolution of ultimate Truth (which he rather egoistically labels “Enryō’s world”) in the following terms.

Making justice our standard we discuss good and bad, making utility our standard we discuss profit and loss. When the standard changes, it is impossible for the
people not to change. But if we progress and arrive at the standard which exists within the standard, then we can see the existence of something which is changeless. In other words, we can see the equal principle of discrimination. That which changes is the relative standard. That which does not change is the absolute standard. From the relative we evolve and enter the absolute. This is what we call evolution of the standard. In other words, this is where we progress from the relationship between the various appearances of object and mind (reality and perception) to the absolute principle generated from within those appearances. If people individually evolve to this state, they will see only the one equal Truth. How then could it be possible for arguments over right and wrong to ever arise again? This is what is called Enryo's world.63

The most politically significant element in this philosophy is Inoue Enryō’s conception of social homogenization as a function of evolution. For Enryō, social homogenization is an inevitable function of evolution. This is particularly evident in Enryō’s 1887 work, Buddhist Action Part One: Action to Smash Heresy [Bukkyō katsuron dai ichi “haja katsuron”].64 In 1889 he explicitly applied his ideas about the organic nature of truth politically. In On State and Church in Japan [Nihon seikyōron], a book written to address the contemporaneous constitutional debates, and in particular the debate about freedom of faith, Enryō argued that “Eastern religions”, by which he indicated an integrated Shinto and Buddhism organic to Japan, should be made the official religions of Japan, and “Western religions” severely restricted.65 Here, his key argument was that Shinto and Buddhism had over a long history become integrated with each other and the Japanese cultural setting, joining them organically to the nation. In other words, his main argument against Christianity, while closely integrated with his philosophical position, was in the end based on a conception of an organic Japanese history.66

Inoue Tetsujirō had made a distinction between “Western religions”, which he saw as antithetic to the Japanese nation, and “Eastern religions”, which he saw as essentially benign in The Clash Between Education and Religion in 1893.67 Inoue Enryō further supported this distinction, not only by arguing that Buddhism was philosophy (a position Tetsujirō did not agree with), but more importantly by designing an historical construct to delineate between Christianity on the one hand, and philosophy and Eastern religions on the other.

Inoue Enryō’s conception of “East-West Philosophy” was most famously represented in his creation of what he called “The Great Hall of Philosophy” [tetsugakudō]. In “The Great Hall of Philosophy” were “enshrined” thirteen “philosophers” whom visitors could come and pay homage to. The choice of the thirteen was based on Enryō’s view of philosophical history seen from a Japanese

64 Inoue Enryō 1889a:119-125, although the three chapters between p.101 and p.145 all deal with evolution. Explicit reference to Spencer can be found on p.11 of same.
65 Inoue Enryō 1889b:63-64.
66 Inoue Enryō 1889b:55.
national perspective. In his 1913 work *A glance at the World of Philosophy* [Tetsukai ichibetsu], Enryō identified Confucius, Buddha, Socrates and Kant as the four representative figures in the history of world philosophy. He then went on to identify a further six figures who were representative of the development of “Eastern philosophy” and a further three who were representative of the development of “Japanese philosophy”. These three figures were chosen one each from the traditions of Shinto, Confucianism and Buddhism. They were Hirata Atsutane, Hayashi Razan, and Gyōzen, respectively. All figures who are associated with integrating these religious/intellectual traditions into the frameworks of governance.

Both Inoue Tetsujirō and Inoue Enryō were the key figures in the discussions of the 1890s and early 1900s over what “philosophy” was. In particular, they both developed the delineation between “philosophy” and “religion” alluded to by Nishi. They developed this differentiation very differently from each other, but with similar political objectives and overtones. Inoue Tetsujirō’s exposition of Confucianism as moral philosophy in his publications between 1900 and 1905 was in content and method quite different to Enryō’s “integration” of “Buddhist philosophy” and “Western philosophy” from the late 1880s. But it rested on the same basic foundations. Those foundations basically emphasized the separation of the political and individual spheres, supported by the separation of the categories of philosophy and religion. As had been inferred in Nishi’s introduction of the term, “philosophy” was part of a modern pantheon of rational knowledge which had a role in discussions affecting politics and governance. Religions like Christianity, as both the traditional anti-Christian arguments, and the new ones which relied on Western philosophy, sociology and science suggested, was an irrational and potentially misleading element which had no role in serious social concerns. Importantly, underpinnings of liberal politics, in particular the idea of free will, were grouped in with “other Christian teachings” as part of this irrational world. This view of a negative and unscientific religion was contrasted against “Japanese philosophy” which supported a “national ethic” which, like Western national ethics, was organic to the nation and therefore also capable of supporting the ideological imperatives which had been explicitly articulated by Itō Hirobumi in the political sphere in the 1880s (as quoted at the top of this article).

The historical writing that supported such a view of Japanese philosophy is usually seen as Inoue Tetsujirō’s main achievement as an academic. In Inoue Tetsujirō’s 1900 to 1905 trilogy on the history of Japanese Confucianism, he presented the history of Zhu Xi-ist Confucianism in Japan as having laid the foundations for the “national ethic” of modern Japan and the glory of the Meiji regime. Inoue opened *The Philosophy of Japan’s Zhu Xi-ist School*, the final and culminating volume of the trilogy, by pointing out the uniqueness of Japanese Zhu Xi-ism over the other
Confucian schools. In his conclusion Inoue described the development of Confucian philosophy in the Tokugawa period as having led to the achievements of the Meiji restoration. Inoue described Zhu Xi-ist Confucianism as having, over the 300 years of Tokugawa rule, laid down the basis of Japan’s “doctrine of education” upon which had been built the success of Meiji Japan. Inoue also clearly wanted to present Japanese Zhu Xi-ism as a philosophy of global historical standing. He spoke of his own study of Zhu Xi-ism as “a demonstration to the scholars of Europe and America as to why our country is great.” He also described parallels between Zhu Xi-ist moral philosophy and the Neo-Kantian moral philosophy of Green and Muirhead.

In *The Philosophy of Japan’s Zhu Xi-ist School*, Inoue emphasized five main points about Zhu Xi-ism in Japan. Firstly, he argued that Zhu Xi-ist Confucianism played a key developmental role, particularly in the early seventeenth century, by “secularizing” Japanese society. Secondly, he described Confucianism in general, and Zhu Xi-ism in particular, as having developed historically in three stages through the Tokugawa period, and its third stage ultimately yielding the “fruit” that was the Meiji Restoration. Thirdly, Inoue claimed that Zhu Xi-ism had played a key role in establishing and protecting ideas of “homogeneity” in Japanese thought. He states that, in both the first and third phases of the development of Zhu Xi-ism in the Tokugawa period, it played a decisive role in “excluding heterodox thinking” from Japan. Inoue particularly praises Zhu Xi-ism’s role in making thinkers apolitical, and in establishing the principle of homogeneity to suppress liberal and utilitarian ideas. Fourthly, Inoue claimed that Japanese Zhu Xi-ism had provided universal

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70 Inoue Tetsujirō 1905:2. The three books of the trilogy dealt one each with the Wang Yang-ming-ist, ancient learning and Zhu Xi-ist schools of Japanese Confucianism as Inoue delineated them; *The Philosophy of Japan’s Yang-ming-ist School* (*Nihon yomeigaku no tetsugaku*) (1900), *The Philosophy of Japan’s Ancient Learning School* (*Nihon kogakuha no tetsugaku*) (1903), *The Philosophy of Japan’s Zhu Xi-ist School* (*Nihon shushigakuha no tetsugaku*) (1905). In English language literature what Inoue describes as “Yangming-ist” is either described by the full name of Wang Yang-ming Confucianism or more commonly as School of Mind Confucianism. This latter description, however, indicates a Chinese context which goes beyond Wang Yang-ming, so I have stuck with a literal translation of Inoue’s description. What Inoue describes as the “ancient learning school” is most notably the Confucianism of mid-Tokugawa thinkers like Itō Jinsai and Ogyū Sorai who were critical of Zhu Xi-ist interpretations of Confucian texts, advocated a return to Han period or earlier texts, and reading the Chinese classics in the original Chinese. In historical reality, Jinsai, Sorai and others grouped in this category did not constitute a unified “school”. What Inoue refers to as Zhu Xi-ist Confucianism is often referred to in English as School of Mind Confucianism. Both of these terms can be misleading in the Japanese context. I stick with Inoue’s use of the term Zhu Xi-ist, which is the term historically used in Japan to refer to this dominant trend of Confucianism.

71 Inoue Tetsujirō 1905:597.

72 Inoue Tetsujirō 1905:597.

73 Inoue Tetsujirō 1905:5.

74 Inoue Tetsujirō 1905:3.

75 Inoue Tetsujirō 1905:595-596. Interestingly, Maruyama Masao later took up this point from the opposite political standpoint. He also argued that Hayashi Razan and other Zhu Xi-ists’ delineation of “heterodoxy” in Confucianism and attacks on Christianity could be linked to an ongoing process of secularization in Japanese history visible since the mid sixteenth century, see Maruyama Masao 2000(6):118.

76 Inoue Tetsujirō 1905:597.

77 Inoue Tetsujirō 1905:598-599.
values and an ethical system that could be integrated into the Western tradition of ethical thought. Inoue saw these parallels with Western ethical thought mainly in terms of Zhu Xi-ism's emphasis on cultivation of the person and respect for the sovereign.78 Fifthly, Inoue described Japanese Zhu Xi-ism through the Tokugawa period as having developed from a dualist to an integrated epistemology. He declared this to have been “a brilliant progression in philosophy.”79

The overriding and most infamous achievement of The Philosophy of Japan's Zhu Xi-ist School as a history, however, was simply to establish an image of “Confucianism” as representing the “moral doctrine,” or “educational doctrine” of Tokugawa Japan.80 Maruyama Masao is often condemned for calling Zhu Xi-ist Confucianism the “guiding doctrine” of Tokugawa Japan and describing Hayashi Razan as the originator of a kind of state ideology in Tokugawa Japan based on Confucianism. But it was Inoue Tetsujirō, not Maruyama, who established this idea in the modern academy.81

As mentioned above, Inoue attributed Tokugawa Japan's “doctrine of education” to the development of Zhu Xi-ist Confucian philosophy and praised it as the basis of both modern Japan's strength and its “national ethic”. Inoue moreover attributed the origins of the development of this “doctrine” to Hayashi Razan personally.

The one who fixed Zhu Xi-ism as the doctrine of education for the 300 years of the Tokugawa period was Hayashi Razan.82

Inoue's assertion that Hayashi Razan established the place of Zhu Xi-ism in Japanese society has since been soundly disproven. Research of the 1960s, 70s and 80s made it quite clear that Hayashi Razan's effect on the place of Confucianism in Japan was limited.83 But if we wish to understand the reasons behind why Inoue himself saw Razan as the most important figure in Tokugawa Confucianism, we need first to look at what it was about Razan that led Inoue to rate him so highly. The two facets of Razan that Inoue focused on and most highly praised were his role in “eliminating heterodoxies” and his fusion of Confucianism with “Our country's Shinto.”84

Inoue emphasized this first point of “eliminating heterodoxies” to the extent that nearly his entire discussion of Razan's Confucian writings center on this theme. Of the twenty four pages, Inoue devotes to discussing Razan's ideas and nearly half are devoted solely to Razan's attacks on Christianity. Most of the other half is devoted to Razan's attacks on Wang Yang-ming Confucianism or his criticism of Wang

78 Inoue Tetsujirō 1905:600-601.
79 Inoue Tetsujirō 1905:602-603.
80 Inoue Tetsujirō 1905:4-5.
81 One could even say that Maruyama's approach was to reform this standpoint inherited from Inoue by concentrating on the political impact of thinkers who were critical of Razan and the Zhu Xi-ists, primarily of course Ōgyu Sorai, whom Inoue had written off with all the other non-Zhu Xi-ist “heterodoxies”.
82 Inoue Tetsujirō 1905:49.
84 Inoue Tetsujirō 1905:83-84.
Yang-ming-ist attributes in Fujiwara Seika.\textsuperscript{85} The basis of Inoue’s conception of the intellectual history of the Tokugawa period, therefore, was heavily reliant on the sectarian nature of Razan’s role. What basically qualified Razan in Inoue’s mind as the founder of the “doctrine of education” upon which the “national ethic” and Meiji success were formed, and the national ideology should be founded, was his central role in promoting Tokugawa sectarianism, particularly anti-Christian sectarianism.

But Inoue did not establish his view of Tokugawa intellectual history and role of Confucianism in Japanese society simply through the publication of the trilogy. His subsequent public lectures and lobbying on the issue of Confucianism’s role in society and his continued occupation of the top academic post in Japan dealing with the history of East Asian thought and Japanese intellectual history, further supported his ability to set in stone his view of the historic mission of “Eastern philosophy” in Japan.

Inoue’s view of what role Confucianism, as opposed to Buddhism and Christianity, should play in society in general was made unflinchingly clear in a speech he gave in 1908, three years after the publication of his last book in his three book series on Japanese Confucianism. In 1908 Inoue Tetsujirō gave a speech to the Society of Philosophy entitled “Strengths and Weaknesses of Confucianism.”\textsuperscript{86} In introducing his paper Inoue addressed the fact that at that time calls for the “reintroduction of Confucianism”\textsuperscript{86} were gaining wide currency from a number of different quarters. The underlying cause of these calls, Inoue sympathized, was an impression that, “the Imperial Rescript on Education in itself is somehow not enough.”\textsuperscript{87} Not enough for what, exactly, is not articulated, but the political undercurrents are clear. It is interesting to note that even in 1908, fifteen years after the debate on the clash between education and religion, and seventeen years after the introduction of the Imperial Rescript on Education and the Uchimura incident, the role of a major intellectual tradition in Japan, Confucianism, was still considered primarily in terms of the Rescript related discourse.

Inoue interpreted the calls for the “re-introduction of Confucianism” broadly in terms of a call for the use of Confucianism in moral education. Inoue then argued that to consider whether Confucianism is suitable for this purpose, it is necessary to look in detail at what Confucianism is.\textsuperscript{88} He therefore framed his investigation of Confucianism in the speech in terms of a perceived socio-political need for a particular kind of moral teaching, defined in terms of the parameters of the Imperial Rescript on Education. After looking at the history of Confucianism in Japan in terms which broadly summarized his approach in his trilogy on Confucianism in the Tokugawa period, Inoue concluded his paper by first restating the need for moral instruction.

\textsuperscript{85} Inoue’s discussion of Razan’s ideas is found at Inoue Tetsujirō 1905:61-85.
\textsuperscript{86} This speech can be found as an appendix to Inoue Tetsujirō 1945:745-807.
\textsuperscript{87} Inoue Tetsujirō 1905:746.
\textsuperscript{88} Inoue Tetsujirō 1905:748.
The motivation of pure morality is the single most urgent need of our time.\textsuperscript{89}

He then went on to recommend the introduction of Confucianism to the national education system as moral philosophy. He did this primarily by contrasting Confucianism against Christianity and Buddhism to argue that Confucianism is not a “religion”.

It would be good to have something like Confucianism in schools. I say it would be good to have it because the aim of Confucianism is pure morality on a grand scale. Also, there is no impediment to teaching it in schools. That is because it does not contradict the teachings of natural science. We would have trouble if we taught Buddhism or Christianity in schools because their teachings are not compatible with the natural sciences.\textsuperscript{90}

In this paragraph Inoue’s conclusions about the social utility of Confucianism are presented in terms of emphasizing its compatibility with “science”, which in many ways parallel his definition of parts of Confucianism as “philosophy”. Of course, this returns to Nishi’s definition of philosophy in terms of scientific categories. In Inoue’s case, however, the original definition of philosophy in terms of scientific disciplines and the implied separation of “religious” and “non-religious” thought seen in Nishi is developed in a markedly political way.

The delineation of philosophy, especially in comparison with “religion”, was carried out in close concert with issues in the political context related to “moral education” and “national ethics”. In many ways, Inoue Tetsujirō’s definition of “Confucianism” as moral philosophy supportive of national ideology (represented by the \textit{Imperial Rescript on Education}), and in contrast against Christianity, played directly into the paradigm articulated by Itō Hirobumi in 1888. Inoue Tetsujirō’s role defining the term “philosophy” to include an “Eastern philosophy” antagonistic to Christianity and directly supportive of national ideology as represented by the “national ethics” of the \textit{Rescript}, provided a framework justified in modern academic conceptions of philosophy for the identification of a “central axis” of Japanese national identity.

Inoue’s intellectual history of Japan emphasized Zhu Xi-ist Confucianism, as it developed in Japan during the Tokugawa period, as having developed philosophical thinking. He argued that the Japanese Zhu Xi-ists developed Confucianism philosophically, both through overcoming its inherent dualism and by developing the ethics within Confucianism to a level commensurate with Western ethical philosophy. In these terms, it seems clear that for Inoue Japanese Zhu Xi-ist Confucianism was a philosophy. More importantly it was a “Japanese philosophy” of which Inoue had shown the historical development inside Japan. It was a historical development which formed the “Tokugawa doctrine of education” which Inoue saw as the foundation

\textsuperscript{89} Inoue Tetsujirō 1905:806.

\textsuperscript{90} Inoue Tetsujirō 1905:806.
of the “national ethic of Meiji Japan”, which in turn was synonymous with Japan's modern statist ideology.

**Continuities and Continuing Questions**

Inoue’s emphasis in *The Philosophy of Japan’s Zhu Xi School* on Razan’s role in “eliminating heterodoxy” is interesting not only because of the amount of attention he focuses on this issue, but also because of the historical role of Tokugawa sectarianism which it projects. The role Inoue sees Tokugawa sectarianism as exemplified by Razan playing is similar to the way the Mitogaku and Jōdoshū compilations describe the role of early Tokugawa anti-Christian ideas. Underlying Inoue’s discussion of Razan’s anti-heterodox thinking is an assumption that heterodox ideas are eliminated from societies (in this case Tokugawa society) by the force of other ideas. Christianity, for instance, is a particular heterodoxy which is often described as being “cast out” by Confucian anti-Christian discourse such as Razan’s. The idea that anti-Christian discourse played an important and heroic role in the fight against Christianity in the early Tokugawa period is omnipresent in the late Tokugawa compilations which re-introduced these early Tokugawa texts to a wide audience. It was developed by Inoue Tetsujirō, academically in *The Philosophy of Japan’s Zhu Xi School* and ideologically in his lectures and *The Clash Between Education and Religion*.

This view of the socio-political role of thought, however, while dominant from the early nineteenth century until now, is rather difficult to sustain from the historical evidence. For instance, in regard to Christian thought in the Tokugawa period, the historical fact is that Christian thought was not cast out by other thought, but by the use of state violence and terror. Most anti-Christian thought emerged well after Christian thought had already been suppressed.

Interestingly, while the vision of the role of Confucianism in Tokugawa society presented in *The Philosophy of Japan’s Zhu Xi School*, and of course tennosei as an ideology, was displaced in mid-twentieth century scholarship, the image of the historic role of anti-Christian thought during the early Tokugawa period as presented in this discourse has remained unchallenged until today. Scholars still almost universally accept the history of sectarian thought in early Tokugawa Japan as a “Japanese reaction” to “foreign thought”, which saw it off or saw it “destroyed.” Yet these sectarian writings generally emerged after Christianity had been suppressed. Also, they were generally attacking heterodox ideas, labeled Christian, which were usually not foreign, nor indeed Christian. It can thereby be seen that not only was the process of reconstruction of early Tokugawa history in the nineteenth century highly politicized, but that reconstruction was itself based on a previous politically loaded historical construction.

Inoue’s representation of the intellectual history of Tokugawa Japan in *The Philosophy of Japan’s Zhu Xi School* became the standard view of the role of Confucianism in Tokugawa society and indeed of the ideological nature of the Tokugawa state until it was refuted in the 1960s, 70s and 80s. But his view on Razan’s approach to Christianity and indeed of the existence of a general conflict between Christian thought and “Eastern thought” in the early Tokugawa period is still generally accepted. I would argue that this is due to the pervasiveness of
representations of the role of anti-Christian discourse presented in the compiled
texts of the 1850s and 60s. Nearly every modern history of Tokugawa anti-Christian
discourse has focused on texts contained in Sokkyohen. This is what has fed the
picture of anti-Christian discourse as the Japanese side in a “clash of ideas” with
Christianity.

The creation of modern ideology in Japan has attracted much attention in
recent times. This is in part because the process by which modern ideology emerged
in Japan seems to fit neatly into recent theories which point out how the “invention
of tradition” is used to create a sense of national identity. To understand the
“invention of tradition” or more pertinently the invention of modern nationalist
historical paradigms of “tradition”, “thought” and “religion”, however, it is necessary
not only to look at the modern process of this construction, but of the historical
processes underlying the pre-modern (in this case sectarian) discourses upon which
they rest. This is why rather than simply rehashing arguments about the process of
“modernization”, this article has tried to bring out the concrete links between the
modern and Tokugawa political constructions of Confucian anti-Christian discourse.

While showing how anti-Christian discourse became enmeshed in modern
imperial Japanese ideology through a number of events which occurred during the
Meiji period, this article has also argued that the way that anti-Christian discourse
interacted with modern state ideology was heavily affected by political uses of anti-
Christian discourse in the early Tokugawa period and historical narratives of anti-
Christian discourse from the late Tokugawa period.

Interestingly, it is these elements of Confucian anti-Christian discourse
originated in the Tokugawa period (for instance the portrayal of Christianity as
“foreign” and Confucianism as “indigenous”) which have been most resistant to
revisions in history writing through the later twentieth century. Transcending the
powerful historical narrative of this discourse requires attention to the way that
Tokugawa anti-Christian discourse operated in its own political context. This article
has paid a degree of attention to that issue to the extent necessary to demonstrate
the role of Tokugawa anti-Christian discourse in Meiji ideology construction. A
more thorough explanation of the political utilization of anti-Christian discourse in
the Tokugawa period itself is another necessary area of enquiry currently enjoying
a resurgence of interest and dealt with by this author in separate publications.

91 “The spirit which engendered Tokugawa Japan also bore the fruit which poisoned it, but in
the clash of principles with Christianity it was victorious,” Elison 1991:253.
92 For more on the use of anti-Christian discourse to attack non-Christian, often Yang-ming
Confucian opponents, see Paramore 2006:90-150.
94 For English publication, please refer Hur 2007, Paramore 2009 and also the recent “Christians
Kurozumi Makoto 2006.
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